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  Chapter 1 
 
 Introduction and research questions 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Social class has been a leading interest of sociologists for decades. By studying social class, 
sociologists can identify societies as open or closed (Goldthorpe, 1980; Ganzeboom, Luijkx & 
Treiman, 1989; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Breen, 2004). It is furthermore a useful concept 
in explaining political orientation (Lipset, (1980 [1960]; Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Nieuwbeerta & 
De Graaf, 1999) income, education and health (Wright, 1985; Heath, Jowell & Curtice, 1985; 
Weenink, 2005). However, from the late 1980s, the relevance of social class in sociological 
enquiry has come into question. Some have announced its ‘death’ (Pakulski & Waters, 1996a) 
whereas others have declared the emergence of new class cleavages within the middle class 
(Bruce-Briggs, 1979; Brint, 1984; Lamont, 1987; Kriesi, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 1993; De 
Graaf & Steijn, 1997). Meanwhile, western societies have experienced changes in their 
employment and social class structures. On the one hand, since 1960 the proportion of the 
semi- and unskilled workers has decreased while, on the other hand, the proportion of the 
middle class has increased enormously.  
This study answers the question of whether new classes have emerged in post-
industrial societies. New class theories (Bruce-Briggs, 1979; Brint, 1984; Lamont, 1987; 
Kriesi, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 1993; De Graaf & Steijn, 1997) claim the ‘birth’ of new 
classes within the service class. Following these theories, we subdivide the service class1 of 
the EGP class schema - initially constructed by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1979) - 
into two ‘old’ classes of technocrats and two ‘new’ classes of social and cultural specialists. 
Then we test the empirical validity of this subdivision. In this chapter, we first introduce the 
discussion over the relevance of social classes in contemporary societies and we describe the 
research program of our class analysis. Furthermore, we elaborate on changes in the 
employment and class structures in advanced western economies. Subsequently, new class 
theories that help us to subdivide the service class are described. We also frame our 
subdivision of the service class. Finally, we present our research problem and questions in 
detail.  
 
 
1.2 The lingering importance of social class 
 
Lipset (1981 [1960]) showed the significance of social class for voting behaviour in his 
classical work Political Man. More recently, sociologists have argued that social classes are 
                                                 
1 The terms ‘middle class’ and ‘service class’ are practically synonymous. In this study, we therefore use these 
words interchangeably.  
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‘dying’ (Clark & Lipset, 1991; Pahl, 1989, 1991; Holton & Turner, 1989; Pakulski & Waters, 
1996a. 1996b) whilst others have claimed that new social classes are emerging (Kriesi, 1989; 
Esping-Andersen, 1993; De Graaf & Steijn, 1997). A third group has presented a new 
research agenda for class analysis by claiming that the traditional class categories have 
become too aggregated to represent existing class cleavages (Sorensen, 2000; Grusky & 
Weeden, 2001; Scott, 2001).  
 Three decades after the publication of Political Man, researchers have concluded that 
social class has lost its importance in explaining political behaviour in contemporary western 
societies (Clark & Lipset, 1991; Clark, Lipset & Rempel, 1993). These researchers used the 
Alford index (Alford, 1962), the difference between the percentages of manual and non-
manual workers that vote for leftist parties, to reach their conclusion. Some have criticized the 
Alford index as too simplistic to measure class-based voting accurately (Heath, Jowell & 
Curtice, 1985; Nieuwbeerta, 1995; De Graaf & Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Manza & Brooks, 1996, 
1999; Evans, 2000), since it only includes two classes and a two-party dichotomy. This index 
does also not accurately take into account possible changes in the general popularity of, for 
example, the leftist parties and thus is unable to capture a hypothesised class-based decline. 
Using the EGP class schema, which contains seven different social classes, and applying 
more sophisticated research methods, Nieuwbeerta (1995) and Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 
(1999) found a decline in class-based voting in western societies in the post-war period. 
Brooks and Manza (1997) also used these sophisticated research methods and distinguished 
six social classes to analyse the influence of social class on voting behaviour. They showed 
that since 1960 social class has not lost importance in explaining voting behaviour in the 
United States (although in the U.S. class-based voting has never been strong). It is clear that 
even the use of sophisticated methods cannot establish a consensus as to whether class-based 
voting is declining.  
The debate on whether social class does indeed represent significant cleavages in 
affluent western societies acquired a new dimension with Inglehart’s thesis (1977, 1990, 
1997). Inglehart asserted that social class has lost its significance in affluent western societies, 
since social class is engendered by income inequalities which are less pressing in those 
societies. Hence, according to Inglehart, the more salient social divisions in affluent societies 
are those between people with different value priorities, i.e. materialists versus post-
materialists. The post-materialists are a relatively new and well-educated social category 
(Inglehart, 1990) that is prevalent in the higher social strata. Inglehart does not refer to this 
social category as a social class. However, in our view this relatively new social category 
forms a separate social class within the service class. Before elaborating on this point, we 
delineate our research program of class analysis in the next section.  
 
 
1.3 A research program of class analysis 
 
There is much confusion about what constitutes a social class (Breen & Rottman, 1995; 
Pakulski & Waters, 1996a). This confusion has partly engendered the discussions about the 
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‘death’ of social class as a concept. To avoid misunderstandings, Goldthorpe and Marshal 
(1992) have delineated a research program of class analysis and condemn the liberal and 
orthodox Marxist approaches which link class with world history and community formation. 
According to Goldthorpe and Marshall (1992), the liberal standpoint claims that class 
inequalities are conducive to the greater welfare of all. Orthodox Marxist sociologists 
perceive social classes as the most important source of all social inequalities. Proponents of 
this kind of class analysis claim that class conflict is the engine of social change. Goldthorpe 
and Marshall (1992) assert that ‘class analysis does not entail a commitment to any particular 
theory of class but, rather, to a research program within which different, and indeed rival, 
theories may be formulated and assessed in terms of their heuristic and explanatory 
performance’ (1992: 382, [italics in original]).   
In the research program of class analysis, classes are understood as ‘historically 
formed macro-social structures’ (Goldthorpe & Marshall 1992: 382) that allow one to use a 
few well-defined concepts such as class position, class origin and class (im)mobility in order 
to understand important social processes. This research program inspires this study. 
According to Goldthorpe and Marshall, class analysis as a research program explores ‘the 
interconnection between positions defined by employment relations in labour markets and 
production units in different sectors of national economies; the processes through which 
individuals and families are distributed and redistributed among these positions over time; 
and the consequences thereof for their life-chances and for the social identities that they 
adopt and the social values and interest that they pursue’ (1992: 382).  
In this formulation, classes are theorized according to occupational structure. Sorensen 
(1991) defines classes as ‘sets of structural positions. Social relationships within markets, 
especially within labour markets and within firms, define these positions. Class positions exist 
independently of individual occupants of these positions. They are “empty places”’ (1991: 
72). This definition of class is the starting point for class analysis and ‘the importance of class 
stems from its linking individuals and households to the economic order of production’ 
(Breen & Rottman, 1995: 456).  
There are two well-known class schemata. One, the EGP class schema, is associated 
with Goldthorpe and his colleagues, and represents a non-Marxist classification. The other is 
associated with Erik Olin Wright (1985, 1989, 1997). The EGP class schema will be 
introduced in the next chapter. Wright’s class conception was initially based on the orthodox 
Marxist class approach described by Marshall, Newby, Rose and Vogler (1988). Wright 
(1989, 1997) retheorised his class concept according to a principal assets model. That is to 
say, his neo-Marxist definition of social classes draws a distinction between the principles of 
organizational assets and credentialised skills. As Rose and Marshall (1989: 246) put it, ‘at 
this level neo-Marxist and non-Marxist class analysis share many features in common and 
hence debates have become more fruitful between them’. Wright (1997) acknowledges that 
the middle class of his class schema and the service class of the EGP class schema are 
practically the same. In this study, we use theories underlying these two schemata, especially 
theories about the middle class (i.e. the service class).  
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Goldthorpe and Marshall (1992) criticized the idea that the social classes are ‘dying’ 
and sketched the promising future of class analysis. Crompton (1991) claimed that classes are 
still viable and class schemata are worth preserving, though they need adjustment. In a similar 
vein, Esping-Andersen (1993) and De Graaf and Steijn (1997) asserted that the industrial 
employment structure is evolving into a post-industrial employment structure. Therefore, 
existing class schemata, which are based on the industrial employment structure, need to be 
retooled to account for changes in the employment and class structures. This study is not only 
an answer to these calls to modify class schemata, but also investigates the extent to which the 
rise of a new class is a gradual process.  
 
 
1.4 Changes in the employment and class structures  
 
The discussions about the relevance of social classes in post-industrial societies have been 
partly influenced by changes in the employment and class structures. Bell (1971) has argued 
that since the 1960s the employment structure in most advanced economies has been 
transforming from the primary (agriculture and mining) and secondary (industry and 
transport) sectors to the tertiary (service sector) as part of the transition from industrial to 
post-industrial societies. He claimed that this process would culminate in a society that is 
highly dependent on a knowledge- and quality-based service sector. The service employment 
in advanced economies has continued to grow since the 1960s, approaching three-quarters of 
all jobs in the late 1990s (Elfring 1988, 1989 and 1992; OECD Employment Outlook 2000). 
In France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, the average share of the service-sector in total employment increased from 46 percent 
in 1960 to 68 percent in 1998 (Elfring 1988, 1989 and 1992; OECD Employment Outlook 
2000).  
The Netherlands, the country on which this study mainly focuses, has also seen vast 
changes in its employment structure. According to Asselberghs, Bottenburg, Huigen, De 
Witte (1998), the Netherlands has undergone a substantial shift in employment from 
agriculture and industry to the service sector since 1960. Between 1960 and 1994 the share of 
industrial employment fell from 33 percent to 18 percent, while employment in the 
commercial service sector rose from 21 to 30 percent and employment in other service sectors 
increased from 19 to 34 percent.  
The social class structure is based on the employment structure. Therefore, changes in 
the employment structure have had consequences for the class structure. According to figures 
provided by Ganzeboom and Luijkx (2004), the proportion of men in the service class – the 
high- and low-grade professionals and managers in the EGP class schema - increased from 31 
percent in 1970 to 50 percent in 1999, implying that today the majority of the employed male 
population works in the service class. However, the proportion of men in the classes of semi-
skilled, unskilled and agricultural workers decreased, from 40 percent in 1970 to 32 percent in 
1999, mainly as a result of mechanization and computerization. Similar figures are shown by 
Breen and Luijkx (2004) for Britain, the second country we examine in this study, and for 
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other European societies. The percentage of men employed in Britain’s service class increased 
from 31 percent in 1970s to 42 percent in 1990s while the percentage of men in the ranks of 
semi-skilled, unskilled and agricultural workers decreased from 53 percent to 39 percent 
within the same period.  
These results show that the service class comprises more than half of the employed 
population in the Netherlands and almost the half of it in Britain. Similar results are shown for 
other advanced societies (Breen & Luijkx, 2004). This fact raises the question of whether the 
service class is a homogeneous class, or whether it is engendering new class divisions.  
 
 
1.5 The need to revise the EGP class schema 
 
In a fictive perfect open society, there is no association between parents’ class (origin class) 
and children’s class (destination class); in a closed society this association in strong. To reveal 
whether a society will be more open or closed, sociologists use, among other instruments, 
intergenerational class mobility tables. A comparison within and between ten European 
countries and Israel showed that between 1970 and 2000, relative social mobility among 
social classes increased in all countries, except in Britain and Germany (Breen & Luijkx, 
2004). The EGP class schema has proved to be a good instrument to make these kinds of 
comparisons (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Ganzeboom, Luijkx & Treiman, 1989, 
Ganzeboom & Luijkx, 1995; Breen, 2004). The EGP class schema replaced a schema that 
distinguished only between manual and non-manual workers. The old classifications were too 
aggregated to capture existing social class cleavages in industrial societies. Therefore the 
differences in political orientation and social inequalities could not be adequately explained. 
In particular, self-employed people and routine non-manual employees were not represented 
in the classical schema.  
The use of more detailed schemata resulted in new conclusions about, for example, the 
political consequences of social inequalities. Using the manual/non-manual workers 
classification, one concludes that class-based voting is decreasing in many societies 
(Inglehart, 1990) while in Britain there is no such decrease if one uses the more detailed EGP 
class schema (Heath, Evans & Payne, 1995). The question still remains of whether a class 
schema that represents the social class cleavages within industrial societies accurately reflects 
the social classes of post-industrial societies. Comparing 16 countries between 1956 and 
1990, Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf (1999) showed that, even if one uses the EGP class schema, 
class-based voting is decreasing.  
Social class is often linked to political preferences and social action (Lipset, 1981 
[1960]; Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Kriesi, 1989; Cotgrove & Duff, 1981). Furthermore, social class 
is related to educational outcomes (Weenink, 2005; Goldthorpe, 2000; Heath & Clifford, 
1990; Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer & Platt, 1969), earnings (Wright, 1985; Heath, 
Jowell & Curtice, 1985), housing (Savage, Barlow, Dickens & Fielding, 1992; Heath et al., 
1985), and a variety of other lifestyle forms (Bourdieu, 1984; Bruce-Biggs, 1979; Heath, 
Jowell & Curtice, 1985; De Swaan, 1985; Ganzeboom, De Graaf & Kalmijn, 1987; Heath, 
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Curtice, Jowell, Evans, Field & Witherspoon, 1991; De Graaf & Kalmijn, 1995; De Graaf & 
Steijn, 1997). More recently, scholars came to new insights by disaggregating the 
conventional classes. On the one hand, Gerber and Hout (2004) gained a better understanding 
of social mobility patterns of former communist societies by disaggregating the service class 
of the EGP class schema into a class of professionals and a class of managers. On the other 
hand, De Graaf and Steijn (1997) suggest distinguishing social and cultural specialists from 
controllers within the service class.  
Many theories have identified new class cleavages within the middle class (Bruce-
Briggs, 1979; Brint, 1984; Lamont, 1987; Kriesi, 1989; De Graaf & Steijn, 1997) and that 
existing class schemata should be adjusted (Esping-Andersen, 1993; De Graaf & Steijn, 1997; 
Grusky & Sorensen, 2001). Social classes might be still important but we need to 
conceptualise and delineate the social classes and class schemata in such a way that accurately 
catches the new social class cleavages. This is the starting point of this dissertation. In the 
next section, we elaborate on theories that claim that new classes have emerged within the 
service class.  
 
 
1.6 New classes within the service class 
 
Several researchers have delineated the emergence of new social classes within the service 
class. Some of these attempts are the new class theories (Bruce-Briggs, 1979; Brint, 1984; 
Lamont, 1987; Kriesi, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 1993; De Graaf & Steijn, 1997). According to 
these theories, the middle class can be divided into a ‘new’ class of knowledge workers, and 
an ‘old’ class of industrialists, managers and business owners. Bruce-Briggs (1979) claims 
that there is a struggle for power and status between these two classes.  
 Views differ on how to conceptualise the ‘new’ classes. Brint (1984) uses several 
conceptualisations to explain liberal attitudes of the middle class members in USA and 
concludes that educational differences within the middle class explain most of the variation 
between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ classes. Lamont (1987), in contrast, claims that their common 
class interests explain the progressive attitudes of cultural capital workers. According to 
Lamont (1987), these common class interests are to maintain and increase the autonomy of 
the cultural capital workers, to create a powerful public sector, raise taxes and support 
political ideologies regarding ‘non-material issues’ like post-materialism, environmentalism 
and the new left.  
Esping-Andersen (1993) claims that industrial labour markets are evolving into post-
industrial labour markets and new class schemata should replace the class schemata that are 
based on the industrial division of labour. He observes that the most frequently used social 
class schemata, like the EGP, do not represent the social class structure of post-industrial 
societies. According to Esping-Andersen (1993), a differentiation should be made between an 
industrial (fordist) and a post-industrial (post-fordist) division of labour. Managers within the 
middle class “reflect a fordist logic of the division of labour” whereas the professionals reveal 
a post-fordist logic (Esping-Andersen, 1993: 13). Esping-Andersen presents a completely new 
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and more complicated class schema (De Graaf & Steijn 1997). It is interesting to note that 
Esping-Andersen considers managers as ‘old’ and professionals as ‘new’ class and placed 
them into different classes. “Autonomy, human capital assets and the trust relationship are 
important attributes that unite the ‘new class’”, according to Esping-Andersen (1993: 13). He 
distinguished four industrial classes: 1) managers and proprietors, 2) clerical, administrative 
and sales workers, 3) skilled manual workers, 4) semi- and unskilled manual production 
workers. In addition, he identified four post-industrial classes: 1) professionals and scientists, 
2) technicians and semi-professionals, 3) skilled service workers, 4) unskilled service 
workers.  
In accordance with Lamont, Kriesi (1989) builds on the ‘new class’ concept, which he 
uses to explain support for new social movements2 in the Netherlands. Kriesi distinguished 
technocrats and specialists as the two main classes. His classification is similar to that of 
Esping-Andersen (1993). Kriesi (1989) argues that there is “a basic antagonism of interest” 
between technocrats and specialists. Technocrats are supposed to preserve the integrity of 
their organization, whilst the social and cultural specialists are expected to act within the body 
of knowledge of their discipline. The social and cultural specialists represent the ‘new’ class, 
and are likely to support the new social movements because “the specialists try to defend their 
own and their clients’ relative autonomy” against the intervention of the controllers (Kriesi, 
1989: 1085-86).  
Two other theories shed additional light on the class structure of the post-industrial 
societies. One is the materialism and post-materialism thesis of Inglehart (1990) on the value 
shift in affluent societies. In the first theory, the value priorities of materialists and post-
materialists are based on their needs, with materialists focusing on material goods and post-
materialists more interested in quality of life issues. Both choose their occupation according 
to their needs and priorities. Thus, the occupations chosen by members of the service class 
correspond with these two dimensions of materialism and post-materialism. While 
materialists are likely to choose occupations that enable them to satisfy their material needs, 
people who have already satisfied those needs will choose occupations that enable them to 
address quality of life issues and realise their aesthetic desires. Cotgrove and Duff’s (1981) 
study imply that post-materialists are more common in social and cultural occupations while 
materialists are concentrated in the managerial and technocratic occupations.  
The second theory is Bourdieu’s thesis of economic and cultural capital. The two 
value dimensions discussed by Inglehart resemble Bourdieu’s (1984) distinction between 
economic and cultural elites (De Graaf & De Graaf, 1988). According to Bourdieu, all 
lifestyle forms, like cultural participation, consumption patterns, aesthetic priorities and 
political attitudes, can be thought of as the ‘social codes’ of social groups. Members of social 
groups use their economic or cultural capital to exclude outsiders from their privileged 
circumstances so as to preserve the status of their group. Bourdieu uses occupational positions 
to describe a person’s economic or cultural status (Ganzeboom, et al., 1987). He uses two 
                                                 
2 Among these new social movements are the ecology movement, the peace movement, the anti-nuclear 
movement, the women’s movement and the squatters’ movement. 
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occupational ladders to depict these two dimensions. Occupations with a low social status, 
like unskilled work, score low on both ladders, while specific high social status occupations 
score high only on the cultural ladder; other high social status occupations score only on the 
economic ladder. Occupations in education, health care and social services score high in 
cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984) and constitute the ‘new’ class of the post-industrial society 
(De Swaan, 1985). Occupations with a relatively high score in economic capital are those of 
the ‘old’ middle class, like economists, engineers, managers and proprietors. 
Grusky and Weeden (2001) offer a new social class agenda. They claim that some 
scholars have announced the death of classes because they are using a wrong class concept. 
Existing social class concepts use overly aggregated occupational groupings and disguise 
important differences on the disaggregated levels such those among carpenters, teachers, 
dishwashers, and so on. Class effects are found at the more disaggregated level of 
occupational groupings, where the associated closure devices, e.g. credentials, licences, 
unions, private property, operate. More recently, Weeden and Grusky (2005) designed a 126-
category schema that supposes to represent the classes in the US. Their schema separates 
‘physicians and dentists’ from ‘other health professionals’. It is unclear what criteria they use 
to treat these occupational groups as single classes since these groups can hardly be 
differentiated due to their closure devices. Furthermore, the complexity of this class schema 
makes it very difficult to use. We support the idea that social classes, especially the middle 
class, are too aggregated. However, Weeden and Grusky (2005) disaggregated social classes 
to such an extent that they are scarcely identifiable as classes.  
 
 
1.7 Reclassifying service class: Social and cultural specialists versus technocrats 
 
In the previous section, we set forth the theories and studies that deal with new social 
cleavages. These cleavages represent the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ social classes. In our 
understanding, the different conceptualisations of social class cleavages represent the same 
phenomenon within the service class and therefore these theories will help us to adjust the 
service class of the EGP class schema. In this study, we distinguish the fractions within the 
service class and validate their ability to constitute separate social classes. For this 
adjustment, we use the EGP class schema because it has been frequently used in sociological 
and political studies on inter- and intragenerational social mobility, voting behaviour and 
lifestyle forms (Dronkers & Ultee, 1995; Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Breen, 2004).  
The validation of our EGP class schema will be based on the Dutch employment and 
class structures. The Netherlands, one of the largest welfare states in the world, has 
experienced rapid changes in its employment and class structures (Cox, 1993; De Swaan, 
1989). As a result, the ranks of people employed in the country’s public sector have expanded 
enormously (SCP, 1998; Pierson, 1991, 1996). The growth of the public sector is important 
for our adjustment of the EGP class schema because that sector employs most of the 
incumbents in one of the two fractions in the service class of this schema. Additionally, we 
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validate our subdivision of the service class in Britain because the EGP class schema was 
initially developed for Britain (Goldthorpe, 1980).  
The service class of the EGP class schema consists of high-grade professionals and 
managers (I) and low-grade professionals and managers (II). We make a distinction between a 
‘new’ class of social and cultural specialists and an ‘old’ class of technocrats within the 
service class of the EGP class schema, both with a higher and a lower version3. We 
distinguish these fractions on the basis of employment relations that are also the underlying 
theoretical basis of the EGP class schema. This adjustment of the service class of the EGP 
class schema is based on the study of De Graaf and Steijn (1997).  
We use two criteria to distinguish the social and cultural specialists from the 
technocrats: difficulty in monitoring the work performance by the employer and social-
cultural skills needed to perform the work tasks well. Our classification of the service class is 
explained in detail in the next chapter. In short, we claim that social and cultural specialists 
are more difficult to control than technocrats since their jobs require specialised knowledge. 
In this way, social and cultural specialists gain more autonomy on their own domain of 
specialisation. Furthermore, we distinguish social and cultural specialists whose basic tasks 
are based on social-cultural knowledge and skills that are needed to deliver social services. 
The class of technocrats consists of people like managers, accountants, engineers, and 
computer specialists. The class of social and cultural specialists combines teachers, medical 
doctors, psychologists, jurists, and religious workers. These kinds of jobs are usually not 
instrumental for profit-maximization since their productivity is inevitably lower than other 
jobs (Baumol, 1967; Bell, 1971). According to Cotgrove and Duff (1980), middle-class 
radicalism is an expression of the interest of those whose class position in the non-productive 
sector locates them at the periphery of the institutions and processes of the capitalist societies.  
 
 
1.8 Research questions 
 
This study will examine the social classes within the service class in order to discover 
whether or not they capture the class cleavages within post-industrial societies and whether 
they predict outcomes in theoretically prescribed ways. Criterion validation and construct 
validation will enable us to reach these conclusions.  
 
1.8.1 Question related to criterion validity  
Criterion-related validity measures the underlying concept of a measurement tool (Carmines 
& Zeller, 1980; Evans, 1992, 1996; Evans & Mills, 1998; Evans & Mills, 2000), in this case 
the social class. The fractions within the service class are differentiated on the basis of 
employment relations. Occupational characteristics are proxies for these relations. Using job 
                                                 
3 By considering the fractions of the social and cultural specialists as the ‘new’ classes and the technocratic 
fractions as the ‘old’ classes we rely on new class theories. In this sense, the technocratic fractions are regarded 
as the classes that stem from the industrial societies. The fractions of the social and cultural specialists emerged 
in the post-industrial society.  
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characteristics, we reveal whether the newly distinguished social classes within the service 
class represent the underlying criteria. Thus, criterion validity measures whether or not the 
newly distinguished social classes divide the occupational structure in a way that exposes 
important cleavages in the job characteristics that we regard as theoretically essential for the 
distinction of social and cultural specialists from technocrats. Therefore, the first research 
question is: 
 
1. To what extent do the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists represent the 
underlying criteria that distinguish them?  
 
If our findings show that the newly distinguished social classes represent the underlying 
criteria, we will test the construct validity of those social classes.  
 
1.8.2 Questions related to construct validity 
Once we have validated the measurement tool, we can test the construct validity of the newly 
distinguished social classes within the service class. Construct validation involves whether a 
measurement tool correctly predicts outcomes of a theoretically linked variable (Evans, 1992, 
1996). That is to say, if a theory predicts that class is related to voting behaviour, the newly 
distinguished social classes are expected to explain a reasonable part of individual differences 
in voting behaviour. When there is a strong link between the newly distinguished social 
classes and voting behaviour and other theoretically linked variables, we could conclude that 
the construct of those social classes is valid. Furthermore, several theories will be formulated 
to test the construct validity of these social classes. 
 
Inter- and intragenerational mobility patterns 
According to Weber (1978 [1922]) mobility might be used as a criterion to determine inter- 
and intragenerational class boundaries. Classes exist when its members share a common 
market and work conditions as the decisive basis for their life chances (Weber, 1978 [1922]). 
Following Weber, Goldthorpe and his colleagues (Goldthorpe, 1980; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 
1992; Goldthorpe, 2000) have claimed that social class does not exist in the absence of 
considerable inter- and intragenerational reproduction of class membership. Thus the newly 
distinguished classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats and the high- and low-grade 
social and cultural specialists are expected to exhibit typical inter- and intragenerational 
mobility patterns. Therefore, our second and third research questions read:  
 
2. To what extent do the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists constitute distinct 
classes with regard to their intergenerational mobility patterns?  
 
3. To what extent do the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists constitute distinct 
classes with regard to their intragenerational mobility patterns?  
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Inter- and intragenerational mobility patterns over time 
It takes time for new classes to form their intergenerational and intragenerational mobility 
patterns. That is to say, if a social class is assumed to be a ‘new’ social class it needs time to 
crystallise its life chances (Goldthorpe, 1980, 1982, 1995, 2000). Goldthorpe (1980, 1995) 
asserts that a social class goes through a process of organising its class interest and forming its 
‘demographic identity’ (Goldthorpe, 1980, 1995; Mayer & Carroll, 1987; Carroll & Mayer, 
1986; Kurz & Müller, 1987). The demographic identity of classes involves collective social 
action that reflects the interests of its members. For example, members of the service class try 
to pass their class position to their offspring in order to prevent downward mobility. The 
social reproduction of the class position of the ‘new’ classes of the high- and low-grade social 
and cultural specialists is therefore expected to increase over time. With regard to their 
intragenerational class mobility patterns, the ‘new’ classes are expected to have manifest class 
boundaries in order to ensure intra-class loyalty, and, to a certain extent, this intra-class 
loyalty determines the collective social action of its members. Therefore, we ask:  
 
4. To what extent have the intergenerational mobility boundaries of the social and cultural 
specialists become more closed over time? 
 
5. To what extent have the intragenerational mobility boundaries of the social and cultural 
specialists become more closed over time? 
 
Social class, lifestyles and attitudes 
Marshall, Newby, Rose and Vogler (1988) claim that the concept of class is relevant when it 
explains differences in collective social action, lifestyle forms and attitudes. Savage (1991) 
showed that in Britain professionals vote more than managers do for left-wing political 
parties. De Graaf and Steijn (1997) showed that in the Netherlands social and cultural 
specialists vote significantly more for left-wing political parties, have less income, read more 
serious literature and watch more serious television programs than other classes within the 
service class. The question arises whether the technocrats and the social cultural specialists 
can explain differences in people’s social-political, cultural and economic preferences and 
behaviour. We analyse the relation between the newly distinguished classes and a variety of 
lifestyles and attitudes. Moreover, we reveal whether these newly distinguished social classes 
differ in their social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour. Social-
political preferences and behaviour involve voting behaviour, subjective class identification, 
attitudes towards ethnic minorities and gender-role attitudes. Cultural preferences and 
behaviour entail reading literature, visiting museums, attending operas and classical concerts, 
and collecting modern art.  Economic preferences and behaviour consist of income, part-time 
work, classical art and antique possession. Our sixth question reads: 
 
6. To what extent do the social and cultural specialists differ from the technocrats in their 
social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour?   
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Social class or education 
Baer and Lambert (1992) argue that people’s education shapes attitudes, political preferences 
and lifestyle forms. The level of education and the field of study have been frequently 
investigated for this purpose (Crotty, 1967; Guimond, Begin & Palmer, 1989; Van de 
Werfhorst, 2001). As an example of the effect of field of education on attitudes, Guimond, 
Begin and Palmer (1989) showed that social science students in Quebec City are less likely 
than students in science or administration to blame the unemployed for their plight. Brint 
(1984) compared conceptualisations of social classes within the service class and concluded 
that they are related to the level of education. However, Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf 
(2004) showed that in the Netherlands, social and cultural specialists vote significantly more 
for left-wing political parties than technocrats even if their level and field of study is taken 
into consideration. Therefore, one might ask whether these differences in social-political, 
cultural and economic preferences and behaviour are related to social classes or to field of 
study. These differences can also be attributable to individual and background factors that 
precede class position or education. Therefore, our next research question is:  
 
7. To what extent do the social and cultural specialists differ from the technocrats in their 
social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour, when the field of study, the 
level of education and other individual and background factors are taken into consideration? 
 
Political orientation over time 
Social classes form a demographic identity that protects and promotes their class interest 
(Goldthorpe, 2000, 1980). Goldthorpe (1982, 1995) claims that the service class is still in 
formation and when it consolidates, it will become a conservative social element. Members of 
the service class hold the most privileged occupations, so they are unlikely to support 
egalitarian values or politics. Instead, they are more likely to defend the status quo. However, 
using data from 1948-1992, Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995) showed that in the United States 
of America that professionals voted for Republicans from 1948 until the 1960s and then 
shifted their votes to Democrats, while managers voted for the Republican candidates 
throughout the period. We know that the service class is far from conservative (Van de 
Werfhorst & De Graaf 2004; Savage, 1991: Hout et al., 1995). It is therefore useful to reveal 
whether the ‘new’ social classes of the high- and low- grade social and cultural specialists 
organise their political interests over time. Does the service class become more conservative, 
as Goldthorpe (2000) claims or are there progressive elements within the service class, as 
others like Savage (1991) argue? The answer depends on whether the social and cultural 
specialists within the service class form indeed a ‘new’ class and crystallise their political 
interest over time. Therefore: 
 
8. To what extent do the ‘new’ social classes of the social and cultural specialists become 
more effective over time in explaining differences in people’s political orientation? 
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After answering these questions, we can learn whether the subdivision of the service class has 
been satisfactorily validated. Whether the newly distinguished classes construct social classes 
in their own right depends on the answers.  
 
 
1.9 Outline of this study 
 
The outline of this study is as follows. In Chapter 2, we classify the fractions within the 
service class of the EGP class schema. In that chapter we discuss the criteria we use to 
reclassify the service class. Subsequently, we use expert knowledge to allocate occupations 
within the service class. Finally, using job characteristics, the criterion validity of our 
classification is being tested with British and Dutch data. This chapter provides the answer to 
our first research question.  
In Chapters 3 and 4, we discuss intergenerational and intragenerational class mobility 
in the Netherlands. In Chapter 3, we use homogeneity criteria to discover whether these newly 
distinguished social classes have specific intergenerational (im)mobility patterns. In that 
chapter we also investigate whether the social and cultural specialists become more 
intergenerationally immobile over time. Chapter 3 answers our second and fourth research 
questions. In Chapter 4, we look at the career class (im)mobility of the social and cultural 
specialists and the technocrats. Immobility patterns of the newly distinguished social classes 
and the over time development of these patterns are studied by using log linear models. 
Chapter 4 answers our third and fifth research questions.  
In Chapter 5, we investigate whether the newly distinguished social classes differ in 
their social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour. This chapter tests also 
whether the differences between the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats are 
related to social class or education. Chapter 5 answers our sixth and seventh research 
questions. Chapter 6 compares the adjusted and the standard EGP class schemata regarding 
their ability to explain political orientation. This chapter also answers whether the social and 
cultural specialists differ from the technocrats regarding class-based voting in Britain. For the 
Netherlands, this question is already answered in Chapter 5. However, Chapter 6 mainly 
concentrates on the development of social and cultural specialists’ and the technocrats’ 
political orientation using Dutch data between 1970 and 2004 and British data between 1964 
and 2001. Chapter 6 answers our eighth research question. In Chapter 7, we present and 
discuss our finding 
  
  
Chapter 2 
 
Classifying and validating the subdivision of the service class 
The Netherlands and Britain 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 1, we set forth the theories and studies of new class cleavages within the middle 
class. New class theories claim that the middle class is fragmented between professionals, 
highly qualified knowledge workers and managers, administrators and technical specialists. 
We also introduced a method of subdividing the service class. In this chapter, we argue the 
adjustment of the service class of the EGP class schema, devised by Erikson, Goldthorpe and 
Portocarero (EGP) (1979)1 by incorporating the theories described in Chapter 1. The EGP 
class schema has been extensively used in revealing inter- and intragenerational social 
mobility patterns and in explaining political orientation and variety of other lifestyle forms. 
Evans (1992, 1996) and Evans and Mills (1998, 2000) have repeatedly tested the criterion 
validity of this schema. In this chapter, we adjust the service class of the EGP class schema 
using expert’s knowledge. Subsequently, we test the criterion-related validity of the obtained 
subdivision of the service class using Dutch and British data.   
 
 
2.2 The EGP class schema 
 
Inspired by Marx and Weber, Goldthorpe and his colleagues (2000, Erikson and Goldthorpe, 
1992) recently defined the structure of the social classes in industrial societies in terms of 
employment relations. The theoretical framing of the EGP class schema has undergone three 
stages. In the first stage the schema was based on an ad hoc classification (Erikson, 
Goldthorpe & Portocarero, 1979). In the second stage, Goldthorpe (1980, 1987) distinguished 
social classes according to market and work situations. The market situation of class members 
involves the members’ income, amount of economic security and life chances. Class positions 
refer to occupations’ location within systems of authority and control in the production 
process (Goldthorpe, 1980). Occupations that share a common market and work situations 
constitute social classes. In the last stage, Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) have provided a 
different set of criteria for the same EGP class schema. In this study, we focus on these 
criteria in the last stage. Erikson and Goldthorpe described the aim of the EGP class schema 
as ‘to differentiate positions within the labour markets and production units or, more 
specifically …to differentiate such positions in terms of the employment relations that they 
entail’ (1992: 37). Goldthorpe (2000) crystallised employment relations as a theoretical basis 
                                                 
1 This schema is known as the EGP class schema (Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero), Goldthorpe-schema, 
Erikson-Goldthorpe schema and CASMIN schema. In this study, we use the term EGP class schema.   
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for the social classes of the schema. Table 2.1 presents the classes and their structure within 
the EGP class schema. 
 
Table 2.1: The EGP class schema, higher-lower order of classes, class name, some examples of 
occupations within these classes and the forms of regulations of employments 
Higher-lower 
ordering 
EGP Class name Occupations 
Forms of regulation of 
employment 
I 
High-grade 
managers and 
professionals  
Administrators and officials; managers in 
large industrial establishments, large 
proprietors and professionals.  
Service relationship  
Service class  
II 
Low-grade 
managers and 
professionals 
Administrators and officials; managers in 
small business and industrial 
establishment, supervisors of non-manual 
employees, higher-grade technicians, 
lower-grade professionals 
Service relationship 
IIIa 
Routine non-
manual workers 
Routine non-manual employees in 
administration and commerce, rank and 
file service workers 
Mixed 
IIIb 
Personal service 
workers 
Personal service workers Labour contract 
IVa Self-employed Small proprietors with employees  
IVb Self-employed Small proprietors without employees  
Intermediate 
class 
IVc 
Self-employed 
farmers 
Self-employed farmers  
 
V 
Manual 
supervisors 
Lower-grade technicians, supervisors of 
manual workers 
Mixed 
VI 
Skilled manual 
workers 
Skilled manual workers Labour contract 
VIIa 
Semi- and 
unskilled workers 
Semi- and unskilled manual workers Labour contract Working class 
VIIb Farm labourers Farm labourers Labour contract 
 
Goldthorpe’s (2000) starting-point of the division of the social classes is threefold. First, he 
distinguished employers, i.e. those who buy the labour of others and thus have authority over 
them. One can find employers in Classes IVa and IVc. Class I also includes employers, which 
actually constitute a single class of entrepreneurs (Goldthorpe, 1995; Luijkx, 1994). However, 
Goldthorpe does not distinguish this class in the schema by appealing to the pragmatic 
argument that this fraction represents only a small portion of society. Second, Goldthorpe 
distinguished self-employed workers, i.e. those who neither buy the labour of others nor sell 
their own. This is Class IVb. Third, he distinguished employees, i.e. those who sell their 
labour to employers and place themselves under their authority, from employers and self-
employed workers. These employees are the members of all other classes (I, II, IIIa, IIIb, V, 
VI, VIIa and VIIb).  
Starting from this classification, Goldthorpe (2000) used employment contracts to 
construct a more detailed class schema. Goldthorpe and his colleagues (1980, 2000; 
Goldthorpe and Heath, 1992; Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) differentiated eleven social 
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classes. Table 2.1 shows these social classes within the EGP class schema. The EGP class 
schema can be divided into three classes (Marshall, 1990) according to a higher-lower 
position of the classes in societies: 1) service class, 2) intermediate class and 3) working class. 
Scholars have used seven-, ten- and elevenfold versions most frequently.  
The social classes of the EGP class schema are distinguished by use of two dimensions 
of employment relations. Goldthorpe (2000) differentiated three forms of regulation of 
employment: service relationships, labour contracts and a mix. This regulation of employment 
can be best understood if one considers the type of work employees perform. The type of 
work can be differentiated according to: 
1. “the degree of difficulty involved in monitoring the work performed by employees: that is, 
the degree of difficulty involved both in measuring its quantity and also in observing its 
quality; and  
2. the degree of specificity of the human assets or human capital – skills, expertise, knowledge 
– used by employees in performing their work: that is, the degree to which productive value 
would be lost if these assets were to be transferred to some other employment” (Goldthorpe, 
2000: 213). 
Goldthorpe (2000) reinterpreted his social class schema according to these two 
dimensions. Note that these two dimensions do not apply to employers’ and self-employed 
workers’ classes IVa, IVb and IVc because they do not sell their labour. The important 
dichotomy is between employment positions that are regulated on the basis of a labour 
contract and those that are regulated with service relationships. The former are employment 
relations without either asset specificity or control problems. Employees under labour contract 
are relatively easy to control because their work tasks are simple, therefore there is no 
problem of asset specificity. The forms of regulation of employment of the classes are shown 
in the last column of Table 2.1. According to Goldthorpe (2000), the two most important 
characteristics of the labour contract are payment for a specified amount of work and the 
absence of a secure long-term relationship between employees and employer.  
The service relationship is characterised both by problems of control and specificity of 
human assets. The basic problem of a service relationship is that of ensuring that employees 
act in the interest of their firm. The second problem arises when jobs involve specialised 
skills, expertise or knowledge. If, for example, an occupation has a high difficulty of 
monitoring the work performance and a high specificity of human assets, this occupation has 
a service relationship. These occupations are classified in the EGP class schema as (I) high-
grade managers and professionals and (II) low-grade managers and professionals. According 
to Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 42), ‘prospective elements’ in the employment contracts 
within the service relationship play an important role for ‘salary increments on an established 
scale, assurances of security’, pension rights and ‘well defined career opportunities’.  
Class I contains scientists, medical experts, administrators and officials, managers in 
large industrial establishments, and large proprietors. Class II contains nurses, teachers, 
administrators and officials, higher-grade technicians, managers in small business and 
industrial establishment, and supervisors of non-manual employers. In this service class 
(Classes I and II, see Table 2.1), Class I comprises higher grade professionals and managers 
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supervising ten or more employees and Class II covers lower grade professionals and 
managers supervising one to nine employees (Goldthorpe and Heath, 1992). 
 
 
2.3 The criteria for reclassifying the service class 
 
We suggest an adjustment of the service class that is composed of Classes I and II of the EGP 
class schema. In so doing, we preserve the original version of the schema. This enables us to 
make over time comparison and it provides continuity in class analysis.  
De Graaf and Steijn (1997) have adjusted the service class of the EGP class schema. In 
this chapter, we elaborate upon that adjustment. De Graaf and Steijn claimed, like we do, that 
the EGP class schema needs to be adjusted to accommodate changes in the employment 
structure in post-industrial societies. Subsequently, they distinguished the social and cultural 
specialists from managers and technical specialists by arguing that the work conditions of 
these fractions are different. By expanding upon this adjustment, we use the theories of Kriesi 
(1989), Lamont (1987), Esping-Andersen (1993), Inglehart (1990, 1997) and Bourdieu 
(1984). These theories imply more or less the same social cleavages within the middle class.  
We suggest distinguishing the service class into a ‘new’ class of social and cultural 
specialists and an ‘old’ class of technocrats on the basis of two criteria. Our first criterion is 
difficulty in monitoring the tasks performed by the employees. This criterion is inspired by the 
work of Goldthorpe (2000), Erikson and Goldthorpe, (1992) and Wright (1985, 1997). Wright 
(1985, 1997) distinguished specialists from managers because the former are more difficult to 
control. He explained that ‘the control over knowledge and skills frequently renders also the 
labour effort of skilled workers difficult to monitor and control’ (Wright, 1997:22). 
The second criterion is the social and cultural feature of occupations. This criterion 
has two components: whether it has a feature of social services and /or whether it needs social 
and cultural specialist knowledge to perform the tasks well. Occupations do not need both 
components to be classified as social and cultural specialists; one is sufficient. With respect to 
the second criterion, we argue that the possession of social and cultural knowledge and skills, 
causes most social and cultural specialists to be employed in the public or non-profit-making 
sectors.  
 
In the early 1970s, the exceptional position of social and cultural specialists within the 
employment structure was discussed (Baumol, 1967; Bell, 1971). Bell (1971) identified three 
stages. Societies move from a dependence on agriculture and mining (primary sector) to 
manufacturing (secondary sector) and finally to services (tertiary sector). In the final stage, 
services move again in three stages. Firstly, the services go from the movement of goods, 
such as transport and repair and secondly to personal services, such as restaurants, hotels, 
travel and entertainment. At the third and last stage, the services become knowledge-based. 
The knowledge-based services provide the ‘quality of life’ in the public sector.  
According to Bell (1971), the work of the social and cultural specialists is difficult to 
perform because professionals carrying out these tasks face, on the one hand, increasing 
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demand of quality of their services as a result of growing wealth in post-industrial societies. 
On the other hand, these occupations are not instrumental to profit maximization. 
Mechanization and computerization can hardly make these occupations more efficient 
(Baumol, 1967). Therefore, the productivity of the professionals in these jobs is lower than 
that of other employees. The time that nurses or teachers need to dedicate to their patients or 
students respectively has remained more or less the same. Economists have termed this 
phenomenon the law of Baumol (Baumol, 1967). It implies that sectors in which social and 
cultural specialists are employed need much investment by the state or charity institutions to 
keep their services up to date.  
Goldthorpe (2000) puts professionals and managers in the same class according to the 
criteria of monitoring and specificity of human assets. It is, however, easier to control 
managers and administrators because, the objectives of managers are more clearly framed 
than are those of professionals. The primary task of managers in the commercial sector is to 
realise profits for their employer. Managers who fail to do this will either be dismissed or 
transferred. In the case of managers in a non-profit organization, the goal is still clear: to 
maintain the viability and success of their organization. Managers and officials act on behalf 
of the firm and are not expected to use their skills and expertise against their firm.  
In contrast to managers, administrators and technical specialists, an employer cannot 
easily monitor the tasks of professionals. This is especially true for the social and cultural 
specialists. The job-specific expertise of the social and cultural specialists is very 
sophisticated; this presents the problem of monitoring (Freidson, 1986; Wanrooy, 2001). This 
problem arises because the social and cultural specialists must use their skills and knowledge 
on behalf of their clients (Kriesi, 1989). Medical specialists and psychologists, for example, 
use highly specialised knowledge. Their managers or employers do not have the specialised 
knowledge that social and cultural specialists possess at their disposal. These managers have a 
classical Principal-Agent-problem (Coleman, 1990). The principal (i.e. the manager) is 
responsible for the agents but these agents have skills and knowledge that the principal does 
not. This limits the principal’s ability to control the agent. 
There are no studies, as far as we know, about whether social and cultural specialists 
are less controllable than technocrats. However, like Flood and Scott (1978:242) put it, ‘it is 
widely recognized that the assessment of professional performance is at best a complex and 
hazardous business’. Freidson (1986:152) convincingly argues that there is a ‘basic 
antagonism of interest’ between managers and professionals. Managers seek to prevent the 
interest and the viability of the organization they work for, while specialists try to seek after 
the interest of their clients, patients or students and/or their field of specialisation. Generally, 
it is important for specialists to have autonomy in their work. Therefore, they do not want 
their managers to interfere in their domain of specialisation. Flood and Scott (1978) show that 
the influence of the managers on surgeons’ decisions was not significantly related to the 
quality of surgical care. However, a greater regulation of the work of individual surgeons by 
the surgical staff was associated with higher quality of surgical care.  
Furthermore, we assume, like Goldthorpe (1992, 2000) and Wright (1985, 1997), that 
occupational characteristics, for the most part, serve as an adequate proxy for important 
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features of employment relations. Thus, occupations are classified as social and cultural 
specialists whose tasks are relatively difficult to monitor by the employers and whose basic 
tasks consist of social services and/or those whose basic tasks are based on specialised social 
and cultural knowledge. Other occupations within the service class are classified as 
technocratic. That is to say, occupations are allocated into the class of technocrats, if their 
tasks are relatively easy to monitor by the employer or if these occupations consist of 
controlling the employees.2  
Figure 2.1 shows the structure of the standard EGP class schema and the adjusted EGP 
class schema. The newly distinguished classes within the service class are the high- and low-
grade social and cultural specialists. The ‘old’ classes within the service class are the high- 
and low-grade technocrats. By labelling these ‘new’ and ‘old’, we resort to the new class 
theories. We consider the fractions of the social and cultural specialists within the service 
class as new classes because, on the one hand, these newly distinguished classes are 
engendered by the post-industrial employment structure. On the other hand, the technocratic 
fractions within the service class are regarded as the old classes because they stem from the 
industrial employment structure. These classes already existed within industrial societies.  
 
Figure 2.1: The EGP class schema compared to the adjusted EGP class schema  
A. EGP Class Schema     B. Adjusted EGP Class Schema 
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The ‘new’ and ‘old’ social classes within the service class are not hierarchically ordered. The 
social and cultural specialists and the technocrats are situated next to each other as regards, 
for example, their social status. The classes of the social and cultural specialists and the 
technocrats cover, more or less, respectively, the post-materialists and the materialists 
(Cotgrove and Duff, 1981). To some extent, Figure 2.1 also reflects Bourdieu’s (1984) 
grouping of occupations according to their cultural and economic dimensions. These 
                                                 
2 Note that the subdivision of the service class is a nominal classification. Nevertheless, the criteria we use to 
classify the occupations are gradual characteristics of occupations. The classification of an occupation into one 
class or the other is a difficult job. Therefore, we asked experts to make the classification according to our 
criteria.  
Ia. High-grade 
technocrats 
Ib. High-grade social and 
cultural specialists 
IIa. Low-grade 
technocrats 
IIb. Low-grade social and 
cultural specialists 
III. Routine non-manual 
employees 
IV. Self-employed persons 
V/VI/VII. Workers 
 
I. High-grade professionals 
 
II. Low-grade professionals 
III. Routine non-manual 
employees 
IV. Self-employed persons 
V/VI/VII. Workers 
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dimensions overlap in the lower levels of occupations, such as in skilled and unskilled jobs, 
and they split into two at the higher levels of occupations, such as in the jobs of technocrats 
and the social and cultural specialists. Note that the higher-lower distinction within the service 
class remains as it was in the standard EGP class schema. Furthermore, we have not changed 
the social classes outside the service class. 
 
 
2.4 Experts allocate occupations  
 
To increase the soundness and the objectivity of our classification of the service class, we 
made use of experts from the Netherlands and Belgium. We asked ten sociologists and two 
economists who were specialists in job and labour markets to independently classify the 
occupations within the service class according to our abovementioned criteria. Table 2.2 
shows the criteria of the allocation rules that were given to the experts. We asked the experts 
to allocate all service class occupations that are relatively easy to control into the class of 
technocrats. Occupations that are relatively difficult to control and that are based on social-
cultural knowledge and/or on social services fall into the class of social and cultural 
specialists. There are a few occupations within the service class of whose incumbents are 
difficult to control by their employer but who do not have specialised knowledge on social 
and cultural issues or who do not serve people with their knowledge on social and cultural 
issues. Mathematicians and astronomers are two such examples. These occupations are also 
classified as technocratic. The last row of Table 2.2 depicts this rule.  
 
Table 2.2: Criteria of allocation rules of occupations within the service class into the classes of the 
technocrats and the social and cultural specialists.  
Controllable Social-cultural knowledge Social service  Class 
Yes Yes Yes Technocrats 
Yes Yes No Technocrats 
Yes No Yes Technocrats 
Yes No No Technocrats 
No Yes Yes Social and cultural specialists 
No Yes No Social and cultural specialists 
No No Yes Social and cultural specialists 
No No No Technocrats 
 
The experts were presented with descriptions of the 293 service class occupations, defined on 
the basis of the 4-digit occupational classification of the Standard Classification of 
Occupations 1984 of Statistic Netherlands (CBS 84). The second column of Appendix 2 
shows these occupations as they were presented to the experts3. There was a strong agreement 
                                                 
3 The labels of the CBS 84 are in Dutch. We chose to use the CBS 84 detailed occupational classification to 
delineate the occupations within the service class in the Netherlands and not the Standard Occupational 
Classification (SBC 1992) of Statistic Netherlands. We preferred not to use the SBC 1992 because in this 
classification, the level of education is also used to code the levels of occupations. Level of education is much 
less enclosed in the CBS 84 classification.   
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among the experts in allocating the occupations. The KR20 reliability coefficient (alpha 
coefficient for dichotomous items) is 0.95. No expert disagreed strongly with the others: 
leaving out one expert did not increase the overall reliability. 
An occupation was received a score of 1 when an expert classified this occupation as 
technocratic, and received the score of 2 when an expert classified this occupation as social 
and cultural specialists. We calculated the average expert allocation score of each single 
occupation based on the scores given by the experts. Thus, all 293 occupations within the 
service class got a mean expert allocation score ranking between 1.00 and 2.00. The experts 
perfectly agreed on the allocation of 42 percent of the occupations; these occupations got the 
mean expert allocation score of 1.00 (technocrats) or 2.00 (social and cultural specialists). 
Using the majority vote rule, occupations with a mean expert allocation score below 1.3 were 
allocated into the class of technocrats and occupations with a mean expert allocation score 
above 1.7 were allocated into the class of social and cultural specialists. These occupations 
comprise 77 percent of all occupations. Occupations that got a mean expert allocation score 
between 1.3 and 1.7 comprise 23 percent of all occupations4. The experts did not agree on 
these occupations. Subsequently, four new experts, Dutch sociologists, discussed these 
occupations in light of our criteria and they reallocated them by majority rule.  
Appendix 2 shows the Standard Classification of Occupations 1984 (CBS 84) and the 
labels of the occupations of CBS 84, the International Standard Classification of Occupations 
1988 (ISCO 88) and the labels of the occupations of ISCO 88, the mean expert allocation 
score and the social classes the occupations were assigned to. One can find these conversion 
tools on www.ayseguveli.nl. The mean expert allocation score in Appendix 2 shows also the 
occupations on which the experts did not have an agreement (occupations that have a mean 
expert allocation score between 1.3 and 1.7). The last column shows the class to which these 
occupations were assigned. Furthermore, in the last column, the occupations are allocated into 
the higher or lower version of the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists. Note that 
the experts did not make this higher-lower distinction; it originates from the standard EGP 
class schema.  
 
 
2.5 Criteria validation of the adjusted EGP class schema 
 
The standard EGP class schema has undergone several validation tests and has shown to 
represent the underlying theoretical criteria (Evans, 1992, 1996; Evans and Mills, 1998; 
Evans and Mills, 2000) developed by Goldthorpe and his colleagues (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 
1992; Goldthorpe, 2000). In this section, we explain whether the criteria the experts used to 
distinguish the social and cultural specialists from the technocrats do indeed differentiate 
these classes according to the job characteristics of the employees. Our central question in this 
chapter is:  
 
                                                 
4 Only 4 percent of the employed service class respondents have these occupations. 
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1) To what extent do the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists represent the 
underlying criteria that distinguish them? 
 
This type of validation, the criteria validation, reveals whether the measurement tool, in this 
case the classification of the service class, measures the underlying class characteristics of the 
employment relations such as controllability of the work performance and the social-cultural 
feature of the occupations. We subdivide our main question in two more specific research 
questions: 
 
a) To what extent do the social and cultural specialists consider their work tasks to be more 
difficult to monitor than the technocrats do?   
 
b) To what extent do the social and cultural specialists consider social services to be one of 
their main work tasks, and how do members of other classes perceive their main work task?  
 
2.5.1 Forms of control and social services 
Before we answer these questions, we will describe the control systems employed in 
organisations. Then we elaborate on social services. 
 
Control systems 
Edwards (1979) defined three overlapping stages in the development of control systems. 
Stage 1 is ‘personal control’, in which the dominant factor is the power of the foreman, who 
hires, fires, disburses wages, punishes, and assigns work. Edwards emphasised that this 
system of personal control remains widespread in small and medium-sized establishments in 
the lower-waged, non-unionised segment of the labor markets. Stage 2 is the ‘technical 
control’, which followed the introduction of ‘scientific management’. Control by a work 
process and control by a system of ‘payment by results’ are two elements of technical control. 
Technical control is popular wherever work can be routinised and standardised. Stage 3 is 
‘bureaucratic control’ and was developed by large companies for their administrative and 
technical specialists. Bureaucratic control focuses on individual progression and depends not 
only on output or performance, which are difficult to measure, but also on company 
behavioural norms such as dedication, collegiality and flexibility.  
 
Social services 
Services are one of the important characteristics of the post-industrial employment structure. 
The services the social and cultural specialists give are based on knowledge. As Bell (1971) 
argues, the knowledge-based services satisfy basic desires for health, education and arts in the 
last stage of the service society. Specialists are responsible for fulfilling the needs of post-
industrial societies. The social and cultural specialists deliver services to patients or students 
with whom they are in direct contact.  
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2.5.2 Data and operationalisation 
To test the criterion validity of our classification of the service class, we use one Dutch and 
two British surveys. The Family Survey of the Dutch Population (FSDP) held in 2003 
contains information about work careers and job characteristics of 2313 respondents. The 
Employment in Britain Survey conducted in 1992 (N=3855) and the Changing Employment 
Relationships, Employment Contracts and the Future of Work Survey held in 2000 (N=2441) 
also contain information about job characteristics. The two British surveys will be referred to 
as the British employment surveys.  
Occupations in the FSDP were identified on the basis of the Standard Classification of 
Occupations 1984 of Statistic Netherlands (CBS 84). Occupations in the British employment 
data were identified on the basis of the British Standard Occupational Classification 1990 
(SOC 90). To distinguish the technocrats from the social and cultural specialists within the 
British service class, we translated the SOC 90 into the International Standard Classification 
of Occupations 1988 (ISCO 88). We used the experts’ classification of the technocrats and the 
social and cultural specialists as described in Section 2.2 in Table 2.3. Occupations in this 
classification are based on CBS 84 in the FSDP data and on ISCO 88 in the British 
employment data. We do not make a higher-lower distinction within the service class in this 
analysis of criterion validation because our criteria apply to both levels5.  
The occupations outside the service class in the FSDP data were classified in the EGP 
class schema with the conversion tools of Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman (1998) and 
Ganzeboom, Treiman and Donald (http://home.fsw.vu.nl/~ganzeboom). These classes within 
the British employment data were already classified in the original data. The social classes we 
use in this analysis are: 1) technocrats (Ia, IIa), 2) social and cultural specialists (Ib, IIb), 3) 
routine non-manual employees (III), 4) self-employed persons (IV) and 5) workers 
(V/VI/VII). We aggregated the classes outside the service class into three classes because we 
are not interested in how those single classes score on our criteria. 
 
Controllability of the employees 
To expose the differences in the importance of control systems in controlling the work 
performance of technocrats and the social and cultural specialists, we use both British 
employment surveys. In these surveys, respondents were asked ‘which, if any, of the following 
things are important in determining how hard you work in your job?  
1) own discretion  
2) your fellow workers or colleagues  
3) clients or customers  
4) reports or appraisals  
5) targets or incentives you are set 
6) pay incentives 
7) machine or assembly line 
                                                 
5 We performed an analysis by making a higher-lower distinction both in the classes of the technocrats and the 
social and cultural specialists. However, the results of this analysis did not lead to any changes in our 
conclusions.  
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8) a supervisor or manager’. 
Respondents could answer each of these questions with (0) ‘no, it is not important’ and (1) 
‘yes, it is important’. This list of aspects that may be important in determining how hard 
people work resembles the stages of control systems described by Edwards (1979). The aspect 
of ‘a supervisor or manager’ can be seen as Stage 1. However, this type of control system is 
prevalent in all organisations in Britain (Gallie et al., 1998). The aspects of ‘machine or 
assembly line’, ‘pay incentives’ and ‘targets or incentives one set’ can be regarded as Stage 2, 
while ‘reports or appraisals’, ‘clients or customers’, ‘fellow workers or colleagues’ and ‘one’s 
own discretion’ represent Stage 3.  
To answer the question of the extent to which work performance of the social and 
cultural specialists is more difficult to control than that of the technocrats, we use the Dutch 
and the British surveys. In the Dutch survey, respondents were asked for each job that they 
have had ‘to what extent can/could your supervisor/manager control whether you 
perform/performed your work tasks well?’ The answers to this question range from 0) very 
little, 1) little, 2) much, 3) a great deal and 4) not applicable / do/did not have a 
supervisor/manager. Respondents who answered ‘not applicable / do/did not have a 
supervisor/manager and self-employed people were excluded from our analysis.   
In both British employment surveys, respondents were asked ‘how easy or hard would 
you say it is for your supervisor or manager to know  
- how much work a person in a job like yours does in a week 
- the quality of the work that is done by a person in a job like yours’. 
The answers are: 0) very easy, 1) somewhat easy, 2) somewhat hard and 3) very hard. 
We summed up these items (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.76) and obtained a scale that ranged from 
0 (very easy to control) to 6 (very difficult to control). Self-employed people and employees 
who do not have a supervisor or a manager were excluded from the analysis.   
 
Social service 
In the Family Survey of the Dutch Population, respondents were asked ‘to what extent 
does/did your job require empathy with other people? This question was asked for all jobs 
respondents have had. Respondents could answer with (0) to a very small extent, (1) to a 
small extent, (2) to a great extent and (3) to a very great extent. To measure whether the social 
and cultural specialists have more contact with clients, patients or students than the 
technocrats do, we use another question from the Dutch survey: ‘what percentage of your 
time in your job are/were you in direct contact with people, such as clients, patients or 
students, who you serve/served?’. The answers range from (0) 0 percent (no contact) to (5) 
100 percent contact (all of the time). This question is also asked for all jobs respondents have 
had in their lifetime.  
In the 1992 British employment survey, respondents were asked whether their job 
involves caring for people, for example the sick and young. If so, they were asked whether 
‘caring for people, for example the sick and young, takes up more than half of their time’. 
Respondents could answer both questions with (0) ‘no’ or (1) ‘yes’. In the 2000 British 
employment survey, this question was unfortunately not asked.   
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Evans (1996) showed that the standard EGP class schema adequately operationalises 
the class divisions for both men and women. To reveal whether our criteria for classifying the 
classes within the service class assess women’s class positions as well as it does men’s, we 
included sex ((0) men and (1) women) in our models.    
 
Method of analysis of job careers 
The occupational characteristics of all occupations the respondents have had are included in 
the Family Survey of the Dutch Population (FSDP). We constructed a person-job file of all 
jobs and their characteristics. Therefore, for the Dutch data, jobs reflect the level of analysis 
and not the respondents. This file has records of all jobs respondents have had after finishing 
their full-time education, and characteristics of these jobs. Each job and its characteristics are 
one record in the data matrix. Together, the 2003 respondents in the FSDP data have a total of 
7417 jobs. This implies that some respondents participate more than once in the analysis. 
Therefore we controlled in our analyses for the fact that respondents participate more than 
once in the analysis. Finally, job characteristics within the British employment surveys were 
asked only for the current main job. Hence, the respondents in this dataset reflect the level of 
analysis and not the jobs.  
 
2.5.3 Results 
The social and cultural specialists were distinguished from the technocrats because the former 
are less controllable in performing their work tasks than the latter. This is our first criterion. 
This claim will be tested in two steps. In Step 1, we discuss the results of the control systems, 
which control the work tasks of the incumbents of the social classes of the adjusted EGP class 
schema in Britain. These results can be seen in Table 2.3. We are not able to make a 
straightforward comparison between Britain and the Netherlands since we do not have the 
same information for both countries. Table 2.3 gives a good indication of different kinds of 
control systems employed. In our case, control systems reveal the importance of monitoring 
the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats. The differences in percentages between 
the social classes are analysed by comparing the mean scores in ANOVA for men and women 
separately. To discover whether the social and cultural specialists significantly differ from the 
technocrats, we have analysed the differences in control systems with logistic regression by 
using the technocrats as the reference category.  
In Step 2, we present the differences in the extent to which the work performance of 
social and cultural specialists are less controllable than the technocrats. The findings are 
presented in Table 2.4 for the Netherlands and in Table 2.5 for Britain. We excluded the 
incumbents of the self-employed class because they do not fall under the control of a 
supervisor or manager.  
Finally, we deal with the criterion of social services in Table 2.6 for the Netherlands 
and in Table 2.7 for Britain. The social and cultural specialists are expected to differentiate 
themselves from the technocrats by social services they carry out as their basic work tasks.  
The criteria of controllability of the work performance and social services are analysed 
in two models in Tables 2.4 to 2.7: Model I shows the differences among the job 
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characteristics of all class members while Model II controls for the effect of sex. That is to 
say, we explore whether the criteria do not assess sex-segregated job characteristics but the 
job characteristics for both men and women. In all models the technocrats are the reference 
category.  
 
2.5.3.1 Control systems for social and cultural specialists and technocrats 
Table 2.3 shows the mean differences in percentages between the incumbents of the social 
classes of the adjusted EGP class schema separately for men and women with regard to 
importance of the different control systems. This table shows that 81 percent of the male 
social and cultural specialists state that their own discretion is important for the work 
performance; 65 percent of the technocrats in Britain do so. Among female social and cultural 
specialists, 74 percent report that own discretion is important for their work performance 
while 65 percent of the technocrats do so. To test whether the social and cultural specialists 
differ significantly from the technocrats, we use logistic regression models by taking the 
technocrats as a reference category. The asterisks in Table 2.3 indicate whether the social 
classes significantly differ from technocrats; these asterisks are based on the results of the 
regression analysis. The differences appear to be substantial. Consequently, this supports our 
assumption that the work tasks of the social and cultural specialists are more difficult to 
control than are the work tasks of the technocrats.  
 
Table 2.3: Mean percentages (ANOVA) of men and women incumbents of the social classes in ‘own discretion, fellows/ 
colleagues, clients/customers, reports/appraisals, targets/incentives, machines/assembly line, supervisors/managers are 
important how hard one works’ (0 = no, 1 = yes) in Britain. (The class of the self-employed persons is excluded). (Level 
of significance in main percentage is analyzed with logistic regression by taking the technocrats as reference category.) 
Classes Own 
discretion 
Fellows/ 
colleagues  
Clients/ 
customers 
Reports/ 
appraisals 
Targets/ 
incentives  
Pay 
incentives 
Machine/ 
assembly  
Supervisor/ 
manager 
   Men in labour force     
Technocrats 
(ref.) 
0.65 
 
0.35 0.59 0.38 0.59 0.24 0.06 0.35 
Social cultural 
specialists 
0.81** 0.46** 0.60 0.41 0.45** 0.15** 0.02* 0.38 
Routine non-
manual 
employees 
0.54** 0.34 0.48** 0.30** 0.43** 0.22** 0.03 0.34 
Workers 0.53** 0.28** 0.36** 0.17** 0.43 0.27 0.12** 0.31 
Total N 2747 2747 2747 2544 2747 2747 2747 2544 
   Women in labour force     
Technocrats 
(ref.) 0.65 0.37 0.59 0.40 0.48 0.23 0.02 0.34 
Social cultural 
specialists 0.74** 0.46** 0.59 0.43 0.46 0.11** 0.01 0.38 
Routine non-
manual 
employees 0.61* 0.37 0.54* 0.27** 0.29** 0.17** 0.01 0.36 
Workers 0.54** 0.29** 0.32** 0.16** 0.30** 0.21 0.12** 0.36 
Total N 2707 2707 2707 2635 2707 2707 2707 2635 
*significant (p<0.05)  **significant (p<0.01) 
Source: British Employment Surveys 1992 and 2000 
 
Table 2.3 shows that fellows or colleagues are considerably more important in controlling the 
work performance of the British social and cultural specialists than of British technocrats. 
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Forty-six percent of the social and cultural specialist men indicate fellows and colleagues are 
important in controlling their work performance, whereas 35 percent of the technocrats do so. 
The comparable percentages for women are, respectively, 46 and 37 percent. These 
differences are significant. This finding supports our claim that the employers of the social 
and cultural specialists need to employ specialists to control the work performance of their 
specialists. 
Table 2.3 shows that 59 percent of the male social and cultural specialists indicate that 
clients or customers are important in controlling their work performance, while 60 percent of 
the technocrat men do so. Fifty-nine percent of both the social and cultural specialists and the 
female technocrats report that clients or customers are important to control their work 
performance. So the clients or customers are equally important to control the work 
performance of both the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats. Unfortunately we 
do not have information to reveal the extent of importance of clients or customers in these two 
kinds of jobs. Table 2.3 shows that reports or appraisals are more important to control the 
work performance of the British social and cultural specialist men (41%) than the British 
technocrat men (38%). These percentages for women are 43 and 40 percent respectively. 
These differences are not significant.  
Table 2.3 shows that the targets or objectives one sets are significantly less important 
in controlling the work tasks of the male social and cultural specialists (45%) than in the jobs 
of the male technocrats (59%). For women, the differences are not significant, 46 and 48 
percent respectively. Pay incentives are significantly less important for the British social and 
cultural specialists to control how hard they work than for the British technocrats. Fifteen 
percent of the male social and cultural specialists indicate that pay incentives are important to 
control their work performance, whereas 24 percent of the male technocrats do so. The 
differences in percentages for women are much higher: 11 percent of the female social and 
cultural specialists report that pay incentives are important to control their work performance 
whereas 23 percent of the female technocrats do so.    
Finally, Table 2.3 shows that machines or assembly lines are significantly less 
important for the male social and cultural specialists (2%) to know how hard they work than 
for the male technocrats (6%). For women, the differences are 1 and 2 percent respectively. 
This is not a significant difference. However, these percentages are very low, indicating that 
very few of these people work with machines or on assembly lines. Table 2.3 shows that both 
male and female supervisors or managers are equally important for all class members to 
control their work performance. Similar results were shown by Gallie et al. (1998). They 
showed that supervisors and managers are equally important in all social classes and 
companies in controlling the employees. Tables 2.4 and 2.5, reveal the extent to which 
supervisors or managers control the work performance of the social and cultural specialists 
and the technocrats.  
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2.5.3.2 Controllability of social and cultural specialists and technocrats 
Table 2.4 shows the differences between the Dutch incumbents of the social classes in the 
extent to which the supervisor or manager can control their work tasks. Model I of Table 2.4 
shows that the Dutch social and cultural specialists are significantly less controllable by their 
supervisors or managers than the Dutch technocrats are. Routine non-manual employees and 
the workers are significantly more controllable than the technocrats. Model II shows that 
these differences are not attributable to sex-specific employment characteristics. There are no 
significant differences between men and women in controllability of their work tasks.  
 
Table 2.4: Linear regression analysis. Differences between the Dutch incumbents of the social classes 
in ‘to what extent can/could your supervisors /managers control whether you perform/performed your 
work tasks well’. (Scale ranking from 0 (very little) to 3 (a great deal). (The class of the self-employed 
persons is excluded). (Standard errors between parentheses).  
I II  
B  B  
Constant 1.74 (0.03)  1.73 (0.04)  
Technocrats Ref.  Ref.  
Social and cultural specialists -0.12 (0.04) ** -0.13 (0.05) ** 
Routine non-manual employees 0.19 (0.03) ** 0.19 (0.04) ** 
Workers 0.18 (0.04) ** 0.18 (0.04) ** 
Female  0.03 (0.03)  
N (jobs) 6803 6803 
N (respondents) 1938 1938 
R2 0.04 0.04 
Rho 0.38 0.38 
*significant (p<0.05) **significant (p<0.01)   
Source: Family Survey of the Dutch Population 2003 
 
Table 2.5 presents the differences between the British incumbents of the social classes in how 
hard it is for their supervisors to know how much they work or the quality of their work. 
Model I shows that it is significantly more difficult for the supervisors of social and cultural 
specialists to know how hard their employees work or the quality of their employees’ work 
tasks than it is for the supervisors of technocrats. This is significantly less difficult for the 
supervisors of the routine non-manual employees and the workers than for the supervisors of 
the technocrats. Model II shows that British women are more likely to hold jobs in which 
their supervisors could control the amount and the quality of their work tasks. However, even 
if one controls for this sex effect, differences in controllability of the work tasks between the 
social and cultural specialists and the technocrats persist.  
We have seen in Table 2.3 that the supervisors or managers are equally important in 
controlling the work performance of all employees from all classes. Our assumption that 
social and cultural specialists are more difficult to control than the technocrats is confirmed. 
Another supportive finding is that fellows or colleagues as a control system are much more 
important to control the work tasks of social and cultural specialists than the work tasks of 
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technocrats. The most important finding is that an employee’s own discretion in the control 
system is much more important among social and cultural specialists than among technocrats.  
 
Table 2.5: Linear regression analysis. Differences between the British incumbents of the social classes 
in ‘how hard is it for your supervisor/manager to know how much you work or the quality of your 
work.’ (Scale ranking from 0 (very easy) to 3 (very hard). (The class of the self-employed persons is 
excluded). (Standard errors between parentheses). 
I II  
B B 
Constant 2.29 (0.05)  1.06 (0.03)  
Technocrats Ref.  Ref.  
Social and cultural specialists 0.20 (0.08) * 0.15 (0.04) ** 
Routine non-manual employees -0.69 (0.06) ** -0.25 (0.03) ** 
Workers -0.82 (0.06) ** -0.31 (0.03) ** 
Female   -0.10 (0.03) ** 
R2 0.05 0.05 
N 5134 5134 
*significant (p<0.05) **significant (p<0.01)   
Source: British Employment Surveys, 1992 and 2000 
 
2.5.3.3 Empathy and contact in jobs of social and cultural specialists  
Table 2.6 shows the differences in ‘job requires empathy with other people’ and ‘direct 
contact with clients, patients or students’. Model I of ‘empathy’ shows that jobs of social and 
cultural specialists require significantly more empathy than do the jobs of technocrats. Jobs of 
the incumbents of all other classes require much less empathy. Model II shows that the jobs 
held by women require significantly more empathy than the jobs held by men. However the 
differences between the jobs of social and cultural specialists remain significantly different 
from jobs of technocrats in terms of empathy. Furthermore, Model I of ‘direct contact’ shows 
that social and cultural specialists have much more direct contract with their clients, patients 
or students than technocrats do. Including sex in Model II shows that women have 
significantly more direct contract with their clients, patients or students in their jobs than men 
do. However, the differences between social and cultural specialists and technocrats remain 
significant in Model II. This means that differences between social and cultural specialists and 
technocrats in terms of contact with clients, patients and students cannot be attributed to sex 
differences.  
Table 2.7 shows the differences between the British incumbents of the social classes in 
whether their work involve caring for people such as sick and young, and whether caring for 
people takes up more than half of their time. Model I shows that jobs of the social and cultural 
specialists involve significantly more caregiving than jobs of the technocrats. Factoring sex 
into the model shows that women’s jobs involve significantly more caregiving than men’s 
jobs but the differences between the social and cultural specialists also remain significant. 
Model I shows that here too, the social and cultural specialists care for people more than half 
of their time in their work significantly more than the technocrats. Women work in more jobs 
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in which they care for people more than half of their time than men do. However, after 
controlling for sex, differences between the social and cultural specialists decrease somewhat 
but remain highly significant. 
 
Table 2.6: Linear regression analysis. Differences between the Dutch incumbents of the social classes 
in ‘job requires empathy with other people’ (scale: 0 [to a very small extent] to 3 [to a very great 
extent] and ‘direct contact with clients, patients or students’ (scale: 0 [0% contact], 5 [100% contact]). 
(Standard errors between parentheses). 
Empathy  Direct contact 
I II I II 
 
B B B  B
Constant 2.14 (0.03)  2.06 (0.03)  3.10 (0.05  2.89 (0.06)  
Technocrats Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Social and cultural specialists 0.28 (0.04) ** 0.25 (0.04) ** 0.51 (0.08) ** 0.45 (0.08) **
Routine non-manual employees -0.21 (0.03) ** -026 (0.03) ** 0.08 (0.06)  -0.00 (0.06)  
Self-employed persons -0.20 (0.08) * 0.21 (0.08) * 0.11 (0.13)  0.11 (0.14)  
Workers -0.60 (0.03) ** -0.60 (0.03) ** -0.68 (0.06) ** -0.67 (0.06) **
Female   0.22 (0.03) **   0.49 (0.06) **
N (jobs) 7417 7417  7459 7459 
N (respondents) 2003 2003  2015 2015 
R2 0.02 0.02  0.07 0.09 
Rho 0.35 0.34  0.44 0.44 
*significant (p<0.05)  **significant (p<0.01)  
Source: Family Survey of the Dutch Population 2003 
 
Table 2.7: Logistic regression analysis. Differences between the British incumbents of the social 
classes in ‘does your work involve caring for people, for example the sick and young?’ (0 = no, 1 = 
yes) and in ‘does caring for people, for example sick or young, takes up more than half your time?’ (0 
= no, 1 = yes). (Standard errors between parentheses). 
Caring for people Caring people more than half of time 
I II I II 
 
B B B  B
Constant -1.91 (0.10)  -2.46 (0.12)  -2.78 (0.15)  -3.64 (0.19)  
Technocrats Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Social and cultural specialists 
2.14 (0.15) ** 2.09 (0.15) ** 2.47 (0.19) ** 2.40 (0.20) *
* 
Routine non-manual employees 
1.33 (0.12) ** 0.92 (0.12) ** 2.01 (0.17) ** 1.53 (0.17) *
* 
Self employed persons -0.97 (0.43) * -0.85 (0.43) * -0.45 (0.51)  -0.28 (0.62)  
Workers -0.17 (0.14)  0.07 (0.14)  -0.13 (0.22)  0.21 (0.22)  
Female   
1.11 (0.10) **   1.55 (0.15) *
* 
Nagelkerke R2 0.18  0.23  0.23 0.29 
N 3475  3475  2885 2885 
*significant (p<0.05)  **significant (p<0.01)  
Source: British Employment Survey 1992 
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2.6 Conclusions and discussion 
 
Following the new class theories and research, we have adjusted the EGP class schema 
according to two criteria: controllability of the work performance and social-cultural character 
of the work tasks. Experts on the Dutch labour and job markets classified the occupations 
within the service class into a class of the social and cultural specialists and into a class of the 
technocrats. Subsequently, we used the Family Survey of the Dutch Population held in 2003, 
the British Employment Survey held in 1992 and the Changing Employment Relationships, 
Employment Contracts and the Future of Work Survey gathered in Britain in 2000 to validate 
our classification.  
Our first criterion is the difficulty in monitoring the work performance. We have 
shown that the work performance, either the quality or the quantity, of the Dutch and the 
British social and cultural specialists is significantly less controllable by their supervisors or 
managers than is the work performance of the technocrats. We have also shown that in British 
employment relations, the importance of machines or assembly line for male employees and 
targets or objectives set by the male employees themselves are significantly less likely to be 
used to control the work performance of the social and cultural specialists than the work 
performance of the technocrats. For women, the importance of these control systems is not 
different for the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats. For both men and women, 
pay incentives are significantly less important to control the work performance of the social 
and cultural specialists than the technocrats. The reports or appraisals and clients or customers 
are equally important in the jobs of the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats both 
for men and women. However, using these control system does not reveal whether there are 
differences in the extent of controllability between the social and cultural specialists and the 
technocrats. 
  We claimed that the work performance of the social and cultural specialists is harder 
to control than the work performance of the technocrats since the work tasks of the former are 
based on specialised knowledge. This results in the Principal-Agent problem (Coleman, 1990) 
in which specialists are hired to control other specialists. Our assertion that the social and 
cultural specialists are more difficult to monitor by the employer without long preparation got 
substantial support from our findings: the social and cultural specialists are significantly more 
likely to be controlled by their fellows and colleagues than the technocrats. The most 
interesting and encouraging finding is that social and cultural specialists have much more 
discretion to perform their work tasks than do the technocrats. This shows that the social and 
cultural specialists have significantly more autonomy in their work tasks.  
The second criterion of social services has two components: the work tasks involve 
social services and are based on specialised knowledge on social and cultural issues. We 
found that jobs of the Dutch social and cultural specialists require much more empathy than 
jobs of the technocrats and that the social and cultural specialists have considerably more 
contact with clients, patients or students than those of technocrats. The results of the British 
data show the social and cultural specialists care significantly more for people than the 
Classifying and validating the subdivision of the service class 
 43
technocrats and the social and cultural specialists spend more often half of their time caring 
for people, unlike the technocrats.  
Unfortunately, we cannot validate whether jobs of the social and cultural specialists 
are indeed based on specialised knowledge. In this respect, we have confidence in our 
experts’ ability to classify the occupations within the service class according to this 
component of our second criterion.  
 
The adjusted EGP class schema 
Our results show that the classification of the service class of the adjusted EGP class schema 
represents the underlying criteria we used to distinguish the social and cultural specialists 
from the technocrats. Therefore, we will use the adjusted EGP class schema as it is presented 
in Table 2.8 in our further analyses.  
 
Table 2.8: The adjusted EGP class schema 
Ia High-grade technocrats 
Ib High-grade social and cultural specialists 
IIa Low-grade technocrats 
IIb Low-grade social and cultural specialists 
III Routine non-manual employees 
IV Self-employed persons 
V/VI Skilled manual workers 
VII  Unskilled manual workers 
 
The next part of this study will turn to the construct validation of the newly distinguished 
social classes within the service class. The social classes outside the service class are 
aggregated in Table 2.8. This aggregation is made because we are primarily interested in the 
differences within the service class. However, when we analyse the patterns of 
intergenerational social mobility in Chapter 3, we will disaggregate all classes within the 
adjusted EGP class schema. In this case, we will compare the development of social class 
reproduction of the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats with that of all other 
classes in the schema. In all other chapters, we will use the version presented in Table 2.8.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Chapter 3 
 
Patterns of intergenerational mobility of the social and cultural 
specialists and the technocrats in the Netherlands 1970-20041 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The research we described in Chapter 1 presented convincing evidence that there are 
cleavages within the service class. We distinguished four service classes in Chapter 2. Classes 
of the higher (I) and lower professionals and managers (II) within the EGP class schema are 
disaggregated into two ‘old’ classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats (Ia and IIa 
respectively) and two ‘new’ classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists 
(Ib and IIb respectively). In that chapter, we tested the criterion-related validity of our 
classification. It turned out that our classification of the service class empirically represents 
our criteria.  
In this chapter, we study the ‘demographic identity’ (Goldthorpe, 1980, 1982, 1995; 
Carroll & Mayer, 1986) of these newly distinguished social classes. That is, the degree to 
which these classes have crystallized their intergenerational mobility patterns into stable units. 
According to Weber ([1922] 1978: 302) “a ‘social class’ makes up the totality of those class 
situations within which individual and generational mobility is easy and typical”. Thus, 
members of a social class follow similar upward and downward mobility patterns. 
Conversely, occupational categories that are similar with respect to mobility chances can be 
regarded as a single social class. Consequently, if the fractions within the service class are 
indeed individual social classes, they should show a certain level of boundaries in intra- and 
intergenerational mobility patterns (Carroll & Mayer, 1986; Mayer & Carroll, 1987). 
Research has focused on the political orientation of the ‘new’ social classes to show that 
they are differentiated (Kriesi, 1989; De Graaf & Steijn, 1997; Van de Werfhorst & De Graaf, 
2004; Güveli, Need & De Graaf, 2006). There are no studies dealing with the mobility 
patterns of these fractions within the service class. In this chapter, we investigate how 
exclusive the mobility patterns of the high- and low-grade technocrats and the high- and low-
grade social and cultural specialists are. The prerequisite for considering an occupational 
group as a social class is its exclusive intergenerational mobility patterns. Following Weber, 
Goldthorpe c.s. (Goldthorpe, 1980; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe, 2000) have 
argued that a social class does not constitute a class proper, unless there is considerable 
intergenerational reproduction of class membership. Accordingly, in this chapter, we ask 
Research Question 2:  
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this chapter is a collaborated work with Ruud Luijkx and Harry Ganzeboom and is 
presented at the Spring meeting 2006 of the Research Committee on Social Stratification and Mobility (RC28) 
of the International Sociological Association (ISA). 
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2. To what extent do the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists constitute distinct 
classes with regard to their intergenerational mobility patterns?  
 
Problem formulation 
Questions about intergenerational mobility patterns of the disaggregated classes within the 
service class are separated into three subquestions. Our first two questions are about the 
external and internal mobility patterns of the newly distinguished classes. External mobility 
involves the relative mobility between the disaggregated classes and the other classes. Internal 
mobility entails the relative mobility among the disaggregated classes. We can learn whether 
the newly distinguished classes are externally and internally homogeneous or whether they 
are differentiated with regard to their mobility patterns by using external and internal 
homogeneity criteria. Breiger (1981) and Goodman (1981) developed the criterion of 
homogeneity to combine two or more classes into one single class. However, one can also use 
these criteria to validate whether the disaggregated social classes meet the condition of having 
specific intergenerational mobility patterns. The external homogeneity entails that 
intergenerational relative mobility between technocrats and the other classes is the same as it 
is between social and cultural specialists and the other social classes. Internal homogeneity 
means that the intergenerational relative mobility between the origin class and destination 
class of the technocrats is the same as the relative mobility between the origin and destination 
class of the social and cultural specialists.  
If technocrats and social and cultural specialists have externally and internally 
homogeneous mobility patterns, we cannot consider these classes as single classes. However, 
if these disaggregated classes have externally and internally heterogeneous mobility patterns, 
we can consider these classes as single classes. In that case, we would conclude that our 
disaggregated service classes of the EGP class schema fulfil the necessary condition of having 
specific intergenerational mobility patterns and effectively constitute social classes in their 
own right. Hence, our first subquestion is: 
 
a) To what extent are the high- and low-grade technocrats and the high- and low-grade social 
and cultural specialists externally homogeneous regarding their intergenerational social 
mobility?  
 
Our second subquestion is whether the social mobility exchange among the newly 
distinguished social classes within the service class is homogeneous:  
 
b) To what extent are the high- and low-grade technocrats and the high- and low-grade social 
and cultural specialists internally homogeneous regarding their intergenerational social 
mobility?  
 
In this chapter, we also answer the fourth research question, which addresses the over time 
development of the mobility patterns of the newly distinguished social classes. The fractions 
Patterns of intergenerational mobility 
 
 47
of the social and cultural specialists are the ‘new’ post-industrial classes. Therefore, these 
classes need to organise their patterns of intergenerational social mobility and to crystallise 
their ‘demographic identity’. Our question is the extent to which the ‘new’ classes within the 
service class establish mobility patterns over time. Has the reproduction of their specific 
intergenerational mobility patterns increased or decreased? Hence, our Research Question 4 
reads: 
 
4) To what extent have the intergenerational mobility boundaries of the social and cultural 
specialists become more closed over time?  
 
 
3.2 Theory and hypotheses 
 
3.2.1 Mobility patterns of the newly distinguished classes 
The new class theorists (Bell, 1971; Brint, 1984; Kriesi, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 1993; De 
Graaf & Steijn, 1997) have not focused on social mobility patterns of the ‘new’ classes within 
the service class; nor have they given a theoretical description of those patterns. We therefore 
use the class reproduction theory of Bourdieu (1984) whose ideas on economic and cultural 
elite formation were the prime source of inspiration for us to distinguish the ‘new’ from the 
‘old’ classes. Following Bourdieu (1984), we argue that differences in social mobility and 
social reproduction between the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists and the 
high- and low-grade technocrats derive from differences in their resources. Social 
reproduction process takes place in the context of fields such as science, education, arts, 
commercial services and governance that require different kinds of resources to be successful. 
People in every field occupy positions, or try to create new ones, by controlling and 
exploiting the resources specific to the occupational roles they perform in a field. The class of 
social and cultural specialists is defined by its role as experts who claim unique knowledge 
and expertise for the field they work in. Conversely, the class of technocrats performs 
commercial, managerial and organizational roles in their fields.  
Bourdieu (1984) claimed that social and cultural specialists have more cultural skills 
such as intellectual, creative and communication skills than the incumbents of other 
occupations. Social and cultural specialists also distinguish themselves from other 
occupational categories within the middle class, as being most prevalent in the field where 
cultural skills and forms are in high demand and highly valued: education, science and arts. 
On the other hand, the technocrats command relatively more often economic resources, such 
as organizational, commercial and managerial skills (Savage, Barlow, Dickens & Fielding, 
1992) that are in high demand in the fields they dominate: governance and commercial 
services. 
Bourdieu (1984) argues that class specific reproduction pattern can best be understood 
with reference the skills and forms that are specific to a class. Cultural forms and skills are 
easier to store in families than economic skills because the former are a set of internalised 
dispositions that govern people’s behaviour (see also Bourdieu, 1984). Therefore, Bourdieu 
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also claims that it is relatively easy to pass off cultural skills to offspring whereas transmitting 
the commercial and organizational skills to them is relatively difficult. Savage et al. (1992) 
add that organizational skills are more difficult to store in families because of their context-
specific nature.  
Our expectations about social mobility of the newly distinguished classes thus derive 
from Bourdieu’s model of economic and cultural differentiation among the service class 
fractions. Children from lower status families are excluded from mobility into the fraction of 
social and cultural specialists. Conversely, educational credentials less exclusively dominate 
access to technocratic positions and these positions allow for more opportunities to be entered 
during the (later) occupational career. Hypothesis 1a states that the technocrats recruit more 
from lower social classes than the social and cultural specialists. By the same token, 
intergenerational reproduction must have been easier to maintain for social and cultural 
specialists, who can use educational reproduction to promote their children’s life chances, 
elevate them to similar positions as their father and prevent downward mobility into the 
working and petty bourgeois classes. Hypothesis 2a reads: the social and cultural specialists 
are intergenerationally more immobile than the technocrats. 
 
3.2.2 Homogeneity of the newly distinguished classes 
A correct distinction of social classes accurately represents their mobility patterns. Breiger 
(1981) and Goodman (1981) showed that only if certain social classes have statistically 
homogeneous mobility patterns, they can be collapsed into a single social class. They 
developed external and internal homogeneity criteria to combine two or more social classes 
in an intergenerational mobility table to gain new insights and conclusions about the mobility 
patterns of these classes. In contrast, we will use these criteria to discern whether we have 
distinguished the classes correctly regarding their mobility patterns. So we do not intend to 
collapse the social classes but to test the justification for our disaggregation.  
According to the external homogeneity criterion, for two or more occupational 
categories to qualify as one class in an intergenerational mobility table, it is necessary for 
these categories to ‘display the same relative mobility towards the other categories’ (Luijkx, 
1994: 245). Simply put, the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists are externally 
homogeneous when they have similar relative flows with the other classes. Internal 
homogeneity means that ‘the flows among these categories are in agreement with the 
frequencies as predicted by statistical independence’ (Luijkx, 1994: 245). That is to say, the 
class of the technocrats and the class of the social and cultural specialists are internally 
homogeneous when ending up in one of these classes does not depend on their origin class 
(father’s class). In this case, mobility of these classes between father’s class and son’s or 
daughter’s class is perfect.  
We have explained why we expect the mobility patterns of the fractions within the 
service class to be different from each other and from the other social classes in Hypotheses 
1a and 2a. Using the two criteria of homogeneity, we are able to reveal whether these 
fractions are indeed distinct social classes. If, on the one hand, mobility from father’s class to 
son’s or daughter’s class in Classes Ia (high-grade technocrats) and Ib (high-grade social and 
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cultural specialists) is independent from each other, these classes are collapsible. 
Simultaneously, if the intergenerational relative mobility between these two social classes (Ia 
and Ib) and the other social classes within the EGP class schema are the same then these 
classes are collapsible into a single class as well. The same applies for the low-grade fractions 
of these classes (IIa the low-grade technocrats) and (IIb low-grade social and cultural 
specialists). That is, if, on the one hand, mobility from father’s class to son’s or daughter’s 
class in the classes IIa and IIb is independent from each other, these classes are collapsible. 
Simultaneously, if the intergenerational relative mobility between these two social classes (IIa 
and IIb) and the other social classes within the EGP class schema are the same then these 
classes are collapsible into a single class as well. In that case, the low-grade technocrats and 
the low-grade social and cultural specialists are collapsible.  
One can also validate the higher-lower distinction within the service class. If the relative 
flows of the classes Ia (the high-grade technocrats) and IIa (the low-grade technocrats) are 
identical and if the relative flows between these two classes and the other social classes are 
the same then these classes are collapsible into a single class. The same applies for the classes 
Ib and IIb: if the relative flows of the classes Ib (the high-grade social and cultural specialists) 
and IIb (the low-grade social and cultural specialists) are similar and if the relative flows 
between these two classes and the other social classes are the same then these classes are 
collapsible into a single class. In that case, the higher-lower distinction within the service 
class is collapsible.  
We expect the technocrats to recruit more from the lower social classes than the social 
and cultural specialists. In accordance with Hypothesis 1a, we expect that the disaggregated 
social classes within the service class have specific, i.e. heterogeneous external mobility 
patterns and therefore are not collapsible (hypothesis 1b). We stated in Hypothesis 2a that 
the social and cultural specialists inherit more their fathers’ class position than the technocrats 
do. In accordance with this hypothesis we expect that the disaggregated social classes within 
the service class have specific, i.e. heterogeneous internal mobility patterns and therefore are 
not collapsible (hypothesis 2b).   
 
3.2.3 Inheritance of class position over time 
New classes need time to form typical intergenerational class mobility patterns. In other 
words, a new class needs time to crystallise its mobility chances i.e., life chances (Goldthorpe, 
1980, 1982, 1995). Goldthorpe (1980) argued that a social class goes through a process of 
organising its class interest via patterns of intergenerational reproduction of class position. 
When this process completes, the members of this class will act in accordance with their class 
interest. However, modernisation theory asserts (Blau & Duncan, 1967) that social 
reproduction will decrease by an increasing modernisation of the labour market. Ganzeboom 
and Luijkx (2004) showed a clear downward trend in total social reproduction between 1970 
and 1999.  
Yet, there are two counterbalancing processes in the development of intergenerational 
social class mobility. On the one hand, the Netherlands and other advanced industrial 
societies (Ganzeboom & Luijkx, 2004; Breen & Luijkx, 2004) are experiencing a clear trend 
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towards more social fluidity and less social reproduction that is consistent with modernisation 
theory (Ganzeboom & Luijkx, 2004; Blau & Duncan, 1967). On the other hand, the ‘new’ 
social classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists need time to reproduce 
their exceptional social positions by recruiting from their own class of origin. Ignoring 
modernisation processes, one would expect the ‘new’ social classes, i.e. the social and 
cultural specialists, to differentiate their class position over time. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 
states that the social and cultural specialists become relatively more immobile over time than 
the technocrats.  
 
 
3.3 Data and method 
 
3.3.1 Data 
We use data from 38 surveys that were collected between 1970 and 2004, which are part of 
the International Stratification and Mobility File (ISMF) project. This project brings together 
and harmonises surveys on social mobility from many countries. The sources of these surveys 
are listed in Appendix 3A, and further information is available from the ISMF website 
(http://home.fsw.vu.nl/~ganzeboom/ismf/). We selected from the ISMF files for the 
Netherlands those files that contain detailed occupation codes, information on self-
employment and supervising status to warrant the construction of detailed intergenerational 
mobility tables. The data originally contain a variety of detailed occupation codes. A majority 
of the data have been categorised in the 1971/19842 standard occupational classification (CBS 
84) Statistics Netherlands, both older and newer classifications have been used. In some files, 
occupational measures have been cast in either the 1968 of 1988 version of the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO 68 and ISCO 88).  
In order to depart as little from the original data as possible, we have constructed the 
class categories in two ways. For all the data files in which occupations were measured in the 
CBS 84 occupation code, we constructed the categories using its close relative ISCO 68 as a 
conversion tool. While the ISCO 68 classification is no longer in use for current data, it 
preserves the categories. For the remaining files3 we used the ISCO 88 classification. We 
experimented with exchanging and combining the two, but have not found any systematic 
divergence between them.  
 
                                                 
2  The difference between the 1971 and 1984 CBS are very minor and not important for the subject of this paper. 
In addition, CBS7184 (CBS 84) is essentially a four-digit variety of three-digit 1968 ISCO. However, neither the 
earlier and later national Dutch codes, nor ISCO-88 are closely related to one another.  
3 In a couple of files, different codes were used for fathers and respondents. In these cases, we have applied 
different conversions for the generations. 
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Figure 3.1: The adjusted EGP class schema, class name and some examples of occupations within 
these classes 
Adjusted EGP Class name Occupations 
Ia High-grade technocrats 
Managers of big firms, governmental and non-
governmental administrators, physical scientists, etc. 
Ib High-grade social cultural specialists 
Medical doctors, dentists, university teachers, social 
scientists high church officers etc. 
IIa Low-grade technocrats 
Managers of small firms, engineers, computer 
programmers, etc. 
IIb Low-grade social cultural specialists 
Medical assistants, professional nurses, teachers, artists, 
etc. 
IIIa Routine non-manual workers 
Routine clerical employees in administration and 
commerce, rank and file service workers 
IIIb Sales and personal service workers Sales and personal service workers 
IVa Self-employed Small proprietors with employees 
IVb Self-employed Small proprietors without employees 
V Manual supervisors 
Lower-grade technicians, supervisors of manual 
workers 
VI Skilled manual workers Skilled manual workers 
VIIa Semi- and unskilled workers Semi- and unskilled manual workers 
VIIb Farm labourers Farm labourers 
IVc Self-employed farmers Self-employed farmers 
 
Only respondents between the ages of 24 and 65 are included in the analysis. Respondent’s 
class is identified on the basis of his/her last or current occupation. Theories discussed make 
no distinction between intergenerational transmitting of men’s and women’s class specific 
features. Is the proper measure of the origin class of women indeed their father’s class, like it 
is always assumed to be for sons? Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) used the ‘dominance’ thesis 
to indicate the class of women. The person in a family, either husband or wife, who is 
dominant in the labour market determines the class of the family. In practice this almost 
always involves father’s class. Korupp (2000) showed that there is considerable same-sex 
intergenerational transfer; mothers more than fathers affect daughters’ occupational status and 
fathers more than mothers affect their sons’ occupational status. However, the same research 
showed that the effect of mothers’ occupational status is much smaller than the effect of 
fathers’ occupational position on daughters’ occupation. Therefore, we are happy to take 
father’s social class as the single indicator of origin class for both sons and daughters.  
The class of respondent’s father is identified on the basis of the occupation the father 
had when the respondent was around 15 years old. The distinguished social classes and all 
other classes within the adjusted EGP class schema are shown in Figure 3.1. In Chapter 2, we 
described how we distinguished the two ‘old’ and the two ‘new’ classes. Interested reader can 
download the conversion tools (the allocation of the service class occupations [ISCO 68 and 
ISCO 88] into the classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists and into 
the classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats) from the following website 
www.ayseguveli.nl. Furthermore, unlike in the other chapters, here we use all 13 social 
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classes in the adjusted EGP class schema, since we are comparing the mobility patterns of the 
newly distinguished social classes to those of the other classes.  
We distinguished seven periods: 1) 1970-1974; 2) 1975-1979; 3) 1980-1984; 4) 1985-
1989; 5) 1990-1994; 6) 1995-1999 and 7) 2000-2004. Table 3.1a and Table 3.1b show the 
frequencies of sons’ and daughters’ social classes in the seven five-years periods respectively. 
Table 3.1a shows that the proportion of men in the class of the high-grade technocrats 
increased between 1970 and 2004 from 13 percent to 16 percent while the percentage of men 
in the class of the low-grade technocrats increased from 11 percent to 18 percent between 
1970 and 2004. Table 3.1b shows that women were initially underrepresented in technocratic 
occupations while the proportion gradually increased in these occupations. The share of 
women increased in the class of the high-grade technocrats from 4 percent in 1970 to 6 
percent in 2004 while it reached unprecedented levels in the class of the low-grade 
technocrats from 3 percent to 11 percent. The proportion of men (Table 3.1a) in the class of 
the high-grade social and cultural specialists remains stable between 1970 and 2004 whereas 
the percentage of men in the class of the low-grade social and cultural specialists is almost 
tripled from 5 percent to 14 percent. Table 3.1b shows that the percentage of women in the 
class of the high-grade social and cultural specialists rose from 1 percent in 1970 to 4 percent 
in 2004.  
  
Table 3.1a: Class structure for men in the labour force for seven five-years periods between 1970 and 
2004  
 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 Total
Ia. High-grade technocrats 12.9 10.2 10.2 9.4 11.3 14.4 15.8 12.7
Ib. High-grade social and cultural 
specialists 
2.5 2.3 3.1 3.4 2.7 2.6 3.3 2.8
IIa. Low-grade technocrats 11.0 12.1 11.1 12.1 17.1 18.7 18.2 16.0
IIb. Low-grade social and cultural 
specialists 
5.2 9.5 10.6 9.8 12.4 12.2 13.9 11.5
IIIa. Routine non-manual employees 9.6 13.8 13.8 14.3 12.4 10.3 9.9 11.6
IIIb. Sales and personal service workers 3.6 2.4 3.0 6.3 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.6
IVa. Self-employed with employees 4.1 2.7 2.3 2.5 2.4 1.5 2.3 2.2
IVb. Self-employed without employees 4.9 3.0 2.8 2.5 1.7 1.7 1.4 2.1
V. Manual supervisors 2.2 4.2 4.3 3.4 3.8 5.0 3.8 4.1
VI. Skilled manual workers  19.3 20.4 20.2 17.4 15.4 13.7 12.4 15.7
VIIa. Unskilled manual workers 16.5 12.0 13.5 15.2 13.3 13.2 12.1 13.4
VIIb. Farm labourers  2.2 2.2 1.6 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.3
IVc. Farmers 6.0 5.1 3.7 2.6 3.0 2.2 2.3 3.0
Total N 1,786 2,910 2,375 2,985 5,167 9,668 4,489 29,380
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Table 3.1b: Class structure for women in the labour force for seven five-years periods between 1970 
and 2004  
 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 Total
Ia. High-grade technocrats 3.7 1.2 0.5 1.1 2.5 4.2 6.1 3.5
Ib. High-grade social and cultural 
specialists 
1.2 1.0 0.7 1.1 1.9 2.2 4.0 2.2
IIa. Low-grade technocrats 2.6 4.3 4.4 5.6 7.6 12.4 11.0 9.3
IIb. Low-grade social and cultural 
specialists 
16.8 18.8 14.6 14.9 20.4 18.5 22.4 18.9
IIIa. Routine non-manual employees 24.6 25.7 26.0 29.2 28.0 24.0 21.9 25.0
IIIb. Sales and personal service workers 14.1 12.5 14.8 17.5 12.0 17.2 12.5 14.9
IVa. Self-employed with employees 3.3 0.8 0.8 1.7 1.2 0.7 1.3 1.1
IVb. Self-employed without employees 5.2 3.6 2.9 2.8 2.0 1.7 2.8 2.3
V. Manual supervisors 0.2 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.5
VI. Skilled manual workers  5.1 3.5 4.4 3.4 3.8 2.5 2.2 3.0
VIIa. Unskilled manual workers 20.8 25.4 29.6 20.9 18.5 14.8 14.1 17.8
VIIb. Farm labourers  1.0 1.3 0.3 0.5 1.2 0.7 0.8 0.8
IVc. Farmers 1.4 1.2 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
Total N 573 1,040 2,073 2,290 4,217 8,867 4,896 23,956
 
Women are relatively overrepresented among low-grade social and cultural specialists and 
their proportion increased from 17 percent to 22 percent between 1970 and 2004. Overall, the 
share of all class members within the service class increased between 1970 and 2004 for both 
men and women. However, the size of the high- and low-grade technocrats increased more 
than the size of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists between 1970 and 
2004. The figures of outflow from origin to destination class for men and women appear in 
Appendix 3B. 
 
3.3.2 Method  
External and internal homogeneity 
We try to determine whether the high- and low-grade technocrats, the high- and low-grade 
social and cultural specialists have specific mobility patterns. As mentioned before, we use 
external and internal homogeneity criteria to do this. By means of these criteria, we explore 
whether they in fact are collapsible in regard to their mobility patterns. In Figure 3.2, we 
visualise the homogeneity criteria we apply to the high-grade technocrats (Ia) and the high-
grade social and cultural specialists (Ib) on the one hand and the low-grade technocrats (IIa) 
and the low-grade social and cultural specialists (IIb) on the other hand. 
 
External homogeneity criterion 
The condition of external homogeneity applies to the cells that represent mobility between, on 
the one hand, the classes considered for disaggregation and, on the other hand, all the other 
categories in the table. The cells of external homogeneity criterion for collapsing the high-
grade technocrats (Ia) and the high-grade social and cultural specialists (Ib) are shaded with 
diagonal lines in Figure 3.2. The condition of external homogeneity for the high-grade 
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technocrats (Ia) and the high-grade social and cultural specialists (Ib) means that these two 
classes have similar relations with the other social classes within this intergenerational 
mobility table. The cells of external homogeneity criterion for collapsing the low-grade 
technocrats (IIa) and the low-grade social and cultural specialists (IIb) are shaded in grey. 
The condition of external homogeneity for the low-grade technocrats (IIa) and the low-grade 
social and cultural specialists (IIb) means that these two classes should have similar relations 
with the other social classes. 
 
Figure 3.2: External and internal homogeneity criteria for classes Ia, Ib, IIa and IIb in a 13-by-13-
mobility table 
     destination        
  Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb IVa IVb V VI VIIa VIIb IVc 
 Ia ○/ ○            
 Ib ○ ○/            
o IIa   ●/■  ●          
r IIb   ● ●/■          
i IIIa              
g IIIb              
i IVa              
n IVb              
 V              
 VI              
 VIIa              
 VIIb              
 IVc              
• When there is independence in the area shaded with diagonal lines, external homogeneity for Classes Ia and Ib applies 
• When there is independence in the grey shaded area, external homogeneity for Classes IIa and IIb applies 
• When there is independence in the cells with ○, the strong version of internal homogeneity for Classes Ia and Ib applies 
• When there is independence in the cells with ●, the strong version of internal homogeneity for Classes IIa and IIb 
applies 
• When there is independence in the off-diagonal cells with ○ and equal immobility in the cells with , the weak form of 
internal homogeneity for Classes Ia and Ib applies 
• When there is independence in the off-diagonal cells with ● and equal immobility in the cells with ■, the weak form of 
internal homogeneity for Classes IIa and IIb applies. 
 
Internal homogeneity criterion 
The condition of internal homogeneity pertains to the cells that represent mobility among the 
classes that are considered for collapsing. Internal homogeneity for collapsing the class of the 
high-grade technocrats and the class of the high-grade social and cultural specialists means 
that there is independence in this part of the table, i.e., that mobility between these two classes 
is perfect. These cells are market by ○ in Figure 3.2. Internal homogeneity for collapsing the 
class of the low-grade technocrats and the class of the low-grade social and cultural 
specialists stands for the perfect mobility between these two classes. These cells are marked 
by ● in Figure 3.2.  
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It is possible that external homogeneity applies but that internal homogeneity does not. 
Furthermore, we test the internal and external homogeneity of Classes Ia and Ib as well as 
Classes IIa and IIb simultaneously4. Therefore, we fit the model of independence on the 
shaded area plus the cells marked by ○ and ● in Figure 3.2.  
Our tests of homogeneity are based on the Equal Row and Column Model II (ERC II), 
which was developed by Goodman (1979) and Hauser (1984a, 1984b). Luijkx (1994) has 
shown how these models can test local independence by using equality constraints on the 
scaling parameters in these models. The ERC II model is a linear-by-linear interaction model 
in which the classes are scaled. In an intergenerational mobility table, the scalings of origin 
and destination show the difficulty to move from an origin to a destination class. If two 
classes are identically scaled, mobility between them is perfect, i.e. that there are no class 
boundaries between these two social classes. If the scalings of two social classes are identical, 
they can be considered as a single class with regard to their mobility patterns. However, if the 
scalings of two social classes are different, this means that exchanges between these two 
social classes and other social classes are very different. This implies that these social classes 
cannot be aggregated into one social class and should therefore be disaggregated.  
 
The strong and weak versions of the internal homogeneity criterion 
The ERC-II model is usually supplemented with parameters that separately model the 
diagonal densities. These diagonal coefficients represent immobility in social classes over and 
above the density for the diagonals implied by the generic association patterns modelled by 
scalings and the generic association coefficients. The condition of internal homogeneity 
implied that there are no diagonal coefficients specific to a certain class.  
The condition of internal homogeneity is the strong version of the internal 
homogeneity criterion. It is likely that this criterion does not apply fully. In this case, we will 
weaken the internal homogeneity criterion by including selected parameters of immobility 
into the model. These parameters of immobility are the class inheritance parameters. These 
cells are marked as  and ■ in Figure 3.2. The baseline log linear model for the weaker 
version of the homogeneity criterion, in which all parameters for the main-diagonal cells are 
included, is the so-called Quasi-Equal Row and Column Model II. We would conclude that 
the Classes Ia and Ib as well as IIa and IIb could be collapsed, if both the external and internal 
homogeneity conditions apply. If not, we can conclude that these classes are differentiated 
and correctly distinguished.  
Figure 3.2 shows the application of internal and external homogeneity conditions for 
collapsing Classes Ia and Ib into a class and for collapsing Classes IIa and IIb into another 
class. However, another option would be to examine the higher-lower boundary. That is, to 
collapse Classes Ia and IIa into a class and to collapse Classes Ib and IIb into another class. In 
this case, we could conclude that Classes Ia and IIa as well as Ib and IIb could be collapsed, if 
                                                 
4 We have also tested the internal and external homogeneity of these classes separately. We equated the scalings 
of Ia and Ib, the scalings of IIa and IIb, the scalings of Ia and IIa and the scalings of Ib and IIb in separate 
models. These results do not show any significant differences from testing their internal and external 
homogeneity simultaneously.  
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both the external and internal homogeneity conditions apply. Again, if these conditions do not 
apply we would conclude that our classification of the service class satisfies the necessary 
condition regarding the mobility patterns of the newly distinguished social classes.  
To check whether the internal and external homogeneity criteria are applicable to the 
fractions within the service class, we compare the fit statistics of the unrestricted baseline 
model with the fit statistics of a model that is restricted for internal or external homogeneity. 
Our analyses are conducted using scaled and constrained association models estimated in 
LEM (Vermunt, 1997).  
 
 
3.4 Results 
 
3.4.1 Baseline models and class inheritance 
Column 1 of Table 3.2 shows the log linear models and Column 3 represents the fit measures 
(L2) of these models for men while Column 5 does so for women. Column 2 shows the degree 
of freedoms (df) of these models for men and women. Columns 4 and 6 show the Bayesian 
Information Coefficient (BIC) of these models for men and women respectively. Raftery 
(1986) states that the BIC score is a device to compare models with each other when one uses 
large sample sizes. Since we use large samples and not all our models are nested, we use the 
BIC and L2 scores. As will be shown, both the BIC and L2 scores lead to the same 
conclusions. We will use both scores: the BIC scores will be used to indicate the best fitting 
model while the L2 scores will be implemented to reveal whether a model improves the fit 
significantly compared to other models. 
 Panel A of Table 3.2 shows the baseline models and examines class inheritance. We 
start the log linear model selections with the independence (Model A0) and the quasi-
independence (Model A1) models to see whether there is an association between the classes 
of origin and destination. Model A0 tests the assumption that there is no such association 
while Model A1 includes the main-diagonal effects of Model A1. These two models have a 
very poor fit, i.e. the L2 scores are high and the BIC statistics are positive, which means that 
there are considerable associations between the class of origin and destination and that these 
models fit substantially worse than the saturated model. 
 Model A2 of Table 3.2 is the baseline model equal row and column model II (ERC II). 
Model A3 is the quasi-equal row and Column Model II. In general, this model is the best 
model for revealing the mobility patterns within an intergenerational mobility table (Luijkx, 
1994). Model A3 contains 13 parameters for the main diagonal cells, inheritance of class 
position. Figure 3.3 presents the scalings of Model A3 for men and women. These scalings 
show the distance between the social classes. Figure 3.3 shows that the maximum distance 
among the classes of men and women is between the agricultural workers (VIIb) and the 
high-grade social and cultural specialists (Ib). We see that both for men and women, it is more 
difficult to enter or exit the classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists 
(Ib and IIb) than to enter or exit the classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats (Ia and 
IIa). The scaling parameters for the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are –
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0.49 and –0.33 respectively for men and –0.59 and –0.33 respectively for women; the scaling 
parameters for the high- and low-grade technocrats are –0.27 and –0.21 respectively for men 
and –0.27 and –0.16 respectively for women. Figure 3.3 shows that it is easier for the children 
of people from all classes outside the service class to enter the classes of the high- and low-
grade technocrats (Ia and IIa) than the classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists (Ib and IIb). Hence this finding supports Hypothesis 1a that the technocrats recruit 
more from other classes than do the social and cultural specialists.  
 
Table 3.2: Log linear model selections for immobility and homogeneity of the service class fractions 
for men and women older than 24 and younger than 65 years ([Nmen=29,377] [Nwomen=23,957]) 
1 2  3 4 5 6 
 Men Women 
Panel A: Baseline models and class inheritance df L2 BIC L2 BIC 
A0. Independence model  144 6736.8 5255.3 3205.1 1753.0
A1. Quasi-independence model 131 2774.1 1426.4 2235.2 914.2
A2. Unrestricted Baseline ERC II 132 2418.7 1060.7 723.8 -607.3
A3. Quasi-equal Row and Column Model II  119 678.9 -545.4 423.4 -776.6
Panel B: External homogeneity  
B4. A3 + without cells Ia, Ib, IIa and IIb (baseline 
model) 
107 630.0 -470.8 366.9 -733.9
B5. B4 + Equal scalings for Ia & Ib and IIa & IIb 109 652.8 -468.6 403.5 -717.9
B6. B4 + Equal scalings for Ia & IIa and Ib & IIb 109 630.7 -490.7 374.0 -747.4
Panel C: Internal plus external homogeneity  
C7. A3 + Equal scaling for Ia & Ib and for IIa & IIb 
(weak version) 
121 776.3 -468.6 564.4 -655.8
C8. C7 + Equal scaling for Ia & Ib and for IIa & IIb 
(strong version) 
123 881.6 -383.8 614.8 -625.6
C9. A3 + Equal scaling for Ia & IIa and for Ib & IIb 
(weak version) 
121 718.3 -526.5 514.1 -706.4
C10. C9 + Equal scaling for Ia & IIa and for Ib & IIb 
(strong version)  
123 758.1 -507.3 549.9 -690.4
 
In Figure 3.4, we show the inheritance parameters of Model A1 and Model A3 of Table 3.2 
for men and women. With these inheritance parameters we can test our second hypothesis, 
that the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are intergenerationally more 
immobile than the high- and low-grade technocrats. Figure 3.4 compares the inheritance 
parameters of Model A1 that assumes that there is no association between origin and 
destination class outside the main diagonal with the inheritance parameters of Model A3 that 
assumes that there is such an association. 
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Figure 3.3: Distance (scalings) between the social classes for men and 
women (Model A3 of Table 3.2) 
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Figure 3.4 shows that, assuming that there is no association between origin and destination 
outside the main diagonal, the male and female high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists (Ib and IIb) are more likely to inherit their fathers’ class position. The male and 
female high- and low-grade technocrats (Ia and IIa) are less likely to do so. These results 
support Hypothesis 2a. For men, there are no differences in inheritance between Model A1 
and A3 for the classes of the routine non-manual workers (IIIa), sales and personal service 
workers (IIIb), self-employed persons with and without employees (IVa and IVb), farmers 
(IVc) and manual supervisors (V). The inheritance of class position is highest for male 
farmers in both models. If one takes the association outside the main diagonal into 
consideration (Model A3 of Table 3.2), the class inheritance of men decreases but the relation 
between the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists and the high- and low-grade 
technocrats remains the same as it is in Model A1. Again this supports Hypothesis 2a.  
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Figure 3.4: Inheritance of class position of all social classes of Models A1 and A3 of Table 3.2 
for men and women 
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The picture is different for women if one models the association in the off-diagonals. Note 
that all inheritance parameters of women are lower than those of men except for the high-
grade technocrats in Figure 3.4. The high-grade female technocrats inherit their fathers’ class 
position more than their male counterparts do. This is an interesting finding. It might be that 
these women are inherited large firms from their father. For women, the inheritance of class 
position decreases in Model A3 and even becomes negative for the high-grade social and 
cultural specialists: they inherit their fathers’ class position less than we would expect in this 
model. These findings contradict Hypothesis 2a that states that the social and cultural 
specialists are more immobile than the technocrats. However, the low-grade female social and 
cultural specialists are more likely to end up in their class of origin than low-grade 
technocrats are. This is in accordance with Hypothesis 2a. Furthermore, modeling the 
association outside the main diagonal (Model A3), the semi- and unskilled female workers 
(VIIa) inherit their fathers’ class position less than we would expect in this model. The sales 
and personal service female workers inherit their fathers’ class position less than we would 
expect on base of the assumptions of both models. So with regard to their intergenerational 
mobility, this class could hardly be considered a social class.  
 
3.4.2 External homogeneity of the newly distinguished classes 
Panels B and C of Table 3.2 respectively test the external and internal homogeneity of the 
newly distinguished social classes. These two panels test Hypotheses 1b and 2b respectively. 
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First we will explain the external homogeneity (Panel B). This panel shows whether relative 
mobility between the service class fractions and the other social classes are the same. Models 
B4 to B6 test the applicability of the external homogeneity criterion. In Model B4, we have 
omitted the effects of all cells within the service class to look to the odds ratios of the classes 
within the service class and the classes outside the service class. This model is the baseline 
model for testing the external homogeneity. In Model B5, we have equated the scaling 
parameter of the high-grade technocrats (Ia) with the scaling parameter of the high-grade 
social and cultural specialist (Ib). Simultaneously, we have equated the scaling parameter of 
the low-grade technocrats (IIa) and the scaling parameter of the low-grade social and cultural 
specialists (IIb).  
Model B6 tests whether the higher-lower distinction within the service class is 
differentiated and thus justified. In Model B6, we have equated the scaling parameter of the 
high-grade technocrats with that of the low-grade technocrats (Ia and IIa) and we have 
equated the scaling parameter of the high-grade social and cultural specialists with that of the 
low-grade social and cultural specialists (Ib and IIb). The comparison of the L2 and BIC scores 
of these three models shows that Model B6 fits the data better than other two models (Model 
B4 and B5) both for men and for women. According to the external homogeneity criterion, 
we cannot consider the high-grade technocrats and the high-grade social and cultural 
specialists as a single class, nor can we consider the low-grade technocrats and the low-grade 
social and cultural specialists as another single class. According to this criterion, the model 
(Model B6) that assumes that the high- and low-grade technocrats exhibit similar external 
mobility patterns and that the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists exhibit 
similar mobility patterns fits our data better than Model B5. That is, combining the higher-
lower distinction within the service class fits the data better than combining the distinctions of 
the fractions of the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists. Note, however, that 
none of these models in Panel B fit the data better than Model A3, indicating that all fractions 
within the service class must be distinguished.  
 
3.4.3 Internal plus external homogeneity of the newly distinguished classes 
Models C7 to C10 test the applicability of internal homogeneity to the external homogeneity 
criterion. These models reveal whether there is the same relative mobility among the fractions 
within the service class and whether that mobility between these fractions and the other social 
classes is homogeneous. They test Hypothesis 2b. In Model C7, the scaling parameter of the 
high-grade technocrats (Ia) is equated with that of the high-grade social and cultural 
specialists (Ib) and the scaling parameter of the low-grade technocrats (IIa) is equated with 
that of the low-grade social and cultural specialists (IIb). In other words, is the mobility 
between the origin and destination of Classes Ia and Ib dependent or independent? 
Simultaneously, is the mobility between the origin and destination of Classes IIa and IIb 
dependent or independent? Consequently, Model C8 tests whether the high-grade technocrats 
and the high-grade social and cultural specialists can be considered as a single class with 
regard to their intergenerational mobility and whether the low-grade technocrats and the low-
grade social and cultural specialists can be regarded as another single class. Model C7 
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assumes that inheritance of class position (weak version) while Model C8 does not (strong 
version). Model C8 significantly worsens the model fit of Model C7 according to L2 scores: 
the model fit decreases from 776.3 by 121 degrees of freedom and for Model C7 to 881.6 
with 123 degrees of freedom for Model C8 for men and from 564.4 to 614.8 for women. 
Hence, we can conclude that mobility between the origin and destination of the high-grade 
technocrats and the high-grade social and cultural specialists, and mobility between the origin 
and destination of the low-grade technocrats and the low-grade social and cultural specialists 
are not statistically independent. That is, the mobility of the high-grade technocrats and the 
high-grade social and cultural specialists is specific, as is the mobility of the low-grade 
technocrats and the low-grade social and cultural specialists. Therefore we cannot combine 
technocrats and social and cultural specialists into a single class. This supports Hypothesis 2b.  
Models C9 and C10 test whether the higher-lower distinction within the service class is 
differentiated with regard to internal mobility. In Model C9, the scaling parameters of the 
high- and low-grade technocrats are equated with each other and so are the scaling parameters 
of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists. In the same way, in Model C10 the 
scaling parameters of the high- and low-grade technocrats are equated and so are the scaling 
parameters of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists. Models C9 and C10 
examine whether the internal mobility flows of these classes are equal to or differentiated 
from each other. The differences between Models C9 and C10 are that Model C9 assumes that 
inheritance of class position (weak version) while Model C10 does not (strong version). 
Model C10 significantly worsens the model fit of Model C9 according to L2 scores: the model 
fit decreases from 718.3 with 121 degrees of freedom for Model C9 to 758.1 with 123 degrees 
of freedom for Model C10 for men and it decreases from 514.1 to 549.9 for women. 
Furthermore, none of these models fit the data better than Model A3. These findings show 
that the high- and low-grade technocrats as well as the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists have no homogeneous mobility patterns either for men or for women. This also 
supports Hypothesis 2b. 
We expected the fractions within the service class to have specific external and internal 
mobility patterns and therefore they are not collapsible. Our results show that the newly 
distinguished social classes indeed have internal and external specific mobility patterns. 
Therefore the fractions within the service class can be regarded as single classes with regard 
to their mobility patterns both for men and women. On the one hand, high- and low-grade 
social and cultural specialists have similar relative mobility with other social classes. On the 
other hand, the relative social mobility between the high- and low-grade technocrats and the 
other social classes is also similar. Hence, these findings imply that removing the higher-
lower distinction is a better representation of the intergenerational mobility patterns of the 
classes within the service class than collapsing the distinctions of the fractions of the 
technocrats and the social and cultural specialists. However, on the basis of Model A3, none 
of the disaggregated classes within the service class are collapsible. That is, the 
intergenerational mobility patterns of all the newly distinguished classes are specific and 
heterogeneous. Furthermore, the differences in mobility patterns between men and women are 
insignificant and lead to the same conclusions.  
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3.4.4 Inheritance of class position over time 
Table 3.3 presents the models for the inheritance of class position as represented in the main 
diagonal cells and the over time development (between 1970 and 2004, 7 periods) of the 
inheritance. Table 3.3 tests Hypothesis 3 about the social class reproduction of the social and 
cultural specialists. Model 0 assumes that the class inheritance is the same for all periods. 
Note that the inheritance parameters of class position of Model 0 in Table 3.3 are the same as 
the inheritance parameters of Model A3 in Table 3.2. These parameters are presented in 
Figure 3.4 and we have elaborated on them in Section 3.4.1.  
 
Table 3.3: Log linear model selections of social class reproduction and over time development of it for 
men and women older than 24 and younger than 65 years in 7 periods between 1970 and 2004 
([Nmen=29,377] [Nwomen=23,957]) 
1 2 3 4 5 6
  Men Women 
 df L2 BIC L2 BIC 
0. Equal diagonals model 977 1709.5 -8341.8 1308.9 -8543.1
1. Unidiff model (relative inheritance differ per period) 971 1665.3 -8324.4 1291.5 -8500.1
2. All diagonals over periods differ 899 1577.2 -7671.7 1209.0 -7856.5
3. Linear diagonals over periods 976 1671.9 -8369.2 1295.7 -8546.3
4. Curvilinear diagonals over periods 975 1669.4 -8361.4 1295.6 -8536.3
5. All diagonals over periods differ (3 classes) 955 1635.8 -8189.2 1291.5 -8338.7
 
Hypothesis 3 states that the social and cultural specialists become more immobile over time 
than do the technocrats. Models 1 to 5 of Table 3.3 test this hypothesis for all social classes. 
The distance between the social classes (scalings) are the same in all models in Table 3.3 but 
the inheritance of class position differs per period in Models 1 to 5. Model 1 (unidiff model) 
assumes that the relative inheritance differs in each period. Figure 3.5 presents the association 
parameters of Model 1 between the origin and destination class over seven five-year periods 
for men and women. Figure 3.5 shows that the association between origin and destination 
gradually weakens between 1970 and 2004 for men while the association for women 
increases in the first three periods and then decreases gradually. The association of men and 
women between origin and destination is almost equivalent in the last period.  
Model 2 of Table 3.3 assumes that the inheritance of class position of all classes 
differs over periods and Models 3 and 4 assume that the class inheritance of all classes 
changes in a linear and in a curvilinear trend, respectively. According to L2, the best fitting 
model among Models 1 through 4 is Model 3: all diagonal parameters (the inheritance of class 
position) change linearly over periods. Model 3 improves the model fit upon Model 1: 
(1665.3 – 1671.9 =) –6.6 for men and (1291.5 – 1295.7 =) –4.2 for women with (971 – 976 =) 
-5 degrees of freedom. In Figure 3.6, we have plotted the average change of inheritance of 
social classes over periods of Model 1 and the linear change of the inheritance over periods of 
Model 3 for men and women. Both linear and average changes of inheritance show a 
decreasing inheritance of class position for men and women. 
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Figure 3.5: Trends in association between origin and destination class 
between 1970 and 2004 for men and women according to Model 1
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Figure 3.6: The average change (Model 2 of Table 3.3) and the linear change (Model 4 of Table 
3.3) of the inheritance of social class position over periods for men and women 
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Model 5 in Table 3.3 is exactly the same model as Model 2, but here we equated the scaling 
parameters of the high-grade social and cultural specialists with the low-grade social and 
cultural specialist, the scaling parameters of the high-grade technocrats with the low-grade 
technocrats and the scaling parameters of all the other classes into a third class. This allowed 
us to compare the over time development of class inheritance of the technocrats and the social 
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and cultural specialists with that of the other classes. It turned out that Model 5 does not fit 
the data worse than does Model 2.5 Therefore we use the inheritance parameters of Model 5 to 
compare the over time development in the inheritance of class position of the social and 
cultural specialists with that of the technocrats. 
 
Figure 3.7: Trends in inheritance of class position of the technocrats, the social and 
cultural specialists and the other social classes over periods (between 1970 and 2004) 
for men and women (Model 5 of Table 3.3) 
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Figure 3.7 shows the inheritance parameters of the high- and low-grade technocrats, the high- 
and low-grade social and cultural specialists and the other classes in each period. It presents 
the immobility trends of the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists relative to the 
other social classes in each period between 1970 and 2004 for men and women. This figure 
shows that the inheritance of class position from fathers to sons and daughters is decreasing 
over time for all social classes. The male social and cultural specialists inherit more their 
fathers’ class position than the male technocrats while the other classes are somewhere in 
between in the early periods. In the last periods, these classes approached each other. For 
women, both the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists inherit more their fathers’ 
                                                 
5 We have also compared the over time development of class inheritance of all fractions within the service class 
with the class of farmers without combining any classes. We compared them with farmers because this social 
class is the most immobile (Breen, 2004). These results do not lead to different conclusions. Therefore and for 
the sake of simplicity, we present only the results of the combined classes.    
Patterns of intergenerational mobility 
 
 65
class position than the other social classes in the first period. The development of the 
inheritance of class position fluctuates but it decreases for women in all class. 
 
Figure 3.8: Trends of inheritance of class position of the technocrats and the 
social and cultural specialists relative to all other social classes for men and 
women in 7 periods between 1970 and 2004 
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To see whether the downward trend of class inheritance is slower for the social and cultural 
specialists than for the technocrats, we have related the inheritance parameter of these classes 
to the inheritance parameter of the other classes. These results are shown in Figure 3.8. The 
inheritance of class position for men of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists 
relative to the other social classes is high (1.67) in the first period of 1970-1974 for men while 
the inheritance of the high- and low-grade technocrats relative to the other classes is lower 
(0.53). The inheritance of class position of the high- and low-grade male technocrats relative 
to the other classes fluctuates but it remains approximately at the same level in the first and 
last periods. The inheritance of the high- and low-grade male social and cultural specialists 
relative to the other social classes is high in the first period but it decreases gradually 
thereafter. However, even in the last period, the relative social class reproduction is higher for 
the high- and low-grade male social and cultural specialists than for the high- and low-grade 
male technocrats. For women, there is no clear upward or downward trend either for the high- 
and low-grade technocrats or for the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists. In the 
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first period, the relative social class reproduction of the high- and low-grade technocrats and 
the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists was the same for women (2.9) while in 
the subsequent periods the relative inheritance of the high- and low-grade technocrats and the 
high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists fluctuates greatly.  
These results show that there is a clear trend towards more social fluidity in the 
Netherlands. Our results also show that the social reproduction of fathers’ class position is 
decreasing for all social classes. The decreasing trend of social reproduction is more salient 
for men than for women. The inheritance of the class position of the social and cultural 
specialists is also decreasing in the Netherlands. Consequently, we are not able to support our 
Hypothesis 3, that the social and cultural specialists become relatively more immobile over 
time. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusions and discussion  
 
In Chapter 2, we distinguished a technocratic and a social and cultural specialist fraction 
within the service class with both a higher and a lower version. In this chapter, we have 
investigated whether these newly distinguished social classes have specific mobility patterns 
and consequently differentiate themselves as single social classes.  
Hypothesis 1a states that the technocrats recruit more from other classes than do the 
social and cultural specialists. It is indeed easier for the children from the lower classes to 
become high- and low-grade technocrats than high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists. Most difficult for these children is to enter the classes of the high- and low-grade 
social and cultural specialists. These results also imply that the high- and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists are more successful in preventing their children from downward mobility 
than the high- and low-grade technocrats are. So these results support our expectation. 
Moreover, if one needs to order the ‘new’ and ‘old’ service classes according to their 
accessibility for people from lower class origins, the ordering, from most difficult to easiest 
should be as follows: high-grade social and cultural specialists, the low-grade social and 
cultural specialists, the high-grade technocrats and the low-grade technocrats. In Chapter 2, 
we situate the high-grade social and cultural specialists and the high-grade technocrats next to 
one another; the low-grade social and cultural specialists and the low-grade technocrats 
remain on the same level. This suggestion was mistaken according to their intergenerational 
accessibility from classes outside the service class.   
Hypothesis 2a states that the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are 
intergenerationally more immobile than the high- and the low-grade technocrats. Bourdieu 
(1984) claimed that it is easier for the social and cultural specialists to pass on the class 
specific features to their offspring but that this is relatively difficult for incumbents of other 
classes. The inheritance parameters show that indeed the low- and especially the high-grade 
social and cultural specialists inherit the origin class more than the high- and low-grade 
technocrats do. Women in the class of the low-grade social and cultural specialists inherit 
their origin class more than women in the class of the low-grade technocrats do. In contrast, 
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the high-grade female social and cultural specialists inherit their fathers’ class position less 
than we would expect and they also inherit the origin class less than the high-grade female 
technocrats. Hence, our results support Hypothesis 2a, except for women in the classes of the 
high-grade technocrats and the high-grade social and cultural specialists.  
Using the external and internal homogeneity criteria, we examined how typical the 
mobility patterns of the classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats and the classes of the 
high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are. These criteria have been used (Luijkx, 
1994) to collapse occupational groups in an intergenerational mobility table. We used them to 
see whether the newly distinguished social classes within the service class have specific 
mobility patterns. Do the newly distinguished social classes within the service class have 
specific external and internal mobility patterns? Do they, as a result, constitute social classes 
in their own right? In accordance with Hypotheses 1a and 2a, we expected the newly 
distinguished social classes within the service class to have specific external and internal 
mobility patterns (Hypotheses 1b and 2b).  
Our results show that the relative mobility between the high-grade technocrats and the 
other classes and the relative mobility between the high-grade social and cultural specialists 
and the other social classes is not the same. Similarly, the relative mobility between the low-
grade technocrats and the other classes and the low-grade social and cultural specialists and 
the other social classes is also differentiated. Subsequently, one needs to make a distinction 
between the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats according to the external 
homogeneity criterion. These findings support Hypothesis 1a that the external mobility 
patterns of the assumed social class are differentiated.  
According to the external homogeneity criterion, removing the higher-lower distinction 
gives a better representation of the external mobility patterns of the fractions within the 
service class than removing the distinctions between the technocrats and the social and 
cultural specialists. We have not formulated an explicit hypothesis about the higher-lower 
distinction within the service class of the EGP class schema. As we argued in Chapter 2, we 
retained the original higher-lower distinction within the service class. Accordingly, our results 
show that distinctions should be made between the technocrats and the social and cultural 
specialists as well as a higher and a lower version of these fractions.  
To disaggregate the fractions within the service class, both the external and internal 
mobility patterns of these fractions should be specific and differentiated. With regard to 
internal mobility patterns, we have shown that all the newly distinguished social classes 
within the service class are differentiated. The relative mobility between the high-grade social 
and cultural specialists and the high-grade technocrats and the relative mobility between low-
grade social and cultural specialists and the low-grade technocrats are far from perfect. 
Likewise, the relative mobility between the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists 
and the relative mobility between the high- and the low-grade technocrats depend on the 
origin class. That is, the internal mobility patterns of all these fractions are specific. 
Regarding the internal mobility patterns, one needs to make a distinction between the 
technocrats and the social and cultural specialists. One needs also to make a higher-lower 
distinction within the service class according to internal homogeneity criterion. These 
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findings support Hypothesis 2b that the disaggregated social classes within the service class 
have specific internal mobility patterns and therefore are not collapsible.  
A remarkable finding is that our conclusions about the internal and external 
homogeneity apply to both men and women. That is to say, the relative mobility of men and 
women in the newly distinguished social classes is specific and differentiated. With respect to 
external and internal homogeneity, one does not need to distinguish these classes for men and 
women separately. Consequently, our findings using the internal and external homogeneity 
criteria confirm our expectation that the newly distinguished social classes within the service 
class are differentiated by their specific mobility patterns both for men and women.  
Hypothesis 3 states that social and cultural specialists are expected to become 
relatively immobile. Note that in the Netherlands the association between origin and 
destination class decreases and the social fluidity increases. Ganzeboom and Luijkx (2004) 
agree with this finding. Therefore, the trend in immobility of the newly distinguished social 
classes should be read in the light of increasing social fluidity. Having said that, we were not 
able to support our Hypothesis 3. Transmitting of class position to offspring is stronger for the 
social and cultural specialists in the early periods while for men we see a clear downward 
trend thereafter. However, the inheritance of class position is still stronger for the male social 
and cultural specialists relative to the other classes in the last period for men than for the male 
technocrats. Inheritance of class position of female technocrats and social and cultural 
specialists decreased but this trend is not that salient as it is for men. Apparently, the class 
formation process of the ‘new’ classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists has ended. In this sense they cannot be ‘new’. However, with regard to political 
orientation Güveli et al. (2005) showed that the low-grade social and cultural specialists are 
still undergoing class formation. An adjusted version of this study will be presented in 
Chapter 6.  
We can therefore conclude that the newly distinguished social classes within the 
service class meet the necessary conditions of having specific mobility patterns to constitute 
typical classes. More research is needed about the development of class reproduction to 
disclose the effects of social fluidity on class formation. Furthermore, having typical 
intergenerational mobility patterns is a necessary condition for a class to constitute social 
class in their own right but it is not the sufficient condition. One needs to reveal whether these 
newly distinguished social classes are differentiated in intragenerational class mobility 
(Mayer & Carroll, 1987; Carroll & Mayer, 1986). Chapter 4 will answer this question. In 
addition, one ought to explore whether the newly distinguished social classes can be 
differentiated with regard to lifestyle forms, attitudes and behaviour. In the following chapters 
we seek answers to these questions.   
  
Chapter 4 
 
Intragenerational class (im)mobility of the social and cultural 
specialists and the technocrats in the Netherlands1 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, we distinguished the social and cultural specialists from the technocrats within 
the service class of the EGP class schema with both a higher and a lower version. New class 
theories show social and cultural specialists as a ‘new’ class and technocrats as an ‘old’ class 
(Kriesi, 1989; Bruce-Brigg, 1979; Bell, 1971). Within the service class, the ‘new’ class of 
social and cultural specialists represent the cleavages of post-industrial societies while the 
technocrats represent the ‘old’ class of industrial societies (Esping-Endersen, 1993; De Graaf 
& Steijn, 1997). This chapter deals with the degree to which the ‘new’ classes are crystallised 
into stable social class units (Goldthorpe, 1980; Mayer & Carroll, 1987). 
Intragenerational and intergenerational class (im)mobility figures and collective 
behaviour of social class members are classically used to outline social class boundaries 
(Goldthorpe, 1980; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Mayer & Carroll, 1987; Lipset, 1960 
[1981]; Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Manza & Brooks, 1996). According to Weber (1978 [1922]: 302) 
“a ‘social class’ makes up the totality of those class situations within which individual and 
generational mobility is easy and typical”. With individual mobility Weber implies 
intragenerational or career class mobility.  
Career class immobility is an indicator of social cleavages (Mayer & Carroll, 1987). If, 
for example, new social classes arise, they should manifest class boundaries before they can 
be labelled as a class. A class boundary ensures intra-class loyalty, and, to a certain extent, 
this loyalty determines the collective social action of its members.  
The idea behind any class distinction is that there is little interclass fluctuation within a 
generation (Mayer & Carroll, 1987). The outflow and inflow figures of an assumed social 
class should be similar to those of other more traditional social classes to justify their 
distinction. If the newly distinguished social classes are as closed as other social classes, the 
concept validity of these social classes is, to some extent, justified regarding their 
intragenerational class (im)mobility. Therefore, in Chapter 1, we formulated Research 
Question 3:  
 
3. To what extent do the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists constitute distinct 
classes with regard to their intragenerational mobility patterns?  
 
In this chapter, we reformulate this question as:  
                                                 
1 A different version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in Europeans Sociological Review, 23 (2 
(2007). The co-author is Nan Dirk de Graaf.  
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a) To what extent are the high- and low-grade technocrats and the high- and low-grade social 
and cultural specialists as closed as the other more traditional social classes within the EGP 
class schema?  
 
An emerging class needs time to become distinct and to gain a ‘demographic identity’ 
(Goldthorpe, 1980, 2000). The question is whether the ‘new’ classes of the high- and low-
grade social and cultural specialists become more stable units. Thus, in this chapter we focus 
on the Research Question 5 in Chapter 1:  
 
5) To what extent have the intragenerational mobility boundaries of the social and cultural 
specialists become more closed over time?  
 
If the ‘new’ social classes form more clear-cut class boundaries while the ‘old’ classes do not, 
this would show that the ‘new’ social classes have formed into stable units and have become 
classes. In this case, one can consider the fractions within the service class as single classes 
regarding their intragenerational mobility patterns.  
 
 
4.2 Theory and hypotheses 
 
Theories about the importance of social mobility for the class formation process concentrated 
more on intergenerational social mobility than on intragenerational class mobility (Mayer & 
Carroll, 1987). However, we argue that intragenerational class (im)mobility is at least as 
important as intergenerational class mobility. We concentrate on theories about social 
(im)mobility within one generation but we also use supplementary theories about 
intergenerational (im)mobility. Marxist theory, for example, claims that high rates of both 
inter- and intragenerational social mobility contribute to the transformation of the class 
structure and in some cases to the decomposition of social classes (Marx, 1926). An opposing 
idea is that high rates of social mobility do not undermine social classes (Wright, 1979). The 
existence of social classes is independent of social mobility; a class is analogous to a hotel, 
‘always full, but always of different people’ (Schumpeter, 1953: 129; Dahrendorf, 1969: 108). 
The latter argument is hard to defend because when classes are very fluid, people will 
anticipate later destination classes and not behave in accordance with their current class 
position (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta & Heath, 1995). For example, if there is a high degree of 
interclass mobility within a generation, the relation between class position and voting 
behaviour will never be strong. 
Weber (1922), asserted that mobility can serve as a criterion for class boundaries. In 
contrast, Goldthorpe (1992, 2000) claims that a class structure is comprised of employment 
relations and not social mobility. Goldthorpe (1980) did not use mobility to classify social 
class but he asserts that a low level of social mobility is crucial for class stability. He would 
argue that social immobility is, to a certain extent, a precondition for class coherence. If a 
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class recruits from its own members, it will improve intra-class solidarity and organise the 
class interest of the incumbents. In case of a high level of interclass fluctuation, it becomes 
more difficult to form a common class interest. For example, Ultee and De Graaf (1991; De 
Graaf & Ultee, 1987) claim that if inflow to upper classes increases substantially, it will be 
difficult for these classes to uphold their norms of highbrow culture. Thus, we argue that a 
necessary condition to constitute a social class is a certain class boundary.   
Even though sociological theories about class mobility are inconclusive about the 
influence of intragenerational class mobility on the existence and formation of social classes, 
there is no question that a high degree of interclass fluctuation within a generation undermines 
class stability. A class distinction requires a certain degree of generational stability. 
According to Mayer and Carroll (1987: 15) if intragenerational inflow and outflow mobility 
figures are high, ‘then the salience of an assumed class distinction might well be questioned’.  
The class structure conditions relative mobility rates via the employment relations they 
comprise (Goldthorpe, 2000). Employment relations are delineated in terms of occupations. 
To enter a social class, one needs to have the skills and capital needed for the occupations 
within that class. We distinguished the ‘new’ classes of the high- and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists on the basis of employment relations as being difficult to monitor and as 
performing their work tasks with social and cultural knowledge and skills. Social and cultural 
specialists have more cultural capital and intellectual, creative and communication skills than 
other employed people; technocrats possess more economic capital and organizational, 
commercial, managerial and technical skills. The classes of the high- and low-grade 
technocrats are expected to recruit more from other social classes than the classes of the high- 
and low-grade social and cultural specialists. The reason for this is that the skills and the 
human capital technocrats need to perform their job well can be obtained by on-the-job 
training (Savage, Barlow, Dickens, & Fielding, 1992: 132-58). For example, in the beginning 
of their work career, people can enter a lower social class ascend into the classes of high- and 
low-grade technocrats. It is harder for these people to enter the classes of the high- and low-
grade social and cultural specialists. Social and cultural specialists, however, obtain their class 
specific skills early from their parents and education. Subsequently, these children are 
encouraged by their teachers who possess the same kinds of skills (Bourdieu, 1984). They are 
consequently more likely to enter the class of the social and cultural specialists. 
Social and cultural specialists are selected more on the basis of their educational 
credentials to their jobs than technocrats are. In this respect, to join the ranks of social and 
cultural specialists, one has to possess specific resources. In other words, there is a litmus test 
for joining the class of social and cultural specialists while this is less true for members of any 
other social class. For example, medical doctors, teachers and pastors, who belong to the class 
of the social and cultural specialists, are only able to enter these occupations if they are 
trained to enter these professions, while managers and computer specialists can enter their 
occupation without a particular diploma. They learn their profession by working in it. In 
recent decades these other social classes have begun to require educational credentials.  
Career class mobility is substantially different from intergenerational class mobility. 
That is to say, having belonged a class, it is harder for someone to move to another class than 
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to move to a class other than the father’s class. This difficulty stems from the difficulty of 
gaining the qualifications needed to reach a specific social class after the formal education 
ends. In particular, we expect that the inflow to and outflow from the classes of social and 
cultural specialists is more restricted than, for example, of the classes of technocrats because 
of the specific kind of qualifications the former class requires from their members. All in all, 
our first expectation is that the classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists to be more closed than the other social classes within the adjusted EGP class 
schema.  
The post-industrial employment relations engender their social class structure. The rise 
of social classes is a gradual process. The ‘new’ social classes need time to organise their 
interests and to form their identity. According to Goldthorpe (1980), this process is primarily 
involved with the creation of ‘stable class collectivities’. However, there are two effects at 
work in this process. On the one hand, there is a formation of the ‘new’ social classes, which 
tightens the boundaries of the ‘new’ social classes, while, on the other hand, there is a process 
of ‘professionalization, bureaucratisation and technical complexity in work’ affecting the 
(im)mobility of the ‘new’ social class members. According to the ‘counterbalance’ thesis 
(Goldthorpe, 1980), work-life career is becoming harder as a result of professionalisation. 
While the last process increases intergenerational mobility, it decreases intragenerational 
mobility because access to the middle and higher levels of the occupational ladder is more 
dependent than ever upon formal education. Therefore, our second expectation is that the 
classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists become more closed over 
time than other social classes within the adjusted EGP class schema.  
 
 
4.3 Data, operationalisation and method 
 
Data 
The data we use in this chapter could test our expectations about intragenerational 
(im)mobility, i.e. career class (im)mobility. We use data from 16 Dutch surveys that were 
collected between 1982 and 2003, which are a part of the International Stratification and 
Mobility File (ISMF) project. This project brings together and harmonises surveys on social 
mobility from around the world. There are 26,058 total respondents. An overview of the data 
sources is given in Appendix 4A.  
Intragenerational mobility is usually studied by analysing the mobility between the 
first and the last occupations (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Goldthorpe, 1977, 1980; Erikson & 
Goldthorpe, 1992; De Graaf & Luijkx, 1995; Blossfeld, 1986). This is not the ideal method of 
dealing with career class mobility since young persons do not have enough time to move from 
one class into another. According to the life-course thesis, career class mobility is much more 
likely early in working life (Mayer & Carroll, 1987). Only people who have a job or have had 
a job when they were 40 years of age or older are included in the analysis. The data used in 
this study enable us to make this selection. This restriction gives people enough time to switch 
from their first class of occupation. Our dataset contains information about the first 
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occupation that respondents had after finishing their education and their last or current 
occupation. Therefore, we analyse (im)mobility between the classes of first and last 
occupation. After excluding the respondents who are younger than 40, the total number of 
respondents included in the analysis is 10,448: 5,787 men and 4,661 women, born between 
1887 and 1963.  
 
Operationalisation 
Class I of the standard EGP class schema is subdivided into a class of the high-grade social 
and cultural specialists and a class of the high-grade technocrats. Class II of the standard EGP 
class schema is also split into a class of the low-grade social and cultural specialists and a 
class of the low-grade technocrats. Occupations were identified on the basis of the four-digit 
occupational classification of the International Standard Classification of Occupations 1968 
(ISCO 68). The social and cultural specialists are distinguished from the technocrats by 
experts on the basis of our criteria, which are explicated in Chapter 2. Interested reader can 
download the conversion tools (from ISCO 68 and ISCO 88 to adjusted EGP) from the 
following website http://www.ayseguveli.nl/. 
To examine the intragenerational class immobility of the newly distinguished classes, 
the inflow and outflow figures of these classes are compared to those of other social classes 
within the EGP class schema. To do this, two variables with eight social classes are 
constructed: one for the class of first occupation and one for the class of last or current 
occupation. The categories of these variables of the class of first occupation (origin class) and 
the class of last or current occupation (destination class) are as follows: 1) high-grade 
technocrats (Ia); 2) high-grade social and cultural specialists (Ib); 3) low-grade technocrats 
(IIa); 4) low-grade social and cultural specialists (IIb); 5) routine non-manual employees (III); 
6) self-employed persons (IV); 7) skilled manual workers (V/VI) and 8) unskilled manual 
workers (VII).  
Classes III, IV, V/VI and VII are identified by using the conversion tools from ISCO 
68 to EGP class schema, which is developed by Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman (1989). 
Furthermore, the class of skilled manual workers contains Classes V and VI. We are aware 
that splitting up these classes and analysing them separately is better for comparing their 
(im)mobility patterns with those of the newly distinguished social classes. However, due to 
the relatively small number of cases, this complicated the estimation of parameters because of 
the zero-cells in the model. Therefore we combine Classes V and VI.  
The (im)mobility between the first and last or current class is controlled for level of 
education because a person’s education  affects his or her work-life mobility (Pollaert, De 
Graaf & Luijkx, 1997). To do so, three levels of education are specified. People with less than 
middle secondary education are coded as having a low education (1). People with middle and 
high (occupational) secondary education are coded as having a middle education (2) and 
people with a high occupational education, university education and post university education 
are coded as having a high education (3). 
To test the (im)mobility of the ‘new’ social classes, a variable cohort is constructed. 
Respondents born between 1887 and 1929 form the first cohort. Respondents born between 
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1930 and 1939 constitute the second cohort. Respondents born between 1940 and 1949 form 
the third cohort and respondents born between 1950 and 1963 constitute the fourth cohort.  
Table 4.1 shows the percentage of incumbents in the last/current class of occupation 
over four birth cohorts for men and women. At first glance, it appears that the share of 
incumbents of all fractions within the service class increased over the four birth cohorts but 
that the share of all other classes decreased for men. The share of women in these classes over 
the four birth cohorts shows a similar process. Only the share of the routine non-manual 
female employees increased over these cohorts; it decreased for men.  
 
Table 4.1: Percentage incumbents in the last/current class of occupations over four birth cohorts for 
men and women older than 39 year (Nmen=5,787 and Nwomen=4,661) 
 Birth Cohorts 
 Men 
Social Classes  1887-1929 1930-1939 1940-1949 1950-1963 
High-grade technocrats  15.4 16.4 14.8 15.7 
High-grade social and cultural specialists 3.9 2.9 4.1 4.5 
Low-grade technocrats 12.2 14.9 17.5 18.5 
Low-grade social and cultural specialists 5.1 7.8 11.7 15.1 
Routine non-manual employees 17.1 13.1 13.5 13.2 
Self-employed persons 10.6 7.6 6.5 3.8 
Skilled manual workers 18.0 20.3 18.6 15.7 
Unskilled manual workers 17.7 17.0 13.6 13.5 
Total N 997 1504 1999 1679 
 Women 
High-grade technocrats  2.1 2.0 3.5  3.7 
High-grade social and cultural specialists 2.0 1.0 1.4  2.8 
Low-grade technocrats 3.8 4.6 7.2  6.4 
Low-grade social and cultural specialists 12.1 14.9 19.0  24.6 
Routine non-manual employees 31.5 37.7 38.0  40.5 
Self-employed persons 6.4 4.9 4.5  2.2 
Skilled manual workers 6.0 4.4 3.3  2.5 
Unskilled manual workers 36.1 30.5 23.1  17.4 
Total N 654 1143 1745 1480 
 
The proportion of men among high-grade technocrats increased slightly from 15 percent in 
the first birth cohort (1887-1929) to 16 percent in the last birth cohort (1950-1963). The share 
of men in the class of the high-grade social and cultural specialists also increased slightly, 
from 4 percent in the first cohort to 5 percent in the last. The share of men in the class of the 
low-grade technocrats increased from 12 percent to 19 percent between the first and last birth 
cohorts. The share of men among low-grade social and cultural specialists tripled from 5 
percent to 15 percent between the first and last cohort. This table shows that for men, the 
share of the upper service class is higher in the first cohort (15.4%+3.9%=19.3%) than the 
share of the lower service class (12.2%+5.1%=17.3%) while in the last cohort the share of the 
lower service class exceeded the share of the upper service class. That is, the share of the 
lower service class became much higher (18.5%+15.1%=33.6) than that of upper service class 
(15.7%+4.5%=20.2).  
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The proportion of women among high-grade technocrats and the high-grade social and 
cultural specialists increased slightly from 2 percent to 4, and from 2 percent to 3, 
respectively. The share of women in the low-grade technocrats increased from 4 to 6 percent 
between the first and last birth cohort. Table 4.1 shows that the proportion of women in the 
class of the low-grade social and cultural specialists more than doubled from 12 percent in the 
first cohort to 25 percent in the last cohort. These figures also show that in the service class 
women are overrepresented among low-grade social and cultural specialists. In this class, 
women comprise more than half of all employed women in the service class in the last cohort. 
However, among the total female employed population, women are overrepresented in the 
class of routine non-manual employees in the last cohort. In the first birth cohort, they were 
overrepresented in the class of unskilled manual workers. Remarkable is the decline in the 
share of female unskilled manual workers from 36 percent in the first birth cohort to 17 
percent in the last birth cohort. In the next section, we elaborate on the structural mobility 
between the first and the last/current class of occupation and on the patterns of relative 
(im)mobility.  
 
Method 
We start our analysis by presenting some figures about intragenerational class (im)mobility. 
The inflow figures of social classes are shown in terms of absolute mobility. The absolute 
mobility figures are gross figures, e.g. without controlling for the changes in the employment 
structure. Even though absolute mobility rates give some information about class stability, the 
relative rates or the odds ratios are more important for delineating class boundaries. To be 
able to reveal class openness (or closeness) of the newly distinguished social classes, one 
should control for structural changes. An example of structural changes is that, in the last 
decades of the 20th century, the working class has become smaller while the service class has 
become larger. Loglinear modelling is a good method to control for these changes. By using 
loglinear modelling one controls for over time changes in the marginal distribution of rows 
and columns. Therefore we use these models to control for structural changes and to reveal 
the stability of the ‘new’ social classes. However, we also show the absolute figures of social 
mobility to show the effect of structural changes on immobility. Subsequently, the cohort 
variable is included in the models to find class stability over time.  
 
 
4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Absolute mobility for men and women 
The absolute (im)mobility figures for men and women are shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. In 
Table 4.2, the absolute mobility for men between the class of first occupation and the class of 
last/current occupation is 46 percent while 54 percent are stable2. This is in line with former 
                                                 
2 Calculation of the percentage of immobile persons within Table 2 is, to sum up the immobile persons of all 
classes (Ia, Ib, IIa, IIb, III, IV, V/VI, VII) and divide this by the total number of persons. We can take the 
percentage of immobile persons from the absolute totals of the columns to find the absolute number of immobile 
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findings (De Graaf & Luijkx, 1995; Pollaerts, De Graaf & Luijkx, 1997) that most people 
remain in their origin class. The column marginals of the skilled and unskilled manual 
workers are lower than their row marginals while the column marginals of all other classes 
are higher than their row marginals, which indicate structural mobility. That is, the number of 
jobs in the destination class of skilled and unskilled manual workers decreased while in all 
other destination classes the number of jobs increased.  
Table 4.2 shows the inflow percentages for men from the origin to the destination 
class. The numbers in the main diagonal cells represent the stable male persons. It appears 
that 37 percent of male persons are upwardly mobile and 9 percent downwardly mobile. 
Intragenerational immobility is highest in the classes of the high- and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists and in the skilled and unskilled manual workers (61.9%, 53.3%, 67.1% 
and 59.3% respectively) while the classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats (24.3% and 
24.8% respectively) show much less intragenerational stability. 
 
Table 4.2: Intragenerational class mobility for men between the class of first and last/current class of 
occupation: inflow percentages (N=5,787) 
Last/current class 
Ia Ib IIa IIb III IV V/VI VII  First class 
H
igh 
technocrats 
H
igh social 
cultural 
specialists 
Low
 
technocrats 
Low
 social 
cultural 
specialists 
R
outine non 
m
anuals 
Self 
em
ployed 
Skilled 
m
anuals 
U
nskilled 
m
anuals 
Total 
Ia. High technocrats 24.3 
 
4.5 
 
6.7 
 
3.6 
 
2.5 
 
1.0 
 
1.6 
 
0.6 
 
6.3 
 
Ib. High social and 
cultural specialists 
3.3 
 
61.9 
 
0.9 
 
1.4 
 
0.2 
 
0.3 
 
0.0 
 
0.1 
 
2.8 
 
IIa. Low technocrats 15.4 
 
2.3 
 
24.8 
 
4.9 
 
5.4 
 
3.8 
 
2.3 
 
1.8 
 
9.0 
 
IIb. Low social and 
cultural specialists 
9.8 
 
10.2 
 
5.7 
 
53.3 
 
2.2 
 
1.0 
 
0.4 
 
0.3 
 
8.4 
 
III. Routine non-manual 
employees  
22.0 
 
10.8 
 
24.9 
 
15.6 
 
47.6 
 
8.5 
 
3.7 
 
6.8 
 
18.6 
 
IV. Self employed 
persons 
1.6 
 
1.1 
 
2.5 
 
0.9 
 
2.3 
 
40.7 
 
1.8 
 
4.1 
 
4.9 
 
V/VI. Skilled manual 
workers  
15.4 
 
5.1 
 
22.0 
 
13.7 
 
20.9 
 
18.1 
 
67.1 
 
27.0 
 
28.2 
 
VII. Unskilled manual 
workers 
8.3 
 
4.0 
 
12.6 
 
6.5 
 
18.9 
 
26.6 
 
23.1 
 
59.3 
 
21.9 
 
N 
Total 
 (918) 
15.9 
100.0 
(179) 
3.1 
100.0 
(1001) 
17.3 
100.0 
(553) 
9.6 
100.0 
 (815) 
14.1 
100.0 
 (398) 
6.9 
100.0 
(1052) 
18.2 
100.0 
(874) 
15.1 
100.0 
(5787)
100.0 
100.0 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
persons (persons in the main diagonal cells). For example, the absolute immobile high technocrats are 24.3 
percent of 918, or 223. That is: 223 +109 + 248 + 295 + 388 + 162 + 706 + 518 = 2649 / 5787 = 0.46. The 
percentage of mobile persons is then 1.0 – 0.46 = 0.54. 
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Sixty-two percent of the high-grade social and cultural specialists in the destination class had 
had first jobs of the same sort in the first class while more than half of the low-grade social 
and cultural specialists (53.3%) are intragenerationally stable. Most high-grade social and 
cultural specialists are recruited from the low-grade social and cultural specialists (10.2%) and 
from the routine non-manual employees (10.8%), while the low-grade social and cultural 
specialists are more recruited from routine non-manual employees (15.6%) and the skilled 
manual workers (13.7%). 
Most high-grade technocrats recruit from the routine non-manual employees (22%) 
and from the skilled manual workers (15.4%) and subsequently from the low-grade 
technocrats (15.4%). The low-grade technocrats recruit as much from the routine non-manual 
employees (24.9%) and from the skilled manual workers (22.0%) as from their own class of 
origin (24.8%). Furthermore, more than one out of five members of all social classes, except 
the high-grade social and cultural specialists in the destination class comes from the classes of 
the skilled and unskilled manual workers. The high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists recruit least from the skilled and unskilled manual workers, 9.1 percent (5.1%+4%) 
and 20.2 percent (13.7%+6.5%) respectively. These figures support our expectations that the 
high- and low-grade technocrats are more intragenerationally mobile than the high- and low-
grade social and cultural specialists.  
Table 4.3 shows the inflow percentages from the origin to the destination class for 
women. The absolute work-life mobility between the origin class and the destination class is 
34 percent while the absolute work-life immobility comes to 66 percent. Women, especially 
in the past, quit their job early in their work-life career and mostly work part-time, which 
limits their career chances (Blossfeld & Drobnic, 2001; Hendrickx, Bernasco & De Graaf, 
2001; Blossfeld & Hakim; 1997; Blossfeld, 1986). This may explain the high work-life 
immobility among women. The column and the row marginals are substantially different, 
implying structural work-life mobility among female employers. The number among routine 
non-manual employees, skilled and unskilled manual workers decreased while the number of 
jobs in all other classes increased. 
Table 4.3 shows that among women 21 percent are upwardly mobile while 11 percent 
are downwardly mobile. Comparing these figures of women to those of men shows that 
women are substantially less upwardly mobile than men (16%). However, there is a negligible 
difference with respect to their downward career class mobility: 2 percent of women are more 
downwardly mobile than men. Furthermore, women are overrepresented among the classes of 
the routine non-manual employees, unskilled manual workers and the low-grade social and 
cultural specialists. 
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Table 4.3: Intragenerational class mobility for women between the class of first and last/current class 
of occupation: inflow percentages (N=4,661) 
Last/current class 
Ia Ib IIa IIb III IV V/VI VII  
First class 
H
igh 
technocrats 
H
igh social 
cultural 
specialists 
Low
 
technocrats 
Low
 social 
cultural 
specialists 
R
outine non 
m
anuals 
Self 
em
ployed 
Skilled 
m
anuals 
U
nskilled 
m
anuals 
Total 
Ia. High 
technocrats 
25.0 
 
3.1 
 
1.9 
 
0.7 
 
0.3 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.3 
 
1.3 
 
Ib. High social and 
cultural specialists 
0.6 
 
46.2 
 
0.3 
 
0.8 
 
0.1 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.9 
 
IIa. Low 
technocrats 
7.7 
 
4.6 
 
37.5 
 
2.8 
 
2.2 
 
1.6 
 
0.6 
 
0.8 
 
4.5 
 
IIb. Low social 
and cultural 
specialists 
25.6 
 
18.5 
 
10.8 
 
64.8 
 
4.2 
 
4.2 
 
0.6 
 
2.9 
 
16.2 
 
III. Routine non-
manual employees  
31.4 
 
24.6 
 
38.4 
 
23.3 
 
76.3 
 
36.1 
 
12.4 
 
19.3 
 
43.8 
 
IV. Self employed 
persons 
0.6 
 
1.5 
 
2.2 
 
0.6 
 
1.1 
 
34.6 
 
3.0 
 
1.2 
 
2.5 
 
V/VI. Skilled 
manual workers  
1.3 
 
1.5 
 
2.5 
 
0.8 
 
2.0 
 
4.7 
 
55.6 
 
3.6 
 
4.2 
 
VII. Unskilled 
manual workers 
7.7 
 
0.0 
 
6.3 
 
6.2 
 
13.9 
 
18.8 
 
27.8 
 
71.9 
 
26.5 
 
N 
Total 
(156) 
3.3 
100.0 
(65) 
1.4 
100.0 
(315) 
6.8 
100.0 
 (854) 
18.3 
100.0 
 (1766) 
37.9 
100.0 
 (191) 
4.1 
100.0 
 (169) 
3.6 
100.0 
 (1145) 
24.6 
100.0 
(4661)
100.0 
100.0 
 
The high- and low-grade technocrats recruit more from the routine non-manual employees 
than from their own class of origin: 31.4 percent and 38.4 percent respectively. Women tend 
to start their work-life career in routine non-manual jobs and change their class during their 
work-life career. Pollaerts, De Graaf & Luijkx (1997) showed similar results by using the 
1992 Family Survey of the Dutch Population. The classes that recruit less from the routine 
non-manual employees are the high-, low-grade social and cultural specialists, the skilled and 
unskilled manual workers. Within the service class, women are least employed as high-grade 
social and cultural specialists (1.4%) and mostly employed as low-grade social and cultural 
specialists (18.3%). The high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are 
intragenerationally more immobile than the high- and low-grade technocrats. This is, on the 
basis of absolute mobility figures, a support for our expectation. In the next section, we 
consider structural mobility and focus on patterns of relative intragenerational mobility. 
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4.4.2 Loglinear models for men 
We do not present loglinear models for women, since their mobility patterns are rather 
unstable.3 The results of the loglinear analysis of the association between the origin and 
destination classes for men are presented in Table 4.4. To indicate the fit of the models, we 
use the likelihood ratio (L2) and the Bayesian Information Coefficient (BIC) (Raftery, 1986). 
Models 1 to 7 of Table 4.4 assume that the association between the origin and the destination 
class did not change over cohorts, i.e. between 1887 and 1963. The class career mobility over 
cohorts is modelled in Model 8 to 11. With these models, the hypothesis that the ‘new’ social 
classes become more closed over time can be tested. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4.4 show the 
model fits of loglinear models in terms of likelihood ratios and BIC scores respectively.  
Model 1 assumes that when controlling for cohort and educational differences, there is 
no association between origin and destination class. This model fits the data poorly. Models 2 
to 7 show the pattern of association in more detail. First, we want to find out whether there is 
an overrepresentation of men who remain in the same class when controlling for structural 
mobility. To test this tendency, Model 2 contains a parameter (D) for the main diagonal 
representing the general inheritance parameter (Hout, 1983). That is to say, this model tests 
the tendency of men to be socially stable within one generation across social classes. 
Additionally, Model 3 assumes that the strength of the tendency towards class similarity 
differs among the origin and destination class. The parameters Di in Model 3 show the 
stability of all social classes within the adjusted EGP class schema. Model 2 shows a strong 
improvement of fit compared to Model 1 and the fit improves substantially in Model 3. This 
substantial improvement reveals that the tendency towards intragenerational class stability 
dominates the association. 
 
Table 4.4: Loglinear model selections for intragenerational class mobility for men (N=5,742)  
Models L2 df BIC 
1. E*FC+E*LC+E*Co+FC*Co+LC*Co  3493.99 672 967.90
2. 1+D  1343.25 671 -1179.08
3. 1+ Di  1054.93 664 -1441.09
4. 3 + SYM  469.09 636 -1921.67
5. 3+U 596.07 663 -1896.19
6. 3+RC 515.41 651 -1931.74
7. 3+E-RC 805.40 658 -1668.06
8. 6 + D*CoL 515.22 650 -1928.17
9. 6 + D*Co 509.90 647 -1922.21
10. 6 + Di* CoL 500.49 643 -1916.59
11. 6 + Di*Co 481.80 619 -1845.06
E= level of education; FC=first class of occupation; LC=last/current class of occupation; Co=Cohort; CoL=cohort 
linear; D=diagonal (class similarity) parameter; Di=differences among diagonal cells; SYM=quasi-symmetry 
model; U=quasi-uniform association model; RC=quasi-row-column effect model; E-RC=quasi-equal-row and 
column effect model. 
                                                 
3 We analysed the loglinear models for women separately. None of the log linear models for women show a 
reasonable fit with the data. The reason may be that the intragenerational mobility table for women contain many 
zero-cells. Therefore, we exclude women from further analysis. The log linear models are available on request. 
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Next, the association in the off-diagonal cells of the mobility table is analysed. Model 
4 in Table 4.4 is a quasi-symmetry model. This model assumes that the inflow to the 
destination class and the outflow from the origin class are symmetrical. The quasi-symmetry 
model (Model 4) fits a separate parameter for each off-diagonal cell of the table, with the only 
restriction that the pattern of relative association must be symmetrical. The fit of this model 
improves substantially compared to Model 1, which means that the mobility in this 
intragenerational mobility table is symmetrical.  
The quasi-symmetry model implies that mobility is less likely as the distance between 
origin and destination increases. Using association models, it is possible to reveal whether this 
kind of pattern persists within this intragenerational mobility table. Models 5 to 7 show these 
patterns. Model 5 is the quasi-uniform association model and it assumes that the barrier to 
ascending or descending one class is the same within the intragenerational mobility table. 
Model 6 and 7 are the quasi-row-column-effect models assuming that the association differs 
between the classes of origin (first class of occupation) and the classes of destination (the 
last/current class of occupation). Model 7 assumes the row and column effects to be the same 
while Model 6 assumes them to be different. According to BIC scores, Model 6 is the best 
model for these samples, meaning that mobility within this intragenerational mobility table is 
the same for origin and destination classes.  
 
4.4.3 Career class immobility over time  
We continue the analysis by examining the over time mobility patterns on this table. 
Furthermore, we present the immobility parameters and the over time development of them. 
These mobility models are based on Model 6 (Table 4.4) since this model is the best model 
according to the BIC scores. Model 8 assumes that the parameters for the differences in class 
stability among social classes differ linearly across cohorts while Model 9 does so for each 
cohort. Model 10 assumes that the strength of the tendency towards class stability differs 
among social classes across cohorts linearly while Model 11 assumes that the class stability of 
social classes differs for each cohort. The improvement of the fit of these models is lower 
than Model 6 but these models fit the data well, according to the likelihood ratio L2. We 
expect that the ‘new’ social classes stabilise over time by recruiting more from their own class 
of origin and therefore organise their own class interest. That is to say, we are interested in the 
linear trends of the strength of class stability (immobility). Model 10 calculates these 
parameters. Thus, our expectation is modelled in Model 10 and the parameters Di*CoL show 
this tendency towards more (or less) closed ‘new’ social classes over cohorts. The parameters 
Di (immobility parameters) and Di*CoL of this model are shown in Table 4.5.  
 Table 4.5 presents the logarithmic parameters Di and Di*CoL and their multiplicative 
versions. The parameters Di are the average immobility scores. Since the multiplicative 
version of these parameters is easier to understand, we discuss them. The parameters for the 
differences in social class stability among the origin and destination class show that the high-
grade social and cultural specialists have the most clear-cut class boundary. The low-grade 
social and cultural specialists are the third closed social class while the class of self-employed 
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persons is the second closed social class. The class stability of the two ‘new’ social classes 
(high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists) and the class of the self-employed are 
respectively 72.24, 8.33 and 13.59 times higher than average. In contrast, the most open social 
class is that of unskilled manual workers: it is 0.97 times less closed than average. The high- 
and low-grade technocrats are highly unstable classes. The least closed social classes are the 
high- and low-grade technocrats: they are respectively 1.51 and 2.77 times more closed than 
average. The immobility of the high-grade technocrats does not differ significantly from the 
average immobile persons under this model. Comparison of these classes shows our findings 
support the hypothesis that the ‘new’ social classes are more closed than the other social 
classes of the EGP class schema. The class of the low-grade technocrats is also significantly 
more closed than the average. The class of the high-grade technocrats is more closed than the 
average but not significantly so. 
 
Table 4.5: Log odds (Di) and odds ratios (Exp(Di)) of the main diagonal of first class of occupation 
(origin class) and class of occupation of 40 years of age (destination class) for men. 
Parameters of Model 10 from Table 4.4 
Social Classes  Di Se (Di ) Exp(Di ) Di*CoL  Se (Di*CoL) Exp(Di*CoL) 
High-grade technocrats   0.41 0.20 1.51  0.01  0.11 1.01 
High-grade social and cultural 
specialists 
 
 4.28* 0.28 72.24 -0.31
  
0.22 
 
0.73 
Low-grade technocrats  1.02* 0.13 2.77  0.06  0.10 1.06 
Low-grade social and cultural 
specialists 
 
 2.12* 0.16 8.33  0.12
 
*
 
0.02 
 
1.13 
Routine non-manual employees  1.21* 0.10 3.35  0.02  0.08 1.02 
Self-employed persons  2.61* 0.15 13.59  0.05  0.14 1.05 
Skilled manual workers  1.54* 0.12 4.66  0.21 * 0.08 1.23 
Unskilled manual workers -0.03 0.20 0.97 -0.23 * 0.08 0.79 
Di=differences among diagonal cells; CoL=Cohort Linear; Se= Standard Error. * p<0.001 
 
The logarithmic parameters Di*CoL in Table 4.5 give the strength of the tendency towards 
class stability among social classes across cohorts. Here too, we prefer to interpret the 
multiplicative versions of these logarithmic parameters. The low-grade social and cultural 
specialists close 1.13 times their boundary per cohort than average. This supports the 
hypothesis that the ‘new’ social classes need time to consolidate their career class mobility. 
However, the high-grade social and cultural specialists do not show a significant development 
towards a more stable class with regard to career class mobility over cohorts. The sign of the 
logarithmic parameter of the high-grade social and cultural specialists is negative, showing a 
decreasing stability of this class over cohorts but this trend is not significant. Given the very 
high level of closure of this class, it seems that the intragenerational class formation process 
of this class has already ended in the Netherlands in the late 20th century. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that the stability of this class continues to increase. The class boundary of the skilled 
manual workers is closed 1.23 times more per cohort than average while the class of the 
unskilled manual workers open their class boundary 0.79 times more per cohort than average. 
None of the parameters of the high- and low-grade technocrats show a significant 
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development of class closure across cohorts. Consequently, the data support partly our 
hypothesis that the ‘new’ social classes become more closed over time.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusions and discussion 
 
In this chapter, we examined intragenerational career class stability. A social class without a 
clear boundary cannot organise its class interest and therefore it does not constitute a single 
class. Our first hypothesis states that the ‘new’ social classes of the high- and low-grade social 
and cultural specialists are more closed than are other social classes within the EGP class 
schema. Our second hypothesis states that if the ‘new’ social classes are arising, they will 
eventually tighten their class boundaries over time because the presumably ‘new’ classes need 
time to organise their class interest. 
The data analysis strongly supports our first hypothesis. The high-grade social and 
cultural specialists have the clearest class boundary. The self-employed (proprietors and 
farmers) have the second clearest class boundary, which is followed by the low-grade social 
and cultural specialists. The outstanding class boundaries of the ‘new’ classes may be partly 
attributed to the field of education the members of the ‘new’ social classes have. The 
incumbents of these occupations are selected on the basis of their skills, which can hardly be 
obtained later in the work life career. The occupations of social and cultural specialists require 
more educational credentials. All in all, it is harder to enter the ranks of the social and cultural 
specialists in work life career than to enter the classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats 
and other classes within the EGP class schema.   
The class of unskilled manual workers is the only class that is more open than one 
would expect of a social class in an intragenerational mobility table. This shows that the 
incumbents of this class experience more career class mobility than the incumbents of other 
classes. The technocratic fractions within the service class are more closed than average but 
they form the least closed classes within the adjusted EGP class schema, especially the high-
grade technocrats. The high-grade technocrats are not significantly more closed than average; 
the low-grade technocrats are significantly more closed than average. This shows that the 
technocratic fractions within the service class fulfil the necessary condition of having a certain 
degree of class stability but their class boundaries are not salient. 
There is also support for the second hypothesis. Even when controlling for the level of 
education, the immobility of the low-grade social and cultural specialists increases over 
cohorts. This supports the idea that the ‘new’ class of the low-grade social and cultural 
specialists needs time to stabilise. Furthermore, there is no significant trend towards 
increasing immobility for the high-grade social and cultural specialists over cohorts. Since 
this class is already the most closed class, it is unlikely that this class will become even more 
immobile.  
Furthermore, we found evidence that the immobility increases significantly over 
cohorts for the other classes, except among skilled manual workers. However, the immobility 
among unskilled manual workers is decreasing and this seems to contradict the 
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counterbalance thesis. Why is the immobility of the skilled manual workers increasing 
whereas the immobility of the unskilled manual workers is decreasing? This question, 
however, falls outside of the scope of this dissertation.  
This chapter argues that on the basis of career class (im)mobility, it is important to 
distinguish high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists from high- and low-grade 
technocrats. In Chapter 5, we will examine the impact of class position on lifestyles. In that 
chapter, we investigate whether the newly distinguished social classes within the service class 
differ in lifestyles and life chances such as social-political, cultural and economic preferences 
and behaviour.  
  
 
 
  
Chapter 5 
 
Social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour of 
technocrats and social and cultural specialists 
Social class or education?1 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
What differentiates the lifestyles of members of a certain class from those of others? Several 
scholars have claimed that social classes have different consumption patterns, political 
preferences, moral attitudes, social behaviour and lifestyle forms. It has shown that there is a 
relation between social class, political preferences, and social action (Lipset, 1981 [1960]; 
Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Kriesi, 1989; Cotgrove & Duff, 1980; Cotgrove & Duff, 1981). Social 
class also affects educational outcomes (Goldthorpe, 2000; Heath & Clifford, 1990; 
Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer & Platt, 1969), earnings (Wright, 1985; Heath, Jowell & 
Curtice, 1985), housing (Savage, Barlow, Dickens & Fielding, 1992), health (Bartley, 
Carpenter, Dunnell & Fitzpatrick, 1996; Kunst, 1996) and a variety of other lifestyle forms 
(Bourdieu, 1984; Ganzeboom, De Graaf & Kalmijn, 1987; Heath, Curtice, Jowell, Evans, 
Field & Witherspoon, 1991). These outcomes are used to test the construct validity of the 
social classes. That is, the newly distinguished social classes are expected to differentiate 
themselves on these outcomes (Ganzeboom, De Graaf & Kalmijn, 1987; De Graaf & Kalmijn, 
1995, De Graaf & Steijn, 1997).  
In this chapter, we focus on differences in lifestyles between the social and cultural 
specialists and the technocrats we distinguished in Chapter 2. In Chapters 3 and 4, we 
analysed the inter- and intragenerational class mobility of these fractions. We showed in 
Chapter 3 that the fractions within the service class have specific intergenerational mobility 
patterns. In Chapter 4, we showed that high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are 
intragenerationally more closed than the classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats. These 
results convincingly show that the subdivision of the service class meets the necessary 
condition of having specific inter- and intragenerational mobility patterns.  
If these newly distinguished social classes are indeed social classes they are also 
expected to differ in their attitudes, behaviour and lifestyle forms. These outcomes are 
categorised into social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour. In this 
chapter, we will examine the construct validity of the newly distinguished social classes by 
revealing whether they differ in their social-political, cultural and economic preferences and 
behaviour. This chapter answers Research Questions 6 and 7 of Chapter 1. Research Question 
6 is:  
 
                                                 
1 A different version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in Social Indicators Research. Co-authors 
are Ariana Need and Nan Dirk de Graaf. 
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6) To what extent do the social and cultural specialists differ from the technocrats in their 
social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour?  
 
Some scholars see education as an important determinant in shaping attitudes, political 
preferences and lifestyle forms (Baer and Lambert, 1992). Therefore, one can claim that 
differences in attitudes, behaviour and lifestyles among the members of the newly 
distinguished social classes are not directly related to social class positions but rather to 
educational differences. Brint (1984) shows that differences in attitudes and lifestyle forms 
between the ‘new’ and the ‘old’ classes within the service class are related to their level of 
education. However, the newly distinguished social classes differ in their level of education 
and in their field of study. Therefore, there is an overlap between the skills that they learn and 
the skills that they will need in their job. In this chapter, we examine the relation between 
social class position and social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour, 
simultaneously considering the field of study, the level of education and background factors 
that are causally prior to one’s class position and education. Hence Research Question 7 
reads:  
 
7) To what extent do the social and cultural specialists differ from the technocrats in their 
social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour, when the field of study, the 
level of education, and other individual and background factors are taken into consideration?  
 
With the exception of Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf (2004), there are to our knowledge no 
studies that control for level and field of education while investigating class effects. Our study 
distinguishes itself in three important respects from that of Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf 
(2004). First, we improve the subdivision of the service class. It is refined with respect to 
classification rules and the use of expert knowledge to allocate the occupations within the 
service class. Second, this study uses more outcome variables (dependent variables) on social, 
cultural and economic issues. Doing so gives the opportunity to validate the adjusted EGP 
class schema on more areas. By using more dependent variables, one can reflect the social 
cleavages within the service class more accurately and can answer the question of whether 
these cleavages show social class divisions more extensively. Finally, this study uses more 
data. Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf (2004) used the 1992, 1998 and 2000 Family Surveys of 
the Dutch Populations (FSDP); we have added the 2003 Survey to the analysis. The FSDP 
data are unique because they contain more information about political behaviour, attitudes 
and lifestyle forms, level and field of education in addition to individual and background 
information. 
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5.2 Theory and hypotheses 
 
5.2.1 Social class and social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour 
Social class position is linked to patterns of class voting, inequalities in health and disparities 
in educational attainments. Weber (1922) is one of the first scholars who divided industrial 
societies into classes that affect people’s economic and social preferences. He also argued that 
a social class typifies itself by the collective action of class members. However, with the 
exception of voting and political attitudes, the theoretical argumentation of this linkage 
between social class position and outcomes remains weak (Breen & Rottman, 1995; 
Goldthorpe, 2000). The primary aim of this chapter is to accumulate evidence for the 
construct validity of our subdivision of the service class. Therefore, our concern is not to 
theoretically elucidate how class exerts its influence on outcomes but to explicate the link 
between the newly distinguished social classes and social-political, cultural and economic 
preferences and behaviour.   
Kriesi (1989) – one of the scholars whose ideas inspired us to subdivide the service 
class - linked the class position of social and cultural specialists and technocrats to explain 
support for new social movements in the Netherlands. He argued that the difficulty of 
controlling the work performance of social and cultural specialists confers a degree of 
autonomy and power. As a result, social and cultural specialists use this power to improve the 
quality of their specialisation and that of public services. Technocrats, in contrast, seek to 
preserve the viability of their organization.  
Bourdieu (1984) linked social class position to societal outcomes. We used his thesis 
of cultural and economic elites to subdivide the service class in Chapters 1 and 2. Bourdieu 
and Passeron (1977) asserted that people’s objective constraints, i.e. resources (or lack 
thereof) establish their social positions, which in turn engender their preferences and 
practices. In similar vein, we elaborate on Bourdieu’s theory to link the class position of the 
social and cultural specialists and the technocrats to lifestyles.   
The social and cultural specialists and the technocrats have different work conditions. 
The former mostly work in the public sector and use specialised knowledge to serve people. 
Their work tasks are relatively less controllable than those of technocrats. According to 
Güveli, Need and De Graaf (2005, 2007), less controllability, social and cultural knowledge, 
and the services they deliver, compel social and cultural specialists to develop a more 
progressive attitude and vote more for left-wing political parties than the technocrats.2 
Lamont (1987) claimed that the relatively autonomous work conditions of the social and 
cultural specialists are their common class interest. These specialists advocate high taxes and 
support political ideologies that favour the non-economic aspects of social life.  
Bourdieu c.s. (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977; Bourdieu, 1984) distinguished occupations 
with cultural features from occupations with economic features and labels their respective 
incumbents as cultural and economic elites. These two kinds of occupations correspond with 
the classification of the ‘new’ and ‘old’ social classes within the service class. People whose 
                                                 
2 An adjusted version of this study by Güveli, Need and De Graaf (2005, 2007) will be the subject of Chapter 6. 
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work has social and cultural features are classified as social and cultural specialists and 
occupations with economic features belong to the technocratic fraction. 
Bourdieu (1984) links occupational characteristics to attitudes, cultural forms, 
consumption patterns and other lifestyle forms. He reasons that occupational characteristics 
represent the resources that the incumbents possess. He claims that members of occupations 
with social or/and cultural capital consume relatively more cultural goods while members of 
occupations with economic capital prefer more economic goods. For example, the social and 
cultural specialists read more serious literature, go to theatres, visit museums, go on historical 
or cultural tours and enjoy modern art. The technocrats are more likely to buy classic art, go 
on luxury vacations, and live in expensive houses.  
People in social-cultural occupations, like teachers, social workers, psychologists and 
artists, require specialised knowledge and creative, artistic and communication skills to serve 
people’s well-being in society. This kind of knowledge is relatively more humanistic and 
value-laden and occupations requiring these knowledge and skills are not instrumental for 
economic goals. Consequently, these features make the members of these occupations to 
develop more progressive social-political, cultural and economic attitudes and behaviour. 
People in technocratic occupations, however, like managers, administrators, and technicians 
have specialised knowledge and skills that serve organizational, technical and structural 
needs. This kind of knowledge and skills encourage the members of these occupations to 
acquire more conservative ideas on social-political, cultural and economic issues.  
Bourdieu (1984) asserts that social and cultural specialists distinguish themselves by 
their cultural tastes and consumption patterns while the economic elites differentiate 
themselves by their economic tastes and consumption patterns. Accordingly, our general 
hypothesis states that the classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists 
differentiate themselves from classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats by being 
relatively more progressive in their social-political, cultural and economic preferences and 
behaviour. 
 
5.2.2 Social class and education 
Numerous studies have shown the impact of education on people’s political beliefs (Hyman & 
Wright, 1979; Feldman & Newcomb, 1969; Newcomb, 1943). Scholars observe two kinds of 
educational effects: level of education and field of study. Sociological research has shown the 
importance of the both on people’s value orientation. Especially in universities, students 
develop their own ideas (Bear & Lambert, 1982). The field of study affects and shapes values, 
attitudes and behaviour (Crotty, 1967; Guimond, Begin & Palmer, 1989; Van de Werfhorst, 
2001). For instance, Guimond et al. (1989) showed that social science students are less likely 
than science or administration students to blame the unemployed for their plight. Van de 
Werfhorst (2001) examined the effects of communicative, cultural, economic, and technical 
educational resources on attitudes. He found that economic educational resources have a 
positive impact on wages in economically oriented jobs while communicative and technical 
resources lead to higher wages in matching jobs. He also showed that: 
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‘Educational resources have an impact on lifestyle to the extent that people with 
extensive cultural resources participate more in highbrow culture relatively often; 
people with economic resources express their lifestyle through materialistic behaviour 
to some extent; and people with extensive communicative resources relatively often 
display tolerant, socially oriented attitudes and behaviour. Furthermore, the impact of 
educational resources on lifestyle is not caused by selectivity with respect to parental 
background’ (2001: 170). 
 
The newly distinguished social classes within the service class partly cover differences both 
in the level of education and in the educational resources Van de Werfhorst (2001) 
distinguished. Therefore, one should take these factors into account to reveal the net effects of 
social class on social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour. Brint 
(1984), for example, claimed that differences between the ‘new’ and ‘old’ fractions within the 
middle class are related to the differences in the level of education and not in social class. In 
order to understand the net effect of social class on attitudes, behaviour and different lifestyle 
forms, one should also take into account the level of education, there is a higher-lower 
distinction within the service class. One should also count for the resources that are acquired 
in different fields of study because one of the criteria that distinguish the social and cultural 
specialists is their knowledge and skills. Moreover, the social and cultural specialists are 
assumed to have greater social-cultural knowledge than incumbents of other occupations 
within the service class. This kind of knowledge is obtained in certain kinds of fields of 
education. The importance of education is illustrated by the fact that post-materialists are 
more left-wing (Inglehart, 1977), while post-materialist values appear to be stable (De Graaf, 
Hagenaars & Luijkx, 1989) and are especially shaped by education (De Graaf & Evans, 
1996). Consequently, the hypothesis is that the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists differentiate themselves from the high- and low-grade technocrats by being 
relatively more progressive in their social, cultural and economic preferences even if one 
takes into account field of study, level of education and other individual and background 
factors. 
The specific expectations derived from the general hypothesis about social-political, 
cultural and economic preferences and behaviour of the social and cultural specialists and the 
technocrats are formulated here per issue. We do not elucidate on the links between the social 
class position and our outcomes because we analyse too many lifestyles to do this here. 
Instead, we give a brief exposition of our expectations about the relation between the newly 
distinguished social classes and the outcomes: 
• Most social and cultural specialists are employed in the public sector. To improve the 
quality of their work circumstances in the public sector, these specialists are more 
likely to support left-wing political parties that are proponents of a large public sector 
(Güveli et al., 2005). Therefore, we expect the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists to vote for left-wing political parties than high- and low-grade technocrats.  
• Most technocrats are the controllers of social and cultural specialists. It is therefore 
likely that the social and cultural specialists’ subjective class identification is lower 
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than that of the technocrats. Therefore, we expect the high- and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists to identify themselves with lower social classes than the high- and 
low-grade technocrats.  
• According to Bourdieu (1984), social and cultural specialists are more progressive 
than technocrats. Therefore, we expect the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists to be proponents of a multi-cultural society and a society with equal rights 
and opportunities for men and women. Hence, the high- and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists are more likely to be tolerant towards ethnic minorities and to have 
equal gender-role attitudes than do high- and low-grade technocrats. 
 
In accordance with our general hypothesis derived from Bourdieu’s (1984) theory, we suggest 
that the social and cultural specialists differ from the technocrats with respect to cultural 
preferences. We expect that: 
• The high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists have more knowledge about 
literature, history, and art. They need this kind of knowledge to perform their job. 
People with this kind of knowledge are more likely to enjoy reading literature. 
Therefore, we expect the social and cultural specialists to read more literature than the 
high- and low-grade technocrats. 
• The high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are expected to be more likely 
to visit museums, architectural buildings, and operas and possess modern artistic 
objects than the high- and low-grade technocrats because the former have more 
knowledge to enjoy from these leisure activities and objects than the latter. Visiting 
museums, architectural buildings, operas and possessing modern art differentiate the 
social and cultural specialists from other class members (Bourdieu, 1984). 
 
With respect to economic preferences and behaviour, we expect the following: 
• The high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists have relatively less income 
than the high- and low-grade technocrats because the former serve people’s basic 
needs and their occupations are therefore not profit oriented.  
• The high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are more likely to work part-
time than the high- and low-grade technocrats because their occupations are more 
suited for part-time work; they have flexible working hours.  
• The high- and low-grade technocrats are more likely to possess classical art and 
antiques than the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists. The technocrats 
do not have the knowledge to enjoy highbrow culture. Therefore, the technocrats 
possess expensive objects to differentiate themselves from other class members 
(Bourdieu, 1984).  
 
Goldthorpe (1995), for example, claims that members of the service class are more likely to 
support right-wing politics than other classes because of their privileged position in society. 
That some fractions within the service class support more left-wing politics can be explained 
by the individual characteristics of these leftist fractions. He argues that the leftist fractions 
  Social class or education? 
 91
are recruited into the service class from lower classes that support leftist politics. In this, he 
claims that the individual factors of the leftist fractions within the service class make them 
support left-wing politics and not the class position they occupy. Therefore, we can better 
reveal the net effect of social class position on outcomes by controlling the effect of class 
position for factors that are causally prior to class position and education. Furthermore, since 
we do not have demarcated theories and hypotheses that link social class position to the 
outcomes under study, it is important to control for individual and background factors. Our 
data give the opportunity to control the effect of social class position on social-political, 
cultural and economic preferences and behaviour for many factors. 
 
 
5.3 Data and operationalisation 
 
The data used for this analysis come from the 1992, 1998, 2000 and 2003 Family Surveys of 
the Dutch Population (FSDP). These surveys contain information about the life course and 
life situation of non-institutionalised, Dutch-speaking population of the Netherlands between 
the ages of 18 and 70. For this analysis we selected respondents who had finished their full-
time education. Primary respondents and, if married or cohabiting, their partners completed 
the same structured questionnaires one oral interview, and a self-administered questionnaire. 
The four FSDP datasets are merged because most of the information we use here is available 
in all of these surveys. Below, we describe the surveys in which the dependent and 
independent variables are available. 
 
5.3.1 Independent variables 
Social class: Occupations were identified on the basis of the four-digit occupational 
classification of the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS 1984). Four social classes within 
the service class of the EGP class schema are distinguished: a class of technocrats and a class 
of social and cultural specialists with both a higher and a lower version. This distinction is 
based on two criteria: 1) the employer’s difficulty in controlling the employees, and 2) the 
social and cultural skills needed to perform the occupational tasks. The second criterion has 
two components: performers of an occupation have specialised social-cultural knowledge 
and/or performers of an occupation give social services (see Chapter 2). Interested reader can 
download the conversion tools (from ISCO 68 and ISCO 88 to adjusted EGP) from the 
following website www.ayseguveli.nl. Finally, there are eight social classes within the EGP 
class schema: 1) high-grade technocrats (Ia); 2) high-grade social and cultural specialists (Ib); 
3) low-grade technocrats (IIa); 4) low-grade social and cultural specialists (IIb); 5) routine 
non-manual employees (III); 6) self-employed persons (IV); 7) skilled manual workers (V/VI) 
and 8) semi and unskilled manual workers (VII). Classes III, IV, V/VI and VII are identified 
with the conversion tools by Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman (1989). 
Field of education: Since the distinction of the classes within the middle class is based 
on social-cultural skills, one should control for the effect of these skills and resources. The 
classification that is constructed by Van de Werfhorst and Kraaykamp (2000; Van de 
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Werfhorst & Kraaykamp, 2001) will be used in this study. In this classification, the fields of 
studies are matched with the educational resources gained in these fields. It calculates scores 
for respondents’ field of education; a field of education gets a high score for, for example, the 
communicative educational resources when much importance is paid for these skills in 
respondents’ field of study. There are 11 fields of studies: 1) general, 2) education, 3) 
humanities/arts, 4) agriculture, 5) technical, mathematics/physics, transport, 6) (para) medical, 
7) economic/administrative, 8) juridical/ managerial, 9) social-cultural, 10) personal or social 
care and 11) order and security (army, police). Finally, there are four scales for the 
educational resources that are controlled for: the communicative, cultural, economic and 
technical educational resources. Appendix 5A shows the SPSS-syntax for recoding the field 
of education into four educational resources scales.  
Figure 5.1 shows the share of people who are educated in a particular field and who 
entered a social class. Thirty-six percent of the high-grade technocrats were educated in 
technical fields, 20 percent were educated in economic and commercial fields and 18 percent 
in general fields. Thirty-seven percent of the high-grade social and cultural specialists come 
from medical fields and 19 percent from law. Thirty-one percent of the low-grade technocrats 
were educated in technical fields, 23 percent of them come from economic studies while 19 
percent of them were educated in general fields. Thirty-seven percent of the low-grade social 
and cultural specialists originate from teacher education, 14 percent come from social-cultural 
studies and 11 percent of them were educated in medical fields. These results show that most 
social and cultural specialists are educated in medical, teacher education and socio-cultural 
fields whereas the technocrats are mostly educated in technical, commercial and general 
fields. 
Figure 5.1: Class members with a particular field of study ending up in a particular social class 
(not all field of studies are shown)
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Level of education is operationalised in five dummies: primary, lower secondary, upper 
secondary, tertiary (vocational college), and (post-) university education. Sex is included in 
the models and is coded as (1) for women and (0) for men. We also controlled for age and it 
is reduced by 18 to interpret the regression-coefficients more easily. According to Scheepers 
and Van der Slik (1998) religious people are more conservative in their social and cultural 
values. It might be that religious people choose occupations on the basis of their religious 
beliefs. Therefore, we include church attendance to control for the effect of social class on 
people’s social-political preferences and behaviour. Respondents are asked how many times 
they visit the church or meetings of their religious community. The answer categories are: 1) 
never, 2) 1 or 2 times a year, 3) 1 time per month, and 4) 1 or more times per week. The 
sector of employment is included in the models: (0) people who are self employed or who are 
employed in the private and (1) people who are employed in the public sector.  
 We control respondents’ voting behaviour for their fathers’ voting behaviour when the 
respondents were 15 years old because fathers’ political orientation has an effect on children’s 
voting behaviour (Need, 1997; De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta & Heath, 1995). Fathers’ voting 
behaviour is coded as: (0) father voted for right-wing political parties and (1) father voted for 
left-wing political parties. Parental educational level is operationalised with parents’ highest 
educational level to control for parental background. Class effects are controlled for the effect 
of parent’s educational level. This variable is coded in the same way as respondent’s 
educational level. Father’s social-economic status constructed by Ganzeboom, De Graaf and 
Treiman (1992) is also included in the models where it is expected to affect the dependent 
variables.3  
 
5.3.2 Dependent variables 
Social-political preferences and behaviour 
We analyse eleven outcome variables: four variables about social-political preferences and 
behaviour, three variables about cultural preferences and behaviour and four variables about 
economic preferences and behaviour. The four dependent variables on social-political 
preferences and behaviour are voting for left-wing political parties, subjective class 
identification, tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minorities and equal gender-role attitudes. 
The political party that respondents would vote for if there elections were held tomorrow is 
asked in all surveys (1992, 1998, 2000 and 2003). To construct the variable voting left-wing 
political parties the left-wing parties (Groen-links (Green Left), PvdA (Labour Party) and 
D66 (Democrats 66)) are coded as (1) and the right-wing parties (VVD (Liberal Party), CDA 
(Christian Democratic Appeal), SGP (Political Reformed Party), GPV (Reformed Political 
Union), RPF (Reformed Political Federation), CD (Centrum Democrats), Christian Union, 
Seniors Party and LPF (List Pim Fortuyn)) as (0). Most of the left-wing parties are defined on 
the basis of the classification of Mackie and Rose (1991).  
To operationalise the dependent variable subjective class identification, respondents 
are asked to place themselves on the social ladder scoring from (1) on the bottom of the social 
                                                 
3 We prefer to use the EGP class categories for father’s social class. However, this variable has many missing 
values. To safe the reduction of the power of our data, we chose to use the father’s social-economic status. 
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ladder and (10) on the top of the social ladder. This question is asked in the FSDP 1998 and 
2000. 
Tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minorities are measured with the following question: 
‘Most Muslims cling tenaciously to their own culture.’ Respondents had to indicate the extent 
to which they agree with this statement. The item is worded negatively; agreeing with these 
views connotes an intolerant attitude. To interpret the results better, this question was recoded 
in such a way that high scores (5) express a tolerant attitude and a low score (1) express an 
intolerant attitude. This item is asked in the FSDP 2003.  
Four items about equal gender-role attitudes are asked in the FSDP of 1992 and 1998. 
Hence we use the following items to construct this variable: 1) ‘A woman is better suited for 
raising young children than a man’; 2) ‘If a man thinks his wife should not work, she has to 
accept that’; 3) ‘Women with children should only look for paid work if they are certain they 
still have enough time left for their children’; 4) ‘A mother should be at home when her 
children return from school’. Respondents had to indicate to what extent they agree with these 
statements. All items are worded negatively; respondents who agree with these statements 
express an unequal gender-role attitude. These items are recoded in such a way that a high 
score means an equal gender-role attitude. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 0.76. The mean 
of the four items is taken, ranging between 1 and 5.  
 
Cultural preferences and behaviour 
The cultural outcome variables are: reading literature, visiting museums, opera’s and 
classical concerts and modern art possession. Reading literature (Dutch literary novels, 
translated foreign literature and literature in English, French or German) is asked in all of the 
FSDP’s. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 0.72. The answer categories on reading 
literature are: never, sometimes and often. The mean of these variables is taken, ranging from 
1 to 3.  
Questions to measure visit to museums, operas and classical concerts (historical 
museums, art museums, classical theatres, opera and architectural buildings) are asked in 
FSDP 1998 and 2000. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 0.80. The answer categories on 
visiting museums, operas and classical concerts are: (1) never, (2) between 1 and 3 times a 
year, (3) between 4 and 6 times a year and (4) more than 6 times a year. The mean of these 
variables is taken, ranging from 1 to 4. Furthermore, the dependent variable modern art 
possession (from after 1900) is coded (1) do not possess modern art and (2) possess modern 
art. Information about this variable is available in FSDP 1998, 2000 and 2003.  
 
Economic preferences and behaviour 
We also try to see whether the social and cultural specialists differ from the technocrats on 
economic outcomes like income, working part-time, classic art possession and antique 
possession. The income variable is constructed with the monthly income of employed people 
plus the twelfth of thirteenth month income, bonus and profit sharing. To obtain a normal 
distributed variable, monthly income is transformed into a 10th base of logarithm. Information 
about monthly income is available in FSDP 1998, 2000 and 2003. The dependent variable 
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working full-time is constructed by grouping people who work more than 32 hours per week 
and coding them as (0) while people working less than 33 hours per week are considered as 
working part-time and they are coded as (1). Information about how many hours respondents 
work per week is available in all surveys. Classic art possession (from before 1900) and 
antique possession can be regarded as valuable goods; therefore they can be considered as 
indicators of status symbols for economic elites. Respondents who possess classic art are 
coded as (1) do not possess classic art and (2) possess classic art. Respondents who possess 
antique are coded as (1) do not possess antique and (2) possess antique. Information about 
monthly income, classical art possession and antique possession is available in FSDP 1998, 
2000 and 2003. Descriptions of all variables and survey years containing these variables are 
shown in Appendix 5B. 
 
 
5.4 Results 
 
For each dependent variable, three models were applied. In the first model, the effects of 
social class are estimated for all dependent variables to reveal the differences between the 
high-grade technocrats and the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists. In the 
second model, communicative, cultural, economic and technical educational resources and the 
level of education are included in the model to examine whether these resources explain the 
differences between the social classes.4 Finally in the third model, respondent’s age, sex and 
parental educational level are included in the analysis as control variables.5 In this model, 
class effects are additionally controlled for more background factors that are causally prior to 
education and social class and that are supposed to be relevant for revealing the net 
differences between the newly distinguished social classes. The dependent variables of 
subjective class identification, tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minorities, equal gender-role 
attitudes, reading literature, visiting museums, operas and classical concerts and log10 
monthly income are analysed with OLS regression. The dependent variables of voting for left-
wing political parties, modern art possession, working part-time, classical art possession and 
antique possession are analysed with logistic regression because the categories of these 
variables are dichotomous 
 
5.4.1 Social-political preferences and behaviour 
Table 5.1 depicts the differences in social-political preferences and behaviour between the 
high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists and the high- and low-grade technocrats. 
                                                 
4 We have included all eleven fields of studies into models that are not shown here. The four scales of 
educational resources explain more variation than the field of studies. Therefore, we show the models where we 
control for educational resources. 
5 We also included father’s educational resources in these models. None of them have explained the differences 
or a part of the differences between the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats. Including these 
indicators in the models reduces the power of our results. Therefore, we chose not to include them in the final 
models. 
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Social-political preferences and behaviour consist of voting for left-wing political parties, 
subjective class identification, tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minorities and equal gender-
role attitudes.  
Model I (Table 5.1) of voting for left-wing political parties shows that members of all 
social classes vote significantly more for left-wing political parties than the high-grade 
technocrats. The high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are the most leftist 
classes. Model II shows that people with communicative educational resources are 
significantly more likely to vote for left-wing political parties; people with economic 
educational resources are significantly less likely to do so. Cultural and technical educational 
resources have no significant direct effect on voting behaviour. People with a low and high 
secondary education are significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than people with 
a tertiary education. Educational resources partially explain the differences between the newly 
distinguished classes.  
In Model III, the background variables (age, sex, sector of employment, church 
attendance and father’s left-wing voting behaviour, parental educational level) are added to 
Model II. None of these independent variables can fully explain the differences in voting 
behaviour between the high-grade technocrats and the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists. In a less refined classification, the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists vote significantly more for left-wing political parties than the high- and low-grade 
technocrats, even after controlling for educational resources (Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf, 
2004). The refined classification of the subdivision of the service class used in this study 
supports this finding.   
The expectation about subjective class identification is that the high- and low-grade 
social and cultural specialists are more likely to rank themselves relatively lower on the social 
ladder than the high- and low-grade technocrats. Model I of this dependent variable shows 
that the high- and low-grade technocrats and the low-grade social and cultural specialists do 
not differ in subjective class identification. The high-grade social and cultural specialists rank 
themselves significantly higher than the high-grade technocrats. This contradicts our 
expectation. The routine non-manual employees, self-employed people, skilled and unskilled 
manual workers rank themselves significantly lower on the social ladder than the high-grade 
technocrats. Model II shows that the differences between the high-grade technocrats and other 
service class member are fully explained by the level of education: the more educated people 
are, the higher they rank themselves on the social ladder.  
Tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minorities is another dependent variables in social 
preferences and behaviour. Our expectation is that the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists are more tolerant towards ethnic minorities than the high- and low-grade 
technocrats. Model I of the variable tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minorities in Table 5.1 
shows that indeed the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are significantly 
more tolerant towards ethnic minorities than the high-technocrats. However, the educational 
resources in Model II explain some of these differences. Only people with a low and high 
secondary education are significantly less tolerant towards ethnic minorities than people with 
a tertiary education. Even after controlling for educational and background factors in Model 
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III, the low-grade social and cultural specialists remain significantly more tolerant towards 
ethnic minorities than the high-grade technocrats.  
 
Table 5.1: OLS or logistic regression, differences in socio-political preferences and behaviour between the high- 
and low-grade social and cultural specialists and the high- and low-grade technocrats (standard errors between 
parentheses) 
Voting for left-wing political partiesL Subjective class identificationO  I  II III  I  II  III  
Constant -0.33 (.08)  
-0.31
(.45)  
-0.20
(.58)  
7.01
(.08)
 7.26 
(.40) 
 7.50
(.43)  
Higher technocrats Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Higher social and 
cultural specialists 
0.93 
(.18) 
*
* 
0.66
(.20)
** 0.63
(.23)
** 0.48
(.17)
*
* 
0.19 
(.17) 
 0.22
(.17)
 
Lower technocrats 0.30 (.11) 
** 0.32
(.11)
** 0.34
(.14)
* -0.14
(.10)
 -0.12 
(.10) 
 -0.08
(.10)
 
Lower social and 
cultural specialists 
0.95 
(.12) 
** 0.63
(.13)
** 0.67
(.15)
** -0.15
(.10)
 -0.21 
(.11) 
~ -0.16
(.11)
 
Routine non-manual 
employees 
0.26 
(.10) 
* 0.33
(.11)
** 0.47
(.13)
** -0.74
(.09)
** -0.69 
(.11) 
** -0.37
(.10)
~ 
Self-employed persons 0.17 (.13) 
 0.25
(.13)
~ 0.13
(.17)
 -1.06
(.11)
** -0.67 
(.11) 
** -0.67
(.12)
 
Skilled manual workers 0.39 (.12) 
** 0.53
(.13)
** 0.69
(.16)
** -0.99
(.11)
** -0.82 
(.12) 
** -0.73
(.11)
~ 
Unskilled manual 
workers 
0.44 
(.11) 
** 0.51
(.12)
** 0.68
(.16)
** -1.35)
(.10)
** -0.84 
(.11) 
** -0.81
(.11)
 
Communicative 
educational resources   
0.28
(.08)
** 0.23
(.09)
*   0.13 
(.07) 
~ -0.12
(.07)
 
Cultural educational 
recourses    
-0.01
(.08)
 0.05
(.09)
   -0.03 
(.07) 
 0.01
(.07)
~ 
Economic educational 
resources    
-0.25
(.06)
** -0.24
(.07)
**   0.01 
(.05) 
 -0.02
(.05)
* 
Technical educational 
resources   
-0.01
(.06)
 0.06
(.08)
   0.07 
(.05) 
 0.05
(.06)
 
Primary education   0.03(.28)
 -0.28
(.35)
   -1.06 
(.25) 
** -0.99
(.26)
** 
Low secondary 
education   
-0.27
(.10)
** -0.49
(.18)
**   -0.75 
(.09) 
** -0.66
(.10)
** 
High secondary 
education   
-0.19
(.09)
* -0.37
(.10)
**   -0.42 
(.08) 
** -0.35
(.08)
** 
Tertiary education   Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  Ref.  
(post-)university   0.17(.12)
 0.28
(.14)
*  0.38 
(.10) 
** 0.31
(.11)
** 
Age     -0.01(.01)
    0.00
(.00)
 
Female     0.17(.08)
*    -0.09
(.06)
 
Public sector     0.40(.08)
**      
Church attendance      -0.51(.03)
**      
Father’s voting 
behaviour    
 1.31
(.07)
**      
Parent’s primary 
education    
 0.19
(.13)
     -0.23(.10)
* 
Parent’s low secondary 
education     
0.13
(.12)
     -0.17(.10)
~ 
Parent’s high secondary 
education     
0.06
(.13)
     -0.02(.10)
 
Parent’s tertiary 
education     Ref.
    Ref.  
Parent’s (post-) 
university education     
0.05
(.19)
     0.36(.12)
* 
Adjusted R2 / 
Nagelkerke’s R2 
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
0.28 
 
0.11 
 
0.16 
 
0.17 
N 5579 5534 4643 3152 3125 2965 
~significant (p<0.1) *significant (p<0.05) **significant (p<0.01) O OLS regression analysis L Logistic regression analysis. 
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Table 5.1: (Continued)  
Tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minoritiesO Equal gender-role attitudesO 
 
I  II III I II  III  
Constant 2.21 (.07)  
2.20
(.35)  
2.26
(.29)  
3.23
(.05)  
3.67 
(.26)  
4.04
(.26)  
Higher technocrats Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Higher social and 
cultural specialists 
0.47 
(.16) 
*
* 
0.33
(.16)
* -0.30
(.13)
~ 0.58
(.10)
** 0.33 
(.11) 
** 0.23
(.11)
* 
Lower technocrats 0.01 (.09) 
 0.14
(.09)
 0.13
(.09)
 0.13
(.07)
~ 0.16 
(.07) 
* 0.11
(.07)
 
Lower social and 
cultural specialists 
0.35 
(.10) 
** 0.24
(.10)
* 0.23
(.10)
* 0.46
(.07)
** 0.26 
(.08) 
** 0.24
(.08)
** 
Routine non-manual 
employees 
0.01 
(.08) 
 0.17
(.08)
 0.14
(.09)
 0.04
(.07)
 0.12 
(.07) 
 -0.01
(.07)
 
Self-employed 
persons 
0.01 
(.10) 
 0.22
(.11)
 0.17
(.11)
 -0.12
(.08)
 0.04 
(.08) 
 -0.01
(.08)
 
Skilled manual 
workers 
-0.15 
(.09) 
 0.01
(.10)
 0.01
(.09)
 -0.31
(.08)
** -0.06 
(.08) 
 -0.12
(.08)
 
Unskilled manual 
workers 
-0.24 
(.09) 
** -0.03
(.10)
 0.03
(.10)
 -0.37
(.07)
** -0.11 
(.08) 
* -0.18
(.07)
* 
Communicative 
educational resources   
0.01
(.05)
 0.02
(.06)
  0.09 (.04) 
* 0.09
(.04)
* 
Cultural educational 
recourses    
0.01
(.06)
 0.05
(.06)
  -0.06 (.04) 
 -0.02
(.04)
 
Economic educational 
resources    
-0.02
(.04)
 -0.03
(.04)
  -0.06 (.03) 
~ -0.03
(.03)
 
Technical educational 
resources   
-0.04
(.05)
 -0.03
(.05)
*   -0.12 (.03) 
** -0.05
(.03)
 
Primary education   -0.35(.22)
 -0.37
(.23)
  -0.78 (.16) 
** -0.40
(.16)
* 
Low secondary 
education   
-0.28
(.08)
** -0.31
(.08)
**  -0.38 (.06) 
** -0.23
(.06)
** 
High secondary 
education   
-0.15
(.07)
* -0.18
(.07)
**  -0.17 (.05) 
** -0.17
(.05)
** 
Tertiary education   Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  Ref.  
(post-) university   0.18(.09)
~ 0.19
(.09)
*  0.10 (.07) 
~ 0.11
(.07)
~ 
Age     0.03(.01)
*    -0.01(.00)
** 
Female     0.01(.04)
    0.17(.03)
** 
Church attendance      0.03(.02)
~    -0.14(.01)
** 
Parent’s primary 
education     
-0.03
(.07)
    -0.27(.06)
** 
Parent’s low 
secondary education     
0.03
(.08)
    -0.15(.06)
** 
Parent’s high 
secondary education     
-0.06
(.06)
    -0.01(.06)
 
Parent’s tertiary 
education     Ref.
    Ref.  
Parent’s (post-) 
university education     
0.11
(.12)
    -0.13(.09)
 
Adjusted R2 / 
Nagelkerke’s R2 
 
0.03 
 
0.06 
 
0.07 
 
0.09 
 
0.13 
 
0.22 
N 2046 2033 1888 3188 3152 3028 
~significant (p<0.1) *significant (p<0.05) **significant (p<0.01) O OLS regression analysis. 
 
We expect the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists to have more equal gender-
role attitudes than the high- and low-grade technocrats. Equal gender-role attitudes are 
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related to social class position. Model I of this dependent variable shows that the high- and 
low-grade social and cultural specialists have significantly more equal gender-role attitudes 
than the high-grade technocrats while Model II shows that these differences cannot fully be 
explained by educational resources and level of education. People with technical educational 
resources have significantly less equal gender-role attitudes and people with a primary, low 
and high secondary education have significantly less equal gender-role attitudes than people 
with a tertiary education. The background variables (age, sex, church attendance and parental 
educational level) cannot explain the differences between the high-grade technocrats and the 
high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists too. Clearly, these differences are related to 
differences in social class. Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf (2004) have, however, found that 
educational resources fully explain the differences between the newly distinguished social 
classes regarding equal gender-role attitudes with the same data. This implies that the refined 
classification of the service class used in this study is more accurate in capturing class 
cleavages than the classification of Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf (2004). 
 
5.4.2 Cultural preferences and behaviour 
People’s cultural preferences and behaviour consist of three dependent variables: reading 
literature, visiting museums, operas and classical concerts and possession of modern art. We 
expect the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists to read more literature, visit 
more museums, operas and classical concerts and possess more modern art than the high- and 
low-grade technocrats. Table 5.2 shows the differences in cultural preferences and behaviour 
between the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists and the high-grade 
technocrats. Model I of reading literature of Table 5.2 shows that only the high- and low-
grade social and cultural specialists read significantly more literature than the high-grade 
technocrats. All members of other social classes read significantly less literature than the 
high-grade technocrats. Incorporating the educational resources and the level of education in 
the model (Model II) fully explains the differences between the low-grade social and cultural 
specialists and the high-grade technocrats. People with cultural educational resources and 
more education read significantly more literature. Thus variation in reading literature is 
related to educational differences and not to social class positions.  
Model I of visiting museums, operas and classical concerts (Table 5.2) shows that 
only the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists visit significantly more museums, 
operas and classical concerts than the high-grade technocrats. However, including the 
educational resources and the level of education in the model (Model II) fully explains these 
differences. People with communicative and cultural educational resources visit significantly 
more museums, operas and classical concerts. People with a low and high secondary 
education visit significantly less museums, operas and classical concerts while people with a 
(post-) university education visit them more frequently than people with a tertiary education.  
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Table 5.2: OLS or logistic regression, differences in cultural preferences and behaviour between the high- and 
low-grade social and cultural specialists and the high- and low-grade technocrats (standard errors between 
parentheses)  
 Reading literatureO Visiting museums, operas and classical concertsO Modern art possession
L 
 I  II  III  I  II  III  I  II  III  
Constant 1.77 (.02)  
1.64 
(.11)  
1.47 
(.11)  
1.72 
(.03)  
1.38
(.13)  
1.20
(.13)  
-0.26 
(.11)  
-0.03 
(.48)  
-0.90
(.54)  
Higher technocrats Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Higher social and 
cultural specialists 
0.21 
(.04) 
** 0.07 
(.05) 
 0.07 
(.05)
 0.19 
(.06)
** -0.02
(.06)
 -0.01
(.06)
 0.62 
(.20) 
** 0.32 
(.21) 
 0.36 
(.22)
 
Lower technocrats -0.06 (.03) 
* -0.02 
(.03) 
 -0.01
(.03)
 -0.05
(.04)
 -0.06
(.03)
~ -0.03
(.03)
 -0.16 
(.13) 
 -0.12 
(.13) 
 -0.04
(.14)
 
Lower social and 
cultural specialists 
0.15 
(.03) 
** 0.06 
(.03) 
~ 0.04 
(.03)
 0.18 
(.04)
** 0.04
(.04)
 0.03
(.04)
 0.05 
(.13) 
 -0.00 
(.13) 
 0.05 
(.15)
 
Routine non-manual 
employees 
-0.13 
(.03) 
** -0.02 
(.03) 
 -0.03
(.03)
 -0.18
(.03)
** -0.08
(.03)
* -0.08
(.03)
* -0.44 
(.12) 
** -0.23 
(.13) 
~ -0.11
(.13)
 
Self-employed 
persons 
-0.26 
(.03) 
** -0.12 
(.04) 
** -0.13
(.04)
** -0.27
(.04)
** -0.14
(.04)
** -0.13
(.04)
** -0.21 
(.15) 
~ -0.03 
(.15) 
 0.08 
(.16)
 
Skilled manual 
workers 
-0.32 
(.03) 
** -0.15 
(.03) 
** -0.10
(.04)
** -0.37
(.04)
** -0.21
(.04)
** -0.16
(.04)
** -0.51 
(.14) 
** -0.34 
(.15) 
* -0.18
(.15)
 
Unskilled manual 
workers 
-0.30 
(.03) 
** -0.12 
(.03) 
** -0.09
(.03)
** -0.43
(.04)
** -0.26
(.04)
** -0.22
(.04)
** -0.42 
(.13) 
* -0.21 
(.14) 
 -0.06
(.09)
 
Communicative 
educational resources   
0.01 
(.02) 
 0.01 
(.02)
  0.07(.02)
** 0.06
(.02)
**   0.08 (.08) 
 -0.08
(.09)
 
Cultural educational 
recourses    
0.09 
(.02) 
** 0.09 
(.02)
**  0.13(.02)
** 0.11
(.02)
**   -0.06 (.08) 
 0.05 
(.09)
 
Economic educational 
resources    
-0.02 
(.01) 
 -0.00
(.01)
  -0.03(.02)
~ -0.02
(.02)
   -0.12 (.06) 
~ -0.11
(.06)
 
Technical educational 
resources   
0.00 
(.01) 
 0.02 
(.02)
  0.02(.02)
 0.03
(.02)
~   0.07 (.06) 
 0.06 
(.07)
 
Primary education   -0.19 (.07) 
** -0.15
(.07)
*  -0.12(.08)
 -0.17
(.08)
*   -0.27 (.30) 
 -0.36
(.32)
 
Low secondary 
education   
-0.27 
(.02) 
** -0.26
(.03)
**  -0.30(.03)
** -0.30
(.03)
**   -0.44 (.11) 
** -0.48
(.12)
** 
High secondary 
education   
-0.15 
(.02) 
** -0.13
(.03)
**  -0.25(.03)
** -0.21
(.02)
**   -0.28 (.09) 
** -0.28
(.10)
** 
Tertiary education   Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  Ref.    Ref.  Ref.  
(post-) university   0.17 (.03) 
** 0.19 
(.02)
**  0.11(.03)
** 0.11
(.03)
**   0.52 (.12) 
** 0.49 
(.13)
** 
Age     0.01 (.00)
**    0.01(.00)
**     0.01 (.00)
** 
Female     0.10 (.02)
**    0.08(.02)
**     -0.02(.08)
 
Parent’s primary 
education     
-0.19
(.02)
**    -0.22(.03)
**     0.12 (.13)
 
Parent’s low 
secondary education     
-0.12
(.02)
**    -0.16(.03)
**     0.15 (.12)
 
Parent’s high 
secondary education     
-0.05
(.03)
*    -0.07(.03)
*     0.19 (.12)
 
Parent’s tertiary 
education     Ref.
    Ref.      Ref.  
Parent’s  (post-) 
university education     
0.08 
(.04)
*    0.02(.04)
     0.18 (.17)
 
Father’s social-
economic status         
     0.01 (.00)
** 
Adjusted R2 / 
Nagelkerke’s R2 
 
0.09  
 
0.14  
 
0.17  
 
0.14 
 
0.23 
 
0.29  
 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
0.05 
N 5407  5364  5134  3199 3171 3065  5241 5201 4844 
~significant (p<0.1) *significant (p<0.05) **significant (p<0.01) O OLS regression analysis L Logistic regression analysis. 
 
Model I of the dependent variable modern art possession of Table 5.2 shows that only the 
high-grade social and cultural specialists possess significantly more modern art than the high-
grade technocrats while the low-grade social and cultural specialists do not differ significantly 
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from the high-grade technocrats. Including the educational resources and the level of 
education in the model (Model II) completely explains the differences between the social 
classes within the service class. People with a low and high secondary education are 
significantly less likely to own modern art whereas people with a (post-) university education 
are significantly more likely to own modern art. All in all, there are differences in cultural 
expressions between the members of social classes within the service class but none of these 
differences are related to differences in social class positions but rather to educational 
differences.  
 
5.4.3 Economic preferences and behaviour 
Differences in economic outcomes among the newly distinguished social classes are 
measured with income, part-time work, classic art possession and antique possession. Table 
5.3 shows these outcomes. All social classes earn significantly less than the high-grade 
technocrats according to Model I of the outcome variable income. Including educational 
resources and the level of education in the model (Model II) reduces the differences without 
explaining them fully. Communicative educational resources have a significantly negative 
effect on income while the cultural, economic and technical educational resources have a 
positive effect on income. People with a primary and a (post-) university education earn 
significantly more than people with a tertiary education. Including the individual variables 
(age, sex, parental educational level and father’s socio-economic status) in the model (Model 
III) does not fully explain the differences in income. Only individual factors affect income; 
parental level of education and father’s socio-economic status do not. The low-grade social 
and cultural specialists earn significantly less than the low-grade technocrats (not shown here) 
whereas the high-grade social and cultural specialists do not differ much from the low-grade 
technocrats (not shown here). 
 Furthermore, Model I (Table 5.3) of working part-time shows that the high- and low-
grade social and cultural specialists are significantly more likely to have a part-time job than 
the high-grade technocrats. The differences in having part-time job among social class 
members are controlled for the educational resources and the level of education in Model II. 
People with cultural, economic and technical educational resources and people with a primary 
education are significantly less likely to have a part-time job. This does not, however, explain 
the differences between the high-grade technocrats and the high- and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists. In Model III, these class effects are controlled for age, sex, parental level 
of education and father’s socio-economic status. This model shows that women have 
substantially more part-time jobs than men. Model III explains the differences between the 
high-grade technocrats and the high-grade social and cultural specialists but it does not 
explain the differences between the high-grade technocrats and the low-grade social and 
cultural specialists.  
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Table 5.3: OLS or logistic regression, differences in economic preferences and behaviour between the high- and 
low-grade social and cultural specialists and the high- and low-grade technocrats (standard errors between 
parentheses) 
 Log10 monthly incomeO Working part-timeL 
 I  II  III  I  II  III  
Constant 3.32 (.01)  
2.84
(.07)  
3.16
(.07)
-1.68
(.16)  
3.23 
(.61)  
-0.09 
(.77)  
Higher technocrats Ref.  Ref.  Ref. Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Higher social and 
cultural specialists 
-0.12 
(.03) 
** -0.10
(.03)
** -0.06
(.02)
** 1.19
(.24)
** 0.69 
(.26) 
** 0.35 
(.31) 
 
Lower technocrats -0.09 (.02) 
** -0.06
(.02)
** -0.05
(.01)
** 0.20
(.19)
 0.07 
(.20) 
 0.15 
(.24) 
 
Lower social and 
cultural specialists 
-0.20 
(.02) 
** -0.14
(.02)
** -0.09
(.02)
** 1.90
(.18)
** 1.29 
(.20) 
** 1.11 
(.24) 
** 
Routine non-manual 
employees 
-0.33 
(.02) 
** -0.23
(.02)
** -0.13
(.02)
** 1.88
(.17)
** 1.41 
(.18) 
** 0.82 
(.22) 
** 
Self-employed persons -0.36 (.02) 
** -0.25
(.02)
** -0.21
(.02)
** 1.34
(.20)
** 1.06 
(.22) 
** 1.04 
(.26) 
** 
Skilled manual workers -0.17 (.02) 
** -0.12
(.02)
** -0.13
(.02)
** -0.91
(.24)
** -0.74 
(.26) 
** -0.23 
(.31) 
 
Unskilled manual 
workers 
-0.35 
(.02) 
** -0.24
(.02)
** -0.20
(.02)
** 1.36
(.18)
** 1.03 
(.20) 
** 1.02 
(.26) 
** 
Communicative 
educational resources   
-0.02
(.01)
* -0.01
(.01)
   0.33 (.10) 
** 0.12 
(.12) 
 
Cultural educational 
recourses    
0.06
(.01)
** 0.01
(.01)
  -0.55 (.09) 
** -0.28 
(.11) 
~ 
Economic educational 
resources    
0.06
(.01)
** 0.03
(.01)
**  -0.59 (.07) 
** -0.37 
(.09) 
** 
Technical educational 
resources   
0.10
(.01)
** 0.02
(.01)
**  -1.35 (.09) 
** -0.67 
(.12) 
** 
Primary education   0.18(.04)
** -0.04
(.04)
   -2.43 (.37) 
** -1.30 
(.46) 
** 
Low secondary 
education   
-0.13
(.01)
** -0.12
(.01)
**   0.55 (.15) 
** 0.19 
(.19) 
 
High secondary 
education   
-0.09
(.01)
** -0.08
(.01)
**   0.33 (.12) 
** 0.29 
(.14) 
* 
Tertiary education   Ref.  Ref.    Ref.  Ref.  
(post-) university 
education   
0.09
(.02)
** 0.07
(.01)
**   -0.18 (.16)  
0.04 
(.19) 
 
Age    0.01(.00)
**    0.03 (.01) 
** 
Female    -0.24(.01)
**    2.79 (.11) 
** 
Parent’s primary 
education    
-0.01
(.01)
     -0.14 (.20) 
 
Parent’s low secondary 
education    
0.01
(.01)
     -0.08 (.17) 
 
Parent’s high secondary 
education    
0.00
(.01)
     0.03 (.18) 
 
Parent’s tertiary 
education    Ref.
     Ref.  
Parent’s (post-) 
university education    
-0.01
(.02)
     0.55 (.24) 
* 
Father’s socio-economic 
status    
0.00
(.00)
    0.00 (.00) 
 
Adjusted R2 / 
Nagelkerke’s R2 
 
0.18  
 
0.29  
 
0.43  
 
0.20  
 
0.33  0.54 
 
N 3078  3053  2866  4047  4016  3747  
~significant (p<0.1) *significant (p<0.05) **significant (p<0.01) O OLS regression analysis L Logistic regression analysis. 
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Table 5.3: (continued) 
Classic art possessionL Antique possessionL 
 
I  II  III  I  II  III  
Constant -0.48 (.09)  
-0.22
(.50)  
-0.94
(.56)  
-0.36
(.11)  
-0.30 
(.48)  
-1.15
(.55)  
Higher technocrats Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Higher social and 
cultural specialists 
-0.42 
(.21) 
* -0.56
(.23)
* -0.54
(.23)
* 0.10
(.20)
 -0.11 
(.21) 
 -0.05
(.22)
 
Lower technocrats -0.33 (.13) 
* -0.30
(.13)
* -0.26
(.14)
~ -0.16
(.13)
 -0.15 
(.13) 
 -0.10
(.14)
 
Lower social and 
cultural specialists 
-0.33 
(.13) 
* -0.39
(.14)
** -0.40
(.15)
* -0.17
(.13)
 -0.27 
(.14) 
~ -0.26
(.15)
~ 
Routine non-manual 
employees 
-0.45 
(.12) 
** -0.42
(.13)
** -0.31
(.14)
* -0.36
(.12)
** -0.35 
(.13) 
** -0.26
(.14)
~ 
Self-employed persons -0.18 (.15) 
 -0.16
(.15)
 0.11
(.16)
 -0.26
(.15)
~ -0.26 
(.15) 
~ -0.18
(.16)
 
Skilled manual workers -0.60 (.14) 
** -0.59
(.15)
** -0.41
(.16)
* -0.55
(.14)
** -0.52 
(.15) 
** -0.34
(.15)
* 
Unskilled manual 
workers 
-.37 
(.13) 
** -0.38
(.14)
* -0.22
(.15)
 -0.37
(.13)
** -0.38 
(.13) 
** -0.21
(.15)
 
Communicative 
educational resources   
0.04
(.09)
 0.02
(.09)
  0.02 (.08) 
 0.01
(.02)
 
Cultural educational 
recourses    
-0.01
(.08)
 -0.05
(.09)
  0.06 (.08) 
 0.04
(.08)
 
Economic educational 
resources    
-0.15
(.07)
* -0.16
(.07)
*  -0.09 (.06) 
 -0.07
(.07)
 
Technical educational 
resources   
0.01
(.07)
 -0.01
(.08)
  -0.03 (.07) 
 -0.01
(.07)
 
Primary education   -0.04(.31)
 -0.30
(.33)
  0.05 (.30) 
 -0.13
(.32)
 
Low secondary 
education   
0.04
(.11)
 -0.04
(.12)
  0.01 (.11) 
 -0.06
(.12)
 
High secondary 
education   
-0.03
(.10)
 0.03
(.10)
  -0.02 (.09) 
 -0.01
(.09)
 
Tertiary education   Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  Ref.  
(post-) university   0.22(.13)
 0.22
(.14)
  0.34 (.13) 
** 0.33
(.13)
* 
Age     0.02(.00)
**    0.02(.00)
** 
Female     0.05(.08)
    0.10(.09)
 
Parent’s primary 
education     
-0.02
(.13)
     0.03(.13)
 
Parent’s low secondary 
education     
-0.12
(.12)
     -0.12(.12)
 
Parent’s high secondary 
education     
-0.20
(.13)
     -0.01(.12)
 
Parent’s tertiary 
education     Ref.
     Ref.  
Parent’s  (post-) 
university education     
-0.14
(.17)
     0.04(.17)
 
Father’s socio-
economic status     
0.01
(.00)
**    0.01(.00)
** 
Adjusted R2 / 
Nagelkerke’s R2 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.04 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.04 
N 5222 5182 4829 5245 5204 4849 
~significant (p<0.1) *significant (p<0.05) **significant (p<0.01) L Logistic regression analysis. 
 
Possessing classic art and antiques are status symbols for economic elites (Bourdieu, 1984). 
Therefore, we expect them to own more classic art and antique than the high- and low-grade 
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social and cultural specialists. Model I of classic art possession (Table 5.3) shows that all 
social class members own significantly less classic art than the high-grade technocrats. In 
Model II, these differences decrease by including the educational resources and the level of 
education in the model but the differences do not disappear. An interesting finding in Model 
II is that people with more economic educational resources possess significantly less classical 
art. The differences between the high- and low-grade technocrats and the high- and low-grade 
social and cultural specialists remain when one includes background variables (age, sex, 
parental level of education, father’s socio-economic status) in the model (Model III): The 
high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists possess significantly less classic art than 
the high-grade technocrats while the low-grade technocrats do not differ much from the high-
grade technocrats. This supports the expectation that class position of the social and cultural 
specialists affects classic art possession. Model I of antique possession shows that none of the 
classes within the service class differ significantly in ownership of antiques. Therefore, we do 
not pay attention to the other two models of this dependent variable. Therefore it is logical to 
conclude that the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists differ notably from the 
high- and low- grade technocrats in income, part-time work and classic art possession.  
 
 
5.5 Conclusions and discussion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to explain whether the newly distinguished social classes are 
different in their social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour. When they 
differed, we wanted to know whether these differences are attributable to people’s class 
positions or whether they are explainable by people’s educational resources or by other 
individual factors. Results show that the classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists differ significantly from the classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats with 
regard to their social-political and economic preferences and behaviour. 
With regard to cultural practices, the social and cultural specialists do not differ from 
the technocrats in reading literature, visiting museums, operas and classical concerts and in 
modern art possession after controlling for educational resources. Obviously, cultural 
preferences and behaviour are highly related to the educational resources and not to social 
class. However, the social and cultural specialists differ significantly from the technocrats in 
their social-political and economic preferences and behaviour, even if one controls for the 
field of study, level of education and other individual factors. With regard to social-political 
preferences and behaviour, the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are 
significantly more likely to vote for left-wing political parties and the low-grade social and 
cultural specialists differentiate themselves substantially in their tolerant attitudes towards 
ethnic minorities and equal gender-role attitudes. Out of four types of economic preferences 
and behaviour, the social and cultural specialists differentiate themselves in three of these 
practices from the technocrats: income, part-time work and classic art possession. The high- 
and low-grade social and cultural specialists have substantially less income and they own 
significantly less classic art than the high- and low-grade technocrats. The low-grade social 
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and cultural specialists work significantly more part-time than the high- and low-grade 
technocrats.  
In conclusion, this study convincingly shows that the social and cultural specialists 
and technocrats are differentiated in their social-political and economic preferences and 
behaviour. It is therefore acceptable to distinguish these fractions as single social classes 
within the EGP class schema to correctly reflect the social class cleavages within the post-
industrial societies. Furthermore, this study also shows that the classification of the classes 
within the service class we used here is better in explaining the equal gender-role attitudes 
than the classification used by Van de Werfhorst and De Graaf (2004). 
  So far, we showed that the newly distinguished social classes within the service class 
differ in their social-political and economic preferences and behaviour. The question now 
arises of whether the differences in lifestyles between the technocrats and the social and 
cultural specialists became more salient over time. Unfortunately, the scarcity of data does not 
provide an answer to this question. Surveys about lifestyles are scarce and there are no such 
surveys covering so many years. One exception is people’s political orientation. Many 
surveys cover a long time span and contain information about people’s political orientation. 
Therefore, we have analysed the class-based voting behaviour of the newly distinguished 
social classes using more surveys for the years 1970 and 2003 (Güveli et al., 2005). In 
Chapter 6, we focus on political orientation of the newly distinguished social classes within 
the service class over time in the Netherlands and Britain.   
  
 
 
  
  
Chapter 6 
 
The rise of ‘new’ social classes within the service class in the 
Netherlands and Britain 
Political orientation of the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats1 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Following new class theories, in Chapter 2 we distinguished an ‘old’ class of technocrats and 
a ‘new’ class of social and cultural specialists within the service class of the EGP class 
schema. Both these classes are divided into a higher and a lower version. In Chapters 3 and 4, 
we showed that the newly distinguished social classes within the service class have specific 
inter- and intragenerational mobility patterns. Chapter 4 also showed that the low-grade social 
and cultural specialists formed their ‘demographic identity’ by becoming more closed, even 
when controlling for the level of education. It is important for class stability of the ‘new’ 
classes to develop a ‘demographic identity’. Class stability makes class members organise and 
act according to their class interest (Goldthorpe, 1980). Consequently, in Chapter 5, we saw 
that these newly distinguished social classes are differentiated by a variety of outcomes. After 
controlling for educational resources and other factors, the social and cultural specialists have 
much more tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minorities, and they have significantly more 
egalitarian gender-role attitudes than the technocrats. Furthermore, the social and cultural 
specialists earn significantly less, they work significantly more part-time, and they possess 
significantly less classical art than the technocrats. In Chapter 5, we showed that the social 
and cultural specialists vote significantly more for leftist political parties than the technocrats 
even if one controls for educational resources and other individual factors.  
This chapter focuses on the development of political identification of the newly 
distinguished social classes in the Netherlands and Britain. That is, this chapter answers 
Research Question 8. First, though, we must compare the explanatory power of the standard 
and the adjusted EGP class schemata. These schemata will be compared with Dutch and 
British data. Discussions and attempts to adjust the EGP class schema have been initiated in 
these countries (Savage, 1991; Heath & Savage, 1995; Goldthorpe, 1995; Butler, & Savage, 
1995; Mills, 1995; Li, 1997; De Graaf & Steijn, 1997; Rose, O’Reilly & Chisnall, 1999; 
Crompton, Devine, Savage & Scott, 2000; Gershuny, 2000; Scott, 2001; De Graaf & Van de 
Werfhorst, 2004). Another reason is that we have already tested the criterion validity of the 
newly distinguished social classes for both of these countries. In Chapter 2, we found that the 
criteria used to distinguish the social and cultural specialists from the technocrats do indeed 
                                                 
1 A previous version on the Dutch data of this chapter has been published as an article in Mens & Maatschappij, 
80 (2005), 257-279. Co-authors are Ariana Need and Nan Dirk de Graaf. A different version of this article has 
been accepted for publication in Acta Sociologica, 50, (2007).  
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differentiate them. Therefore, it is relevant to note the differences in the political orientation 
of the newly distinguished social classes in the Netherlands and Britain.  
We need to know whether the adjusted EGP class schema predicts people’s political 
orientation better than the standard EGP class schema. Our schema can better reflect social 
class cleavages in post-industrial societies if it is more accurate in predicting people’s 
political orientation. Therefore, in order to answer Research Question 8, we must answer two 
subquestions: 
 
a) To what extent does the adjusted EGP class schema predict people’s political orientation 
better than the standard EGP class schema in the Netherlands and Britain? 
 
In Chapter 5, we argued that in the Netherlands the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists are more likely to vote for left-wing political parties than the high- and low-grade 
technocrats are. In this chapter, we investigate whether these differences in voting behaviour 
between the newly distinguished social classes within the service class also hold for Britain. 
Therefore, our question reads: 
 
b) To what extent do the social and cultural specialists differ in their political orientation 
from the technocrats in Britain?  
 
According to class formation theory, it takes time for a class to gain a ‘demographic identity’ 
(Goldthorpe, 1995). The ‘new’ classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists thus need time to become stable units and to organise their class interest 
(Goldthorpe, 1980). Hence, if the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists form 
’new’ classes within the service class, they should eventually become better at explaining 
differences in people’s political orientation. We examine the political orientation of these 
newly distinguished classes in the Netherlands between 1970 and 2003 and in Britain between 
1964 and 2001. Thus, Research Question 8 will be answered in this chapter. This question 
reads: 
 
8) To what extent do the ‘new’ social classes of the social and cultural specialists become 
more effective over time in explaining differences in people’s political orientation? 
 
 
6.2 Theory and hypotheses 
 
6.2.1 Political cleavages within the service class 
Goldthorpe and his colleagues (1995, 2000; Goldthorpe & Heath, 1992; Erikson & 
Goldthorpe, 1992) place managers and professionals into the same social class. We argued in 
Chapter 1 and 2 that several authors have criticized this. Savage (1991) drew a distinction 
between professionals and managers. He argues that managers are more likely to be 
conservative than professionals because they are committed to ‘organizational assets’, just as 
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employers are. According to Savage (1991), professionals can be less conservative because 
they have ‘cultural assets’, and perceive themselves as relatively independent of their 
employers or organization. Heath and Savage (1995: 279; Heath et al., 1991) expect the 
creative and welfare professionals to be ‘politically distinctive because of their low degree of 
support for the Conservative Party’. They show that in Britain, creative and welfare 
professionals support the leftist politics more than other incumbents of service class 
occupations.  
Goldthorpe (1995) acknowledged that some fractions within the service class might be 
more leftist than others. However, he claimed that the service class is still in formation and if 
it consolidates, it will become an essentially conservative social element. The members of the 
service class hold the most privileged occupations within society and therefore they are 
unlikely to be advocates of egalitarian values or politics. Rather, they are more likely to wish 
to preserve the status quo. This claim has been criticized (Lamont, 1987; Kriesi, 1989; De 
Graaf & Steijn, 1997). Studies show that large differences in political orientation persist 
within the service class (Brint, 1984; Kriesi, 1989; Savage, 1991; De Graaf & Steijn, 1997; 
Hout, Brooks & Manza, 1995), so it is obvious that the consolidation process of the service 
class is not finished.  
A study by Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995) on the voting behaviour of social classes 
in the United States seems to contradict Goldthorpe’s (1995) predictions. Using data from 
between 1948 and 1992, Hout et al. (1995) showed that professionals voted for Republican 
candidates from 1948 until the 1960s and then shifted their votes to Democratic candidates, 
while managers voted for the Republican candidates throughout the whole period. These 
results suggest that within the service class members of different occupations are becoming 
increasingly differentiated in their behaviours and attitudes regarding political orientation in 
US.  
Goldthorpe (1995) asserted that the differences in political orientation of the members 
of the service class are related to their individual characteristics such as education and sector 
of employment rather than to structural features of their class position. It is therefore 
important to test whether individual characteristics of the incumbents of the service class can 
explain differences between the incumbents of the newly distinguished social classes. We 
explore the political orientation of the ‘new’ classes of the high- and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists and the ‘old’ classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats by controlling 
the class effects for individual factors. 
 
6.2.2 Political orientation of the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats 
Most sociologists adopt either a sociological or an economic approach to the study of voting 
behaviour. The sociological approach claims that parents, friends and co-workers influence 
voting behaviour. It suggests that group membership has an adhesive quality, which binds 
people to their parties. Voting is a symbolic act of allegiance to a social group (Heath, Jowell 
& Curtice, 1985). The economic approach, on the other hand, claims that people vote for 
parties whose policies will bring them the greatest advantage (Schumpeter, 1943; Downs, 
1957). People in the same socio-economic position will have the same interests and thus vote 
Chapter 6 
 110
 
for the same party. Political parties cater to the interests and preferences of people and social 
groups. According to Need (1997) the sociological approach does not explain why co-workers 
from the working class vote more for left-wing parties while the economic approach is not 
able to explain why people are influenced by other voters (see Need, 1997). Need (1997) used 
Popkin’s (1991) ideas on low information rationality to integrate these approaches. According 
to Popkin (1991) voters do not invest much time to gather information about political parties, 
for example by reading the party programmes because this does not necessarily lead to the 
desired outcome. People know that politicians turned to be inflate their promises and form 
coalitions that make their promises mostly impossible to keep. Instead, voters use information 
about what other voters say, especially when this information comes from people who are in 
similar social, economic and religious positions.  
On the base of the integrated approach to voting behaviour, we expect the social and 
cultural specialists to be more leftist oriented than the technocrats. These parties stand for the 
interest of employees in the public/non-profit sector. Social and cultural specialists carry out 
tasks that provide for basic needs of a society (education, health care and the like). It is 
difficult, however, to make these tasks more efficient by using innovations such as 
mechanisation and computerisation (Baumol, 1967). The time that a nurse or a general 
practitioner needs to dedicate to a patient, for example, has remained much the same over 
time. That is why these occupations are economically less profitable than that of managers or 
computer scientists. In other words, these occupations require more financial investment than 
they yield to keep the quality of the services they provide up to date. Since these jobs are not 
directly instrumental to profit maximization, sectors (e.g., health, education) of these 
occupations need much investment by the state or any charitable institution. Clearly, the 
performers of these jobs are aware that their jobs require the financial support of the state. The 
integrated approach would claim that the social and cultural specialists talk to each other 
about their class interest and influence one other as to their political party identification. 
Therefore, we expect the social and cultural specialists to be more leftist oriented than the 
technocrats.  
Another reason why we expect the social and cultural specialists to be more leftist 
oriented than the technocrats is the fact that the jobs of social and cultural specialists are 
relatively more difficult to mechanise. Furthermore, the fact that the jobs of the social and 
cultural specialists are not directly instrumental to profit maximisation gives certain autonomy 
to the performers of these jobs. Mechanised work tasks are easier to monitor than tasks that 
are difficult to mechanise or tasks that cannot be mechanised at all. Mechanised or 
computerised work tasks are easier to trace or control than the tasks in which the performers 
of these tasks have their own responsibility and discretion. This relative autonomy, possession 
of specialised knowledge and the fact that most social and cultural specialists predominantly 
work in the public sector gives them more progressive political beliefs. In this way, they try to 
affect political decisions in order to improve their employment situation and organizational 
regulations for their own and their clients’ interest by voting for left-wing parties. 
The few social and cultural specialists working in the private sector also are relatively 
less concerned with economic outputs, but more with the quality of their services. Since the 
The rise of ‘new’ social classes within the service class in the Netherlands and Britain 
 
 111
aim of the private sector is financial gains, the autonomy of the social and cultural specialists 
with regard to their work tasks will be endangered if the sector they work for is privatised. 
This is why we expect the social and cultural specialists to identify more with left-wing 
political parties, which support a large public sector. These parties are also against 
privatisation of the sectors in which the social and cultural specialists work (e.g., education 
and health care).  
The progressive attitudes held by social and cultural specialists owe much to the 
relative autonomy they enjoy in their work tasks since this autonomy is not conditioned by 
profit making. Members of these occupations also tend to possess more humanistic and value-
laden knowledge, which makes them more sensitive to non-economic issues. New-left 
political parties are proponents of democratisation, a multi-cultural society and environmental 
protection. For these reasons, we expect the social and cultural specialists to be more likely to 
identify with the new-left political parties than the technocrats.2  
As regards the technocrats, we expect them to identify more with right-wing political 
parties, because these parties strive to preserve the status quo while promoting privatisation 
and lower taxes. Most technocrats are employed in the private sector. Furthermore, they have 
economic and organizational assets, which they use for profit-maximization and for the 
viability of the organisation they work for. The technocrats’ assets and strategies are therefore 
in line with the right-wing party programs.  
The data we use in this chapter enables us to test previous claims about class 
formation. Since the class structure has changed gradually, we expect the political preferences 
of the ‘new’ classes of the social and cultural specialists to have crystallised gradually as well. 
Our assertion is that over the past decades, the political orientation of the social and cultural 
specialists has become more crystallised (i.e., class-based political party identification has 
become stronger) in the Netherlands and Britain.  
 
 
6.3 Data and operationalisation 
 
In this study, we use data gathered in the Netherlands between 1970 and 2003 and in Britain 
between 1964 and 2001. First we describe the Dutch data and the operationalisation of our 
variables and later the British data and operationalisation.   
 
6.3.1 Dutch data and operationalisation 
For the years between 1970 and 1990 we use the Dutch part of the International Social 
Mobility and Politics File (ISMP), which is combined and harmonised by Nieuwbeerta and 
Ganzeboom (1996). The data between 1992 and 2003 came from the Family Survey of the 
                                                 
2 We do not directly test whether the social and cultural specialists possess more humanistic and value-laden 
knowledge. However, we assume that a person carrying out an occupation possesses the qualifications and the 
knowledge required for this occupation. For example, a medical doctor personally treats patients. By treating 
patients, specialised knowledge about diseases is not enough. One needs also humanistic qualifications to 
empathise with the patient. Thus, we assume that people with specific occupations possess some qualifications 
that are needed to perform their tasks and which, to a certain extent, influences their political party choices. 
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Dutch Population (FSDP) held in 1992 (Ultee & Ganzeboom, 1995), 1998 (De Graaf, De 
Graaf, Kraaykamp & Ultee, 1999), 2000 (De Graaf et al., 2002) and 2003 (De Graaf et al., 
2005). The Family Survey of the Dutch Population 1992, 1998, 2000 and 2003 were made 
comparable to the dataset of Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom (1996) and added to it. The 
resulting dataset consists of 19 surveys with 34,856 respondents over a 33-year period. 
Appendix 6A describes the data sources for the Netherlands.  
Occupations in the ISMP file were based on the International Standard Classification 
of Occupations 1968 (ISCO 68) and occupations in the FSDP file were identified on the basis 
of CBS 84. Therefore, occupations in the FSDP file were converted into ISCO 68 with the 
conversion tools of Ganzeboom, Luijkx and Treiman (1989). We have also converted the 
experts’ classification of the occupations of the service class into the ISCO 68. The 
conversion tools are shown in Appendix 2 and can be downloaded from www.ayseguveli.nl.  
To learn whether the adjusted EGP class schema improves upon the old one, we use 
the standard and the adjusted EGP class schemata in our analysis. As we argued in Chapter 2, 
we reduced the 11 social classes of the standard EGP schema to six. The reduced standard 
EGP class schema consists of the following classes: 1) high-grade professionals and managers 
(I); 2) low-grade professionals and managers (II); 3) routine non-manual employees (III); 4) 
self-employed persons (IV); 5) skilled manual workers (V and VI) and 6) unskilled manual 
workers (VII). Class I of the standard EGP class schema is split up into a class of high-grade 
technocrats and a class of high-grade social and cultural specialists in the adjusted EGP class 
schema. Class II of the standard EGP class schema is subdivided into a class of low-grade 
technocrats and a class of low-grade social and cultural specialists in the adjusted EGP 
schema. All other classes are the same within both schemata. (For further clarification see 
Chapter 2.)  
To examine trends about the political party identification of the newly distinguished 
classes over time, we constructed a time variable ranging from 0 to 33 years (i.e., 1970 to 
2003) for the Netherlands. We also modelled the interaction between time and the high- and 
low-grade social and cultural specialists and the low-grade technocrats (i.e., time*high-grade 
social and cultural specialists, time*low-grade social and cultural specialists and time*low-
grade technocrats). These interaction terms reveal the party identification of the newly 
distinguished classes over time.  
Table 6.1 presents the frequency distribution of the adjusted EGP class schema.3 This 
table shows that besides the ‘old’ classes (Ia and IIa), the ‘new’ classes in the service class (Ib 
and IIb) have expanded between 1970 and 2003 both for men and women.4 In Chapter 3, we 
                                                 
3 The share of men and women within the social classes are shown separately because in the surveys until 1981 
only the occupation of the heads of the households was asked. To see whether the results for men and women are 
different, we analysed men and women separately. The results were not different for men but it was for women. 
Because the inclusion of women in the analysis did not change the overall results, we included women in our 
further analysis. 
4 There is some instability in the proportional representation of social classes in the early seventies. This 
instability is caused by the years 1971, 1974 and 1976. The data we used for the analysis originate from different 
sources as we mention in Appendix 6A. The codification of occupations is made with different coding schemata 
in the early 1970s. These schemata differ in detail with each other. Therefore, some fluctuations in the early 
1970s appear. We excluded these years one by one from our analysis to see whether the results change and it 
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discussed the Dutch class structure between 1970 and 2004. Therefore, we describe only the 
British class structure in the remainder.  
 
Table 6.1: Column percentages of class structure for men and women between 1970 and 2003 in the Netherlands 
(Nmen =15,768 / Nwomen =11,019)  
Classes  ‘70 ‘71 ‘72 ‘74 ‘76 ‘77 ‘79 ‘81 ‘82 ‘85 ‘86 ‘87 ‘89 ‘90 ‘92 ‘98 ‘00 ‘03
     Men    
Ia. High technocrats  6.8  7.6 7.3  5.2  15.4 10.6 8.5 10.0 10.2 14.5 10.3 10.0 10.6 15.0  14.2  15.5  14.9 12.4 
Ib. High social and 
cultural specialists 
1.2  1.1 0.5  4.4  2.5 1.1 3.2 2.2 1.2 1.9 1.7 1.1 2.2 1.7  2.4  2.6  3.5 3.9 
IIa. Low technocrats 15.7  13.1 14.4  16.8  13.5 10.6 14.4 9.2 9.3 12.8 10.1 14.0 16.4 12.9  17.3  19.7  21.1 20.1 
IIa. Low social and 
cultural specialists 
6.3  6.8 5.6  5.9  12.4 7.2 7.0 8.7 8.8 11.7 9.6 15.4 10.5 11.8  11.0  12.6  11.1 13.0 
III. Routine non-
manual employees 
13.7  15.4 12.2  15.6  15.5 15.2 14.7 17.0 16.0 16.0 16.8 16.4 17.6 16.3  11.9  12.8  13.5 15.5 
IV. Self-employed 
persons 
15.4  17.8 11.6  11.4  18.2 9.5 10.4 10.4 7.8 8.2 9.5 8.4 5.9 7.4  9.3  5.5  3.7 5.1 
V/VI. Skilled 
manual workers 
22.3  23.3 27.5  24.3  13.2 26.2 29.9 25.9 29.1 15.1 23.1 20.8 20.3 18.8  18.6  17.8  18.1 15.1 
VII. Unskilled 
manual workers 
18.6  15.0 20.9  16.4  9.4 19.5 11.9 16.6 17.7 19.8 18.8 14.0 16.4 16.1  15.4  13.4  14.1 14.9 
N 954 473 1060 572 638 2597 402 946 657 1260 696 371 408 1129 846 973 750 1036
     Women    
Ia. High technocrats  1.3  1.0 1.9  0.4  1.5 2.2 0.3 0.6 1.9 1.9 1.5 2.7 1.0 2.0  2.1  4.6  4.1 4.0 
Ib. High social and 
cultural specialists 
1.0 1.0 0.0 1.7  1.2 0.7 1.8 0.4 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1  1.1  2.5  2.3 2.1 
IIa. Low technocrats 4.4  4.1 3.8  3.7  4.4 3.9 4.6 4.1 4.1 6.0 4.0 5.6 5.2 5.9  7.6  6.4  7.5 6.3 
IIa. Low social and 
cultural specialists 
12.7  11.4 15.3  15.6  18.0 19.8 14.8 15.9 17.1 19.7 17.5 19.3 17.4 20.9  18.5  21.8  18.7 20.5 
III. Routine non-
manual employees 
34.9  36.7 34.0  44.2  37.3 35.6 40.3 38.5 40.5 40.8 39.9 35.0 42.3 42.4  36.8  41.6  39.3 41.4 
IV. Self-employed 
persons 
2.4  10.3 3.8  3.2  3.2 3.9 1.2 5.2 3.9 5.6 5.8 4.7 3.7 3.1  5.2  2.7  2.8 4.1 
V/VI. Skilled 
manual workers 
6.8  6.1 3.8  5.0  3.1 3.2 7.1 5.5 5.3 3.4 5.4 3.9 5.7 5.3  2.9  3.2  4.5 3.5 
VII. Unskilled 
manual workers 
37.5  39.4 37.5  27.3  31.5 30.7 30.9 29.8 26.4 21.8 24.9 27.9 23.8 19.3  25.9  17.3  20.8 18.1 
N 221 98 53 462 93 878 325 927 639 1310 670 337 420 1003 829 967 737 1050
 
For the Netherlands, we analysed two dependent variables for voting behaviour. For the first 
variable, the political parties were divided into left- and right-wing political parties. For the 
second dependent variable, the political parties were divided into old-left, new-left and right-
wing political parties.  
We use respondents’ political party identification as a dependent variable. It is a better 
measure of people’s political orientation than actual vote because the latter might be 
influenced by specific electoral factors such as tactical voting and particular campaigns 
(Heath & Savage, 1995). In our surveys, party identification was not asked in 1985, 1992, 
1998, 2000 and 2003. For these surveys respondents were asked to name the party they would 
vote for if national elections were held tomorrow. In all other surveys, respondents were 
asked with which political party they identify. We therefore used first party identification and 
                                                                                                                                                        
turned out that this does not affect the results significantly. The results do not even change significantly when 
excluding all these years (1971, 1974 and 1976) simultaneously. This implies that our results are robust. 
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if this is not asked, we used political preferences to construct political party identification5. 
We used the classification of political parties by Mackie and Rose (1991) to categorise parties 
as leftist or rightist. (Appendix 6B presents this classification.) The right-wing political parties 
were coded as zero (0) and the left-wing political parties were coded as one (1).  
We split the left-wing political parties in the Netherlands into two groups according to 
De Graaf, Heath and Need’s (2001) classification of the new-left and the old-left parties. The 
old-left parties are the Radicals, the Communist Party (CPN), the Democratic Socialists 70 
(DS70), the Labour Party (PvdA) and the Socialist Party (SP). These parties stand for the 
interests of the working class (De Graaf et al., 2001). The new-left is comprised of political 
parties like the Democrats ’66 (D66), the Green Left (Groen-Links), the Radical Political 
Party (PPR), the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP) and the Evangelical Peoples Party (EVP). 
New-left political parties stress issues like democratisation, human rights and environmental 
protection. All other parties are grouped as right wing parties.6 The dependent variable for 
old-left versus new-left versus right-wing political parties was coded as (1) old-left, (2) new-
left and (3) right-wing parties. Table 6.2 presents the party identification of all classes within 
the adjusted EGP class schema in the Netherlands. This table shows that the high- and low-
grade social and cultural specialists are more likely to identify with old-left as well as with 
new-left political parties than the high- and low-grade technocrats. It is remarkable that there 
are few differences in new-left party identification between the self-employed and the skilled 
and unskilled manual workers; all of them identify less with new-leftist parties. The self-
employed generally identify with rightists while the skilled and unskilled manual workers 
identify with leftist parties. Obviously, new-leftist parties do not get much support from 
manual workers. 
 
Table 6.2: Percentages old-left, new-left and right-wing party identification of all social class members 
for all survey years within the adjusted EGP class schema in the Netherlands (N=26,790) 
 Old-left party 
identification 
New-left party 
identification 
Right-wing party 
identification 
Total N 
Ia. High technocrats 15.6 14.2 70.1  2057
Ib. High social and cultural specialists 24.8 24.6 50.6  427
IIa. Low technocrats 20.1 14.4 65.5  2777
IIb. Low social and cultural specialists 25.6 23.1 51.2  3560
III. Routine non-manual employees 25.7 13.8 60.6  6753
IV. Self-employed persons 12.0 6.4 81.6  1990
V/VI. Skilled manual workers  37.5 9.4 53.1  3990
VII. Unskilled manual workers 35.3 7.9 56.8  5236
Total  27.4 12.9 59.7  26790
 
                                                 
5 To avoid doubts about pooling these two types of questions into one dependent variable, we run a separate 
analysis without the surveys (in the years 1985, 1992, 1998, 2000 and 2003) containing voting behaviour. This 
did not significantly affect the results. 
6 Of course for the Netherlands, there are detailed left-right scores for political parties. However, using scales 
based on these scores hardly results in different outcomes. Our division into three categories is a rather 
conservative test. 
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Education was coded as (1) primary, (2) low secondary, (3) high secondary, (4) tertiary and 
(5) university and post-university. The sector of employment variable was coded as (0) people 
employed in the private sector and (1) in the public sector. The public sector contains all 
organisations that are partly or wholly financed by the state, including education, social 
services, health care and foundations. Sex (0 for man, 1 for woman) and age (18 years and 
older) were also used as control variables. Appendix 6C describes all variables.  
 
6.3.2 British data and operationalisation 
For Britain, we use data from surveys gathered between 1964 and 2001. Surveys held 
between 1964 and 1990 are from the International Social Mobility and Politics File (ISMP) 
(Nieuwbeerta & Ganzeboom, 1996). This file contains three types of surveys for Great Britain 
(except Northern Ireland): surveys held in 1964, 1966 and 1970 are from Political Change in 
Britain, the survey held in 1974 is the British General Election Cross-Section Surveys and the 
surveys of the International Social Science Program gathered each year between 1985 and 
1990.7 Moreover, we added the British General Election Cross-Section Surveys (BGES) 
1992, 1997 and 2001. These surveys were made comparable and the resulting dataset consists 
of 13 surveys of 25,062 respondents over a 37-year period. (Appendix 6D describes the data 
sources.) 
Occupations in the surveys until 1990 were based on different classifications. All of 
these classifications are translated into the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations 1968 (ISCO 68) by Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom (1996). We have used only 
those surveys in which at least 3-digit occupational classifications were used to identify the 
occupations. The occupations in the BGES 1992 and 1997 were coded with the British 
Standard Occupational Classification 1990 (SOC 90) but we have converted the SOC 90 into 
the International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988 (ISCO 88). The occupations in 
the BGES 2001 were based on ISCO 88. ISCO 68 and ISCO 88 are detailed classifications 
that allow us to differentiate the occupations within the service class into two ‘old’ classes of 
technocrats and two ‘new’ classes of social and cultural specialists.  
All surveys held in Britain contain the standard EGP class schema. To compare the 
standard and the adjusted EGP class schemata, we also use both of them for Britain. These 
schemata contain the same classes as we have described above for the Netherlands. The ISCO 
68 and 88 occupational classification is used to classify the fractions of the high- and low-
grade technocrats and the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists. The occupations 
within the service class that are allocated to these classes are shown in Appendix 2.  
To examine trends, we constructed a time variable ranging from 0 to 37 years (i.e., 
from 1964 to 2001). We also looked for the interaction between time and the fractions within 
the service class (i.e., time*high-grade social and cultural specialists, time*low-grade social 
and cultural specialists and time*low-grade technocrats) to see whether the ‘new’ social 
classes become more effective to explain the cleavages within the service class.  
                                                 
7 This file contains also the BGES 1979, 1983 and 1987 but the classification of the occupations of these surveys 
are not detailed enough. We need a detailed occupational classification for a proper presentation of the 
occupations within the middle class. Therefore, these surveys are excluded from our analysis. 
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Table 6.3 shows the column percentages of the incumbents of the social classes for men and 
women between 1964 and 2001 for Britain. This table shows that the share of men in the class 
of high-grade technocrats increased from 5 percent in 1964 to 13 percent in 2001 and the 
proportion of men in the class of the high-grade social and cultural specialists increased from 
1 percent in 1964 to 5 percent in 2001. The share of men in the class of the low-grade 
technocrats increased from 11 percent in 1964 to 15 percent in 2001 while the proportion of 
men in the class of the low-grade social and cultural specialists hardly increased (from 4 
percent in 1964 to 5 percent in 2001). The share of women in the class of the high-grade 
technocrats increased from 3 percent in 1964 to 5 percent in 2001 while the share of women 
in the class of the low-grade technocrats almost tripled from 3 percent in 1964 to 11 percent 
in 2001. There were a few women in the class of high-grade social and cultural specialists in 
1964 (0.3%) while they increased to 3 percent in 2001. In 1964, 8 percent of the female 
labour force were in the class of the low-grade social and cultural specialists and the 
proportion of them increased in 2001 to 13 percent. A general comparison between the male 
and female labour force within the service class shows that men are more prevalent in the 
technocratic occupations while women are more employed in the low-grade social and 
cultural specialist occupations. However, the share of both male and female incumbents 
within these fractions of the service class increased between 1964 and 2001.8 Furthermore, 
the share of the technocrats increased more than the share of the social and cultural specialists 
between 1964 and 2001.  
The developments outside the service class show a different picture in Table 6.3. The 
proportion of the incumbents in these classes fell between 1964 and 2001. The share of men 
in the class of the routine non-manual employees decreased from 10 percent in 1964 to 7 
percent in 2001 while the proportion of women in this class dropped from 40 percent to 32 
percent in this period. The class of the self-employed persons, both men and women, 
remained approximately the same size throughout the whole period. The proportion of men 
and women in the class of the unskilled manual workers plunged: the proportion of men in 
this class from 29 percent in 1964 to 21 percent in 2001 and the share of women from 36 
percent to 25 percent.  
A comparison between the Dutch and the British class structures (Table 6.1 and 6.3) 
shows that in both countries, the proportion of men and women in the fractions within the 
service class increased while the share of men and women among skilled and unskilled 
manual workers decreased. Many other post-industrial countries have experienced the same 
process (Breen, 2004). In both countries, the share of the technocrats in the class structure 
increased more than the share of the social and cultural specialists. A notable difference is that 
the share of men and women in the class of the low-grade social and cultural specialists is 
higher in the Netherlands than in Britain. In 2001, it is 5 percent in Britain and 13 percent in 
                                                 
8 We have analysed men and women separately. Inclusion of women in our analysis did not change our results, 
except in one case, which we will discuss in the remainder. Therefore, the political orientation of men and 
women were analysed together.  
 
The rise of ‘new’ social classes within the service class in the Netherlands and Britain 
 
 117
the Netherlands for men. The percentages for women are 13 percent in Britain and 21 percent 
in the Netherlands. 
 
Table 6.3: Column percentages of class structure for men and women between 1964 and 2001 in Britain (Nmen 
=12,449 / Nwomen =12,485)   
Classes       Men       
 1964 1966 1970 1974 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992 1997 2001
Ia. High technocrats  5.0 7.3 6.0 5.2 8.9 8.3 8.2 8.1 11.6 11.9 9.8 10.6 12.7
Ib. High social and cultural 
specialists 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.7 3.4 2.9 4.2 3.9 2.5 3.0 5.2 5.8 4.7
IIa. Low technocrats 11.2 10.5 14.5 16.9 21.7 20.7 22.5 22.8 19.5 15.2 12.7 13.3 14.9
IIa. Low social and cultural 
specialists 3.9 2.9 3.4 3.4 3.4 4.0 4.4 3.9 4.7 5.3 4.0 3.5 4.5
III. Routine non-manual 
employees 10.0 11.3 8.4 7.0 5.5 5.8 6.2 5.6 5.4 6.1 7.7 6.5 6.9
IV. Self-employed persons 8.2 8.1 8.1 10.0 5.7 7.3 8.0 8.1 9.8 12.8 9.2 12.2 9.2
V/VI. Skilled manual 
workers 
31.0 30.7 29.5 28.7 29.9 26.8 26.0 29.5 27.4 28.5 25.4 26.1 28.3
VII. Unskilled manual 
workers 
29.3 27.8 28.9 27.1 21.6 23.2 20.5 18.2 19.1 17.2 26.0 22.0 21.3
N 777 892 620 1143 653 624 547 1134 1140 494 1606 1592 1302
      Women       
Ia. High technocrats  2.6 1.5 2.4 2.3 4.1 6.2 6.6 5.1 3.0 2.8 2.3 4.4 5.0
Ib. High social and cultural 
specialists 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.9 0.3 1.2 2.1 4.0 3.0
IIa. Low technocrats 2.3 1.8 2.7 2.3 8.3 7.0 6.6 8.3 8.1 9.0 6.5 8.4 11.1
IIa. Low social and cultural 
specialists 8.4 8.5 10.9 9.0 11.8 13.6 14.7 13.1 16.4 13.6 10.8 10.7 13.4
III. Routine non-manual 
employees 39.9 43.6 41.6 40.5 37.8 36.4 37.0 34.4 35.7 39.1 39.2 34.5 31.6
IV. Self-employed persons 3.3 3.8 5.0 4.1 2.4 2.1 3.1 3.9 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.2
V/VI. Skilled manual 
workers 
7.4 6.9 7.7 8.1 11.1 12.7 11.4 11.8 11.2 10.9 7.3 7.7 8.1
VII. Unskilled manual 
workers 
35.8 33.6 29.2 30.8 23.8 21.6 19.6 22.5 21.3 19.6 27.9 26.4 24.8
N 391 390 339 896 748 675 606 1342 1326 653 1793 1847 1532
 
We have information of respondents’ political party identification in all British surveys, 
except in 1985, 1986 (surveys of the International Social Science Program [ISSP]) and 2001 
(British General Election Cross-Section Survey [BGES]). In the 1985 and 1986 surveys, 
respondents were asked to name the party they would vote for if national elections were held 
tomorrow. In 2001, respondents were asked to name the party they voted for in recent 
elections. We used this information for the survey years of 1985, 1986 and 2001 to construct 
the dependent variable of political party identification. Thus, political party identification was 
constructed from different variables requested in different surveys9.  
We used the classification of political parties by Mackie and Rose (1991) to categorise 
parties in Britain as leftist or rightist. (Appendix 6E presents this classification.) The right-
wing political parties were coded as zero (0) and the left-wing political parties were one (1). 
For the Netherlands, the left-wing political party identification is subdivided into old-left and 
                                                 
9 To avoid doubts about pooling these two types of questions into one dependent variable, we ran a separate 
analysis without the surveys held in 1985, 1986 and 2001. This did not significantly change our results.  
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new-left. Since the new-left political parties in Britain are too small to be represented in our 
surveys, we are not able to distinguish them. Therefore, we could not make a comparison 
between the Netherlands and Britain regarding new-left party identification.  
Table 6.4 presents the percentages of left-wing and right-wing party identification of 
the incumbents of the social classes in Britain. This table shows that 35 percent of the high-
grade social and cultural specialists and 40 percent of the low-grade social and cultural 
specialists identify with left-wing political parties while 27 percent of the high-grade 
technocrats and 32 percent of the low-grade technocrats do so. 
We controlled for sector of employment, education, sex (0 for man and 1 for woman) 
and age (18 years and older). The sector of employment variable was coded as (0) for people 
employed in the private sector and (1) for people employed in the public sector. The public 
sector contains all organisations that are partly or entirely financed by the state. Furthermore, 
four dummies are used to control for education: people who ended their education when they 
were 15 or younger (1); when they were 16 (2); when they were 17 or 18 (3) and when they 
were 19 or older (4). Appendix 6F describes all these variables. 
 
Table 6.4: Percentages left-wing versus right-wing party identification of all social class 
members for all survey years within the adjusted EGP class schema in Britain (N=21,577) 
 Right-wing parties Left-wing parties Total N 
Ia. High technocrats 73.2 26.8 2208 
Ib. High social and cultural specialists 65.5 34.5 479 
IIa. Low technocrats 67.6 32.4 1878 
IIb. Low social and cultural specialists 59.7 40.3 1750 
III. Routine non-manual employees 62.2 37.8 4722 
IV. Self-employed persons 72.4 27.6 1382 
V/VI. Skilled manual workers  40.6 59.4 4023 
VII. Unskilled manual workers 39.7 60.3 5135 
Total  55.4 44.6 21577 
 
 
6.4 Analysis and results 
 
6.4.1 Comparing the standard and adjusted EGP class schemata 
 
6.4.1.1 The Netherlands  
To analyse party identification, a logistic regression analysis was applied. First, the fit of a 
model with the standard EGP class schema was compared to the fit of a model using the 
adjusted EGP class schema. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the improvement of the model fit using 
the adjusted EGP class schema with regard to political party identification for the Netherlands 
and Britain respectively. To compare the adjusted EGP class schema with the standard EGP 
class schema, the class of unskilled manual workers was used as a reference category in both 
tables. In Tables 6.5 and 6.6, Model A represents the effects of social class position on party 
identification and the model fit of the standard EGP class schema while Model B does so for 
the adjusted EGP class schema.  
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Model B of Table 6.5 significantly improves the model fit of Model A, with 158.2 
(948.1-789.9) against 2 degrees of freedom. Since this is a rather substantial improvement in 
fit, we can conclude that for the Netherlands the adjusted EGP class schema is a substantially 
better predictor of political party identification than the standard EGP class schema. Our 
expectation was that there are ‘new’ social classes within the service class and the adjusted 
EGP class schema will predict their voting behaviour more accurately than the standard EGP 
class schema. Table 6.5 shows that the political party identification of the high- and low-grade 
social and cultural specialists is not significantly different from that of the unskilled manual 
workers. This indicates that the distinction made between technocrats and social and cultural 
specialists is important in the Netherlands. After distinguishing these fractions in Model B, 
the rightist political party identification of the high- and low-grade technocrats and the leftist 
party identification of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists become more 
prominent in the Netherlands. 
 
Table 6.5: Logistic regression on comparing the standard and adjusted EGP class schemata with 
regard to leftist versus rightist party identification in the Netherlands (standard errors between 
parentheses) (N=22,710) 
Model Aa  Model Bb  
B  B  
Constant 0.16 (0.03)  0.17 (0.03)  
High professionals and managersa / High 
technocratsb 
-0.63 (0.05) ** -0.78 (0.05) ** 
High social and cultural specialists -  0.01 (0.10)  
Low professionals and managersa / Low technocratsb -0.17 (0.04) ** -0.48 (0.05) ** 
Low social and cultural specialists -  -0.05 (0.05)  
Routine non-manual employees -0.28 (0.04) ** -0.28 (0.04) ** 
Self-employed persons -1.47 (0.06) ** -1.49 (0.06) ** 
Skilled manual workers 0.12 (0.05) * 0.12 (0.05) * 
Unskilled manual workers Ref. Ref. 
Chi2 789.9 948.1 
Degrees of freedom 5 7 
a EGP class schema  b Adjusted EGP class schema *significant (p<0.05) **significant (p<0.01). 
 
6.4.1.2 Britain 
Table 6.6 gives a comparison between the standard and adjusted EGP class schemata 
regarding leftist versus rightist party identification for Britain. Model B of Table 6.6 
significantly improves the model fit of Model A, with 17.8 (1648.2-1630.4) and 2 degrees of 
freedom. This is a small but a significant improvement. Therefore, we can also conclude for 
Britain that the adjusted EGP class schema is a better predictor of political party identification 
than the standard EGP class schema. Our expectation that the service class became 
fragmented and therefore the standard EGP class schema needs to be adjusted is also 
supported by the British data. Model B of Table 6.6 shows that after distinguishing the 
fractions of the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists, the rightist and leftist 
political party identification of these fractions become more salient in Model B. This indicates 
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that the distinction made between technocrats and social and cultural specialists is likewise 
important in Britain.  
 Comparison of the Netherlands and Britain shows that improvement of model fit for 
Britain is significant but not as substantial as for the Netherlands. Another difference is that in 
the latter country, the social and cultural specialists identify much less with leftist political 
parties than the unskilled manual workers; in the Netherlands, the social and cultural 
specialists do not differ in their party identification from the unskilled manual workers.  
 
Table 6.6: Logistic regression on comparing the standard and adjusted EGP class schemata with 
regard to leftist versus rightist party identification in Britain (standard errors between parentheses) 
(N=21,838) 
Model Aa  Model Bb  
B  B  
Constant 0.43 (0.03)  0.44 (0.03)  
High professionals and managersa / Higher 
technocratsb 
-1.39 (0.05) ** -1.43 (0.06) ** 
High social and cultural specialists -  -1.13 (0.08) ** 
Low professionals and managersa / Higher technocratsb -1.09 (0.05) ** -1.27 (0.06) ** 
Low social and cultural specialists -  -1.00 (0.06) ** 
Routine non-manual employees -0.94 (0.04) ** -0.94 (0.04) ** 
Self-employed persons -1.34 (0.06) ** -1.34 (0.06) ** 
Skilled manual workers 0.06 (0.04)  -0.06 (0.04)  
Unskilled manual workers Ref. Ref. 
Chi2 1630.4 1648.2 
Degrees of freedom 5 7 
a EGP class-schema.  b Adjusted EGP class-schema *significant (p<0.05) **significant (p<0.01). 
 
6.4.2 Leftist-rightist party identification in the Netherlands and Britain 
 
The Netherlands 
Since the adjusted EGP class schema predicted people’s political party identification better 
than the standard EGP class schema in the Netherlands and Britain, we continue our analysis 
using only the adjusted EGP class schema. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 present the differences in party 
identification between the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists in the 
Netherlands and Britain respectively. In both tables, the high-grade technocrats were the 
reference category, to enable us to compare the ‘old’ classes of the high- and low-grade 
technocrats and the ‘new’ classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists.  
 Model A of Table 6.7 shows that all classes except the self-employed are significantly 
more likely to identify with left-wing political parties than the high-grade technocrats do in 
the Netherlands. Model B shows that people working in the public sector are significantly 
more likely to identify with left-wing political parties than people working in the private 
sector. After including the sector of employment in the model, the differences between the 
‘old’ and the ‘new’ classes become somewhat smaller but remain significant. This means that 
social class has an effect independent of the sector of employment on party identification. 
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Neither does the level of education, Model C in Table 6.7, fully explain the differences in 
party identification between the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists. 
 
Table 6.7: Logistic regression, effects of the ‘new’ and ‘old’ social classes on leftist versus rightist 
political party identification in the Netherlands (standard errors between parentheses) (N=22,707) 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E  
B  B  B  B  B  
Constant -0.23 (.07) 
 -0.28
(.07)
 -0.10
(.09)
 -0.15
(.07)
 -0.20 
(.09) 
 
Sex 0.00 (.03) 
 0.02
(.03)
 0.01
(.03)
 0.00
(.00)
 0.02 
(.03) 
 
Age -0.01 (.00) 
** -0.01
(.00)
** -0.02
(.00)
** -0.01
(.00)
** -0.02 
(.00) 
** 
Time (0-33) 0.01 (.00) 
** 0.01
(.00)
** 0.01
(.00)
** 0.01
(.00)
** 0.01 
(.00) 
** 
High technocrats Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
High social and 
cultural specialists 
0.70 
(.11) 
** 0.67
(.11)
** 0.57
(.12)
** 0.45
(.19)
* 0.42 
(.20) 
* 
Low technocrats 0.26 (.06) 
** 0.27
(.06)
** 0.31
(.06)
** 0.11
(.09)
 0.19 
(.10) 
~ 
Low social and cultural 
specialists 
0.77 
(.06) 
** 0.71
(.06)
** 0.76
(.06)
** 0.38
(.09)
** 0.37 
(.09) 
** 
Routine non-manual 
employees 
0.43 
(.06) 
** 0.45
(.06)
** 0.48
(.06)
** 0.43
(.06)
** 0.48 
(.06) 
** 
Self-employed persons -0.63 (.08) 
** -0.56
(.08)
** -0.61
(.08)
** -0.65
(.08)
** -0.58 
(.08) 
** 
Skilled manual workers 0.90 (.06) 
** 0.94
(.06)
** 0.91
(.06)
** 0.88
(.06)
** 0.92 
(.06) 
** 
Unskilled manual 
workers 
0.80 
(.06) 
** 0.82
(.06)
** 0.76
(.06)
** 0.80
(.06)
** 0.74 
(.06) 
** 
Public sector    0.28(.04)
**   0.27 
(.04) 
** 
Primary education     Ref.    Ref.  
Low secondary 
education 
    -0.35
(.04)
**   -0.36 
(.04) 
** 
High secondary 
education 
    -0.47
(.05)
**   -0.48 
(.05) 
** 
Tertiary education     -0.19 (.06)
**   -0.25 
(.06) 
** 
(Post) university     -0.06(.08)
  -0.12 
(.08) 
 
Time∗High social and 
cultural specialists 
     0.02
(.01)
~ 0.01 
(.01) 
 
Time∗Low technocrats      0.01(.00)
* 0.01 
(.01) 
 
Time∗Low social and 
cultural specialists 
     0.02
(.00)
** 0.02 
(.00) 
* 
Chi2 1177.2 1238.5 1308.7 1212.6 1393.9 
Degrees of freedom 10 11 14 13 18 
*significant (p<0.05) **significant (p<0.01)  ~significant (p<0.10) 
 
Model D includes the trend variables. Between 1970 and 2003, people in the Netherlands 
became significantly more likely to identify with leftist political parties. While the high-grade 
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social and cultural specialists are one of the most leftist classes within the service class, there 
is no trend of this group becoming more leftist during the 33 years. However, Model D shows 
that the low-grade social and cultural specialists were less leftist than the high-grade social 
and cultural specialists in 1970; but they became significantly more leftist after 1970. 
Moreover, the low-grade technocrats came to identify significantly more with leftist political 
parties between 1970 and 2003.  
After controlling for sector of employment (private versus public), level of education, 
age and sex in Model E, the ‘new’ social classes still differ considerably from the high-grade 
technocrats with regard to leftist versus rightist political party identification. The high-grade 
social and cultural specialists did not change their political party identification significantly 
over time but they were already more likely to identify with leftist parties in 1970. The low-
grade social and cultural specialists did change significantly their party identification and 
calculations show that they became the most leftist social class by the end of the 33 years. The 
regression coefficient of the low-grade social and cultural specialists in Model E is 0.37. If 
we add the trend effect of 0.66 (33∗0.02) of this social class, we get a parameter of 1.03 
(0.37+0.66) in 2003. The exponent of this effect is 2.80 (Exp(1.03)), and this is the effect of 
the low-grade social and cultural specialists on party identification in 2003. This means that 
by 2003 the low-grade social and cultural specialists had become the most leftist social class 
within the service class. By contrast, after controlling for all other factors, the party 
identification of the low-grade technocrats does not change significantly over time in the 
Netherlands.  
 
Britain 
In Table 6.8, we answer the question whether the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists in Britain differ significantly from the high- and low-grade technocrats with regard 
to their political orientation. Model A shows the differences in political orientation among all 
social classes compared to the high-grade technocrats. The high- and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists are significantly more likely to identify with left-wing political parties than 
the high-grade technocrats. The low-grade technocrats in Britain identify also significantly 
more with leftist parties than the high-grade technocrats.  
In Model B of Table 6.8, we controlled for the sector of employment. The sector of 
employment reduces the differences between high-grade technocrats and the high- and low-
grade social and cultural specialists but these classes remain quite different in their political 
orientation. In Model C of Table 6.8, education is added to Model A. This model shows that 
people who ended their education when they were 16 and people who were 15 or younger are 
significantly more likely to identify with left-wing political parties than people whose 
education ended when they were 19 0or older. Furthermore, controlling for education 
increases the differences between the high-grade technocrats and the high- and low-grade 
social and cultural specialists.  
Model D includes the trend variables (1964-2001). In 1964, none of the fractions 
within the service class differed in their political orientation. The high-grade social and 
cultural specialists tend to lean to right-wing politics but not significantly. However, all of the 
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fractions within the service class become significantly more leftist over time. In a separate 
analysis for only men (which is not shown here), the low-grade social and cultural specialists 
do significantly differ from the high-grade technocrats in 1964. They are significantly more 
likely to be leftist oriented than the high-grade technocrats. This is the only difference 
between a separate multivariate analysis for men and women. 
 
Table 6.8: Logistic regression, effects of the ‘new’ and ‘old’ social classes on leftist versus rightist 
political party identification in Britain (standard errors between parentheses) (N=29,976) 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E 
 B  B  B  B  B  
Constant -0.72 (.07) 
 -0.70
(.07)
 -0.94
(.09)
 -0.66
(.07)
 -0.92 
(.08) 
 
Female -0.13 (.03) ** 
-0.14
(.03) ** 
-0.13
(.04) ** 
-0.14
(.03) ** 
-0.14 
(.03) 
** 
Age -0.01 (.00) ** 
-0.01
(.00) ** 
-0.02
(.00) ** 
-0.01
(.00) ** 
-0.02 
(.00) 
** 
Time (0-37) 0.01 (.00) ** 
0.01
(.00) ** 
0.02
(.00) ** 
0.01
(.00) ** 
0.02 
(.00) 
** 
Higher technocrats Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Higher social cultural 
specialists 
0.29 
(.10) 
** 0.25
(.10)
* 0.39
(.11)
** -0.61
(.38)
 -0.08 
(.43) 
 
Lower technocrats 0.28 (.07) 
** 0.26
(.07)
** 0.21
(.07)
** -0.02
(.15)
 0.07 
(.17) 
 
Lower social cultural 
specialists 
0.51 
(.07) 
** 0.38
(.07)
** 0.60
(.07)
** 0.11
(.14)
 0.37 
(.19) 
~ 
Routine no manual 
employees 
0.58 
(.06) 
** 0.57
(.06)
** 0.41
(.06)
** 0.58
(.06)
** 0.39 
(.06) 
** 
Self-employed persons 0.13 (.08) 
 0.15
(.08)
 0.03
(.08)
 0.14
(.08)
 0.09 
(.08) 
 
Skilled manual workers 1.43 (.06) 
** 1.43
(.06)
** 1.16
(.06)
** 1.43
(.06)
** 1.16 
(.06) 
** 
Unskilled manual workers 1.53 (.06) 
** 1.52
(.06)
** 1.21
(.06)
** 1.53
(.06)
** 1.18 
(.06) 
** 
Public sector    0.25(.03)
**   0.30 
(.04) 
** 
Left education 
19 years or older     Ref.   Ref. 
 
Left education 17 or 18 
years 
   0.00
(.05)
  0.02 
(.05) 
 
Left education 16 years     0.49(.05)
**  0.51 
(.05) 
** 
Left education 15 years or 
younger 
   0.70
(.05)
**  0.74 
(.05) 
** 
Time*higher social cultural 
specialists 
     0.03
(.01)
** 0.02 
(.01) 
* 
Time*lower technocrats      0.01(.00)
* 0.01 
(.01 
 
Time*lower social cultural 
specialists 
     0.02
(.01)
* 0.02 
(.02) 
 
Chi2 1811.7 1863.2 1777.5 1830.2 1849.6 
Degrees of freedom 10 11 13 13 17 
*significant (p<0.05) **significant (p<0.01) ~significant (p<0.10). 
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These trends disappear when we control for sector of employment, education, age and gender, 
in Model E. However, in this model, the high-grade social and cultural specialists still become 
significantly more leftist oriented. Calculation shows that the high-grade social and cultural 
specialists did significantly change their political orientation and become more leftist oriented 
by the end of the 37 years. The regression coefficient of the high-grade social and cultural 
specialists in Model E is -0.08. If we add the trend effect of 0.74 (37∗0.02) to the effect of this 
social class, we get a parameter of 0.68 (-0.06+0.74) in 2001. The exponent of this effect is 
1.97 (Exp(0.68)), and this is the effect of the high-grade social and cultural specialists 
identifying with leftist parties in 2001. This means that by 2001 the high-grade social and 
cultural specialists were twice as likely to be leftist oriented than the high-grade technocrats. 
A comparison between the Netherlands and Britain shows that in both countries the 
social and cultural specialists are more leftist oriented than the technocrats. Controlling for 
individual factors such as sector of employment, education, sex and age do not explain these 
differences. However, in the Netherlands the leftist political orientation of the social and 
cultural specialists is more prominent (Table 6.7 and 6.8). Another difference is that in 
Britain, if one controls for individual characteristics over time, the trend of the low-grade 
technocrats and the low-grade social and cultural specialists becoming more leftist oriented is 
no longer significant. By contrast, over time changes in these individual characteristics cannot 
explain the upward trend in becoming more leftist oriented among the low-grade social and 
cultural specialists in the Netherlands and of the high-grade social and cultural specialists in 
Britain.  
 
Trends in leftist orientation of the newly distinguished classes in the Netherlands and Britain 
In Figure 6.1, we plotted the trends of the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists in 
the Netherlands and Britain regarding their party identification. For the Netherlands, all social 
and cultural specialists became more leftist between 1970 and 2003. In contrast, all 
technocrats became also more leftist between 1970 and 2003 but in a manner that was less 
pronounced.  
In Britain, there were no differences in political party identification between the high-
grade technocrats and the high-grade social and cultural specialists in 1964: both classes were 
rightist. However, from 1964 onwards the high-grade social and cultural specialists came to 
identify significantly more with leftist parties. The high-grade technocrats became also more 
leftist oriented but as late as 2001, they identified still more with right-wing parties. The low-
grade technocrats and the low-grade social and cultural specialists were not different in their 
political orientation in 1964 but thereafter they become increasingly differentiated. In 
conclusion, contrary to Goldthorpe’s (1995) predication, the service class is far from 
becoming the ‘conservative element in society’. Our results show that both for the 
Netherlands and Britain, the service class becomes more fragmented in its political 
orientation.  
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Figure 6.1: Trends in leftist political orientation of the high- and low-grade technocrats and the high- and 
low-grade social and cultural specialists in the Netherlands and Britain  
the Netherlands between 1970 and 2003
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6.4.3 New-left and old-left party identification in the Netherlands 
According to Kriesi (1989) the social and cultural specialists support the new social 
movements in the Netherlands more than other social classes do. Therefore, it is interesting to 
determine whether the ‘new’ social classes within the service class also identify more with 
new-left politics. We will now discuss the new-left versus right and old-left versus right party 
identification for the Netherlands. We cannot do this for Britain because new-left parties in 
this country are too small to be represented in our data.  
The left-wing political parties were split into the new-left and the old-left. We expect 
the ‘new’ classes to identify more with the new-left parties than the ‘old’ classes in the 
Netherlands. We used a multinomial logistic regression model for this part of the analysis, as 
this enabled us to analyse a multi-categorical dependent variable. We estimated the likelihood 
of a person voting for an old-left, a new-left or a right-wing political party. In analysing the 
dependent variable of political party identification, the right-wing political parties were taken 
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as the baseline category (Lammers, Pelzer and Hendricks, 1996). Table 6.9 presents the 
results. 
Model A in Table 6.9 shows that the party identification of the ‘new’ classes of the 
high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists is significantly different from the party 
identification of the high-grade technocrats. While the odds of identifying with old-left 
political parties is highest for the skilled manual workers, the high-grade social and cultural 
specialists are, nonetheless, 1.92 (Exp(0.65)) times more likely than the high-grade 
technocrats to identify with old-left political parties. The ‘new’ classes (the high-grade and 
low-grade social and cultural specialists) are most likely to identify with new-left political 
parties; respectively, 2.08 (Exp(0.73)) and 1.93 (Exp(0.66)) times more than the high-grade 
technocrats. Interestingly, while all social classes, except the self-employed, are more likely 
to identify with old-wing political parties than are the high-grade technocrats, only the high- 
and low-grade social and cultural specialists identify significantly more with new-left 
political parties than the high-grade technocrats do. Manual workers are even more likely to 
identify with right-wing parties than are the high-grade technocrats, while they are the most 
likely to identify with old-left political parties. These results are consistent with our 
expectations.  
The sector of employment has a telling effect on political party identification, for both 
old-left versus right-wing and new-left versus right-wing political parties. Model B shows that 
people working in the public sector are significantly more likely to identify with old-left and 
with new-left political parties than with rightist parties than are people employed in private 
sector. Yet Model B shows, once more, that the sector of employment cannot explain the 
differences in political orientation between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ classes. Even the level of 
education, in Model C, fails to explain these differences.  
Including time and trend (interaction) variables, in Model D, shows that people 
became significantly less likely to identify with old-left political parties, while the likelihood 
of identifying with new-left political parties increased significantly. In 1970, the fractions 
within the service class do not differ in their old-left versus right-wing party identification. 
However, there are significant upward trends for the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists with regard to this identification: with time they came to identify more with old-
wing parties. Moreover, the low-grade technocrats also came to identify more with old-wing 
parties. The high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists identify more with new-left 
parties in 1970 than the high- and low-grade technocrats. The low-grade social and cultural 
specialists came to identify even more with new-left parties while the high-grade social and 
cultural specialists and the low-grade technocrats did not.   
Model E in Table 6.9 includes all variables. Model E shows that the high- and low-
grade social and cultural specialists do not differ from the high-grade technocrats regarding 
voting for old-wing parties by 1970. However, over time, the low-grade social and cultural 
specialists and the low-grade technocrats came to identify with old-left parties. By the end of 
the 33 years (in 2003) the low-grade social and cultural specialists became the most leftist 
social class; that is, an exponent of 3.29 (Exp(1.19)) (33∗0.03=0.99+0.20=1.19). The low-
grade technocrats became 2.05 (Exp(0.72)) (33∗0.02=0.66+0.06=0.72) times more likely to 
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identify with old-wing parties than the high-grade technocrats in 2003. Model E shows also 
that the high-grade social and cultural specialists are most likely to identify with new-left 
political parties by 1970 but they do not change their political orientation significantly over 
time. The low-grade social and cultural specialists came to identify significantly more with 
new-left parties over time while the low-grade technocrats do not. If we add the trend effect of 
0.33 (33∗0.01) for the 33 years for the low-grade social and cultural specialists to the 
regression coefficient of 0.33 (0.33+0.33=0.66) for this social class, we see that the exponent 
of this parameter 1.94 (Exp(0.66)) approaches that of the high-grade social and cultural 
specialists 1.95 (Exp(0.67)). This means that between 1970 and 2003 the low-grade social 
and cultural specialists constituted one of the most leftist social classes. These results also 
show that the classes of the social and cultural specialists within the service class are 
becoming the most leftist in the post-industrial Netherlands.  
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Figure 6.2: Trends in old-leftist and new-leftist party identification of the service class fractions 
between 1970 and 2003 in the Netherlands 
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Trends party identification in the service class in the Netherlands 
Figure 6.2 shows that the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists came to identify 
more with old-left parties from 1970. The low-grade technocrats also identify increasingly 
with old-left parties whereas the high-grade technocrats became more rightist oriented 
between 1970 and 2003. The low-grade social and cultural specialists came to identify with 
new-leftist parties from 1970 and became as new-leftist as the high-grade social and cultural 
specialists in 2003. The class that identifies most with new-leftist parties is the high-grade 
social and cultural specialists and they do not change their party identification after 1970. 
The high- and low-grade technocrats leaned more on rightist parties than upon new-leftist 
parties between 1970 and 2003. 
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6.5 Conclusions and discussion 
 
In this chapter, we reassessed the appropriateness of the service class of the standard and the 
adjusted EGP class schemata regarding political party identification in the Netherlands and 
Britain. Inspired by new class theories, we made adjustments to the service class of the 
standard EGP class schema in Chapter 2. In that chapter, we distinguished two ‘new’ classes 
and two ‘old’ classes within the service class. Incumbents of these ‘new’ classes execute tasks 
that require specialised social and cultural knowledge so their performance is difficult to 
monitor. In contrast, the ‘old’ classes in the service class preserve the viability of their 
employing organization, and their performance is easier to monitor. After distinguishing these 
classes, we examined their criterion and construct validity. 
In Chapter 5, we showed that the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists in 
the Netherlands are more likely to vote for leftist parties than the high- and low-grade 
technocrats. We speculated whether the social and cultural specialists differ in their political 
orientation from the technocrats in Britain. Furthermore, the ‘new’ classes within the service 
class need time to organise their class interest and form their demographic identity. Therefore, 
the question was to what extent the distinguished ‘new’ social classes become more effective 
in explaining differences in political orientation in the Netherlands and Britain. Using data 
from Dutch surveys conducted between 1970 and 2003 and British surveys between 1964 and 
2001, we compared our adjusted EGP class schema to the standard EGP class schema with 
regard to their ability to predict voting behaviour. Our results showed that the adjusted EGP 
class schema is significantly better in predicting political orientation than the standard EGP 
class schema in both countries.  
Goldthorpe (1982, 1995) claimed that the service class is in formation, and as it 
consolidates, internal fractions will become similar to each other. He also argued that the 
service class is an essentially a conservative element within society. Our data show that there 
are substantial social cleavages within the service class. Politically, the ‘new’ classes are 
much more leftist oriented than the ‘old’ classes in the Netherlands and Britain. Furthermore, 
the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists differ considerably in their political 
orientation from the high-grade technocrats; this has been so since 1970 in the Netherlands. 
Moreover, these fractions become more leftist between 1970 and 2003. The high- and low-
grade technocrats, in contrast, also become more leftist but these differences in political 
orientation became more pronounced in the Netherlands. In Britain, the high-grade social and 
cultural specialists were not different from the high-grade technocrats in their political party 
identification in 1964. However, the high-grade social and cultural specialists came to identify 
significantly more with leftist parties and by 2001 had become one of the most leftist social 
classes within the service class. The low-grade technocrats and the low-grade social and 
cultural specialists in Britain were also not different in 1964 in terms of their political party 
identification but did become differentiated as time passed.  
This means that the consolidation process of the service class is working in a direction 
that is the opposite of what Goldthorpe expected. The social cleavages within the service class 
are salient. Apparently, the consolidation process parallels the process of transformation from 
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an industrial to a post-industrial society. Thus we conclude that the newly distinguished social 
classes within the service class can explain the political cleavages within the service class 
over time. In this respect, the adjusted EGP class schema will provide a better understanding 
of the political cleavages within the service class in the Netherlands, Britain and other post-
industrial societies.  
Most of the social and cultural specialists in the Netherlands and Britain work in the 
public sector. They are known to vote more for left-wing political parties which invest more 
in that sector. Our results also show that people employed in the public sector are much more 
likely to identify with left-wing political parties. But even after controlling for sector of 
employment, the ‘new’ classes are still significantly more likely to be leftist oriented than the 
‘old’ classes. This means that the differences in political orientation between the ‘old’ classes 
and the ‘new’ classes cannot be attributed to the sector of employment in the Netherlands and 
Britain. Thus social class remains an important determinant of political orientation.  
According to Brint (1984) and Goldthorpe (1995), the lifestyle and behaviour 
differences among the fractions within the service class can be explained by educational 
differences. However, level of education did not explain the differences between the ‘old’ and 
the ‘new’ classes. Perhaps the type of education could explain the differences that we found. 
Chapter 5, we argued that even the educational resources have not been able to explain the 
political cleavages within the service class in the Netherlands. Van de Werfhorst and De 
Graaf (2004) showed similar results for the Netherlands. 
A difference between the Netherlands and Britain is that in the latter country, over 
time differentiation between the high-grade technocrats and the low-grade social and cultural 
specialists regarding political orientation can be explained by individual factors such as sector 
of employment, level of education, sex and age. In the Netherlands, these factors explain the 
differentiation between the high-grade technocrats and the high-grade social and cultural 
specialists over time. Other class cleavages can only be explained by capturing the new class 
cleavages within the service class.  
  
  
Chapter 7 
 
Summary and discussion 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
At the end of the 1980s, some sociologists claimed that social class had lost its ability ‘to do 
any useful work for sociology’ (Holton & Turner, 1989; Pahl, 1989:710; Pakulski & Waters, 
1996a). Others have claimed that the concept of social class is worth preserving but that the 
existing social class schemata need adjusting to accommodate changes in the employment and 
class structures in light of the transition from industrial to post-industrial societies (Crompton, 
1991; Esping-Andersen, 1993; De Graaf & Steijn, 1997). This study is an answer to these 
calls.  
The size of the service class increased enormously in the Netherlands, Britain and in 
other post-industrial societies while the share of the working class decreased in these 
countries after the 1960s (see Chapter 1; Breen, 2004). New class theorists have divided the 
service class into a ‘new’ class of ‘knowledge workers’ and an ‘old’ class of industrials and 
managers (Bruce-Briggs, 1979; Brint, 1984; Lamont, 1987; Kriesi, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 
1993; De Graaf & Steijn, 1997). 
 Following new class theories, we adjusted the service class of the EGP class schema, 
which is currently the most frequently used for sociological inquiry. We have distinguished a 
‘new’ class of social and cultural specialists and an ‘old’ class of technocrats within the 
service class; both classes with a higher and a lower version. We have based our distinction 
on a combination of two criteria. The social and cultural specialists are considered to be less 
controllable by their employer and their work tasks have a social-cultural feature. The second 
criterion has two components: a) the work tasks are based on specialised knowledge of social 
and cultural issues and b) the work tasks involve social services. All occupations that fulfil 
these criteria are allocated into the class of social and cultural specialists while the other 
occupations within the service class are considered to be technocratic. Twelve experts on 
labour and job markets assigned occupations within the service class to one or the other of 
these classes.  
 After adjusting the service class of the EGP class schema, we tested the criterion and 
the construct validity of the newly distinguished social classes. By testing the criterion 
validity, we explored whether our criteria to distinguish the social classes did indeed 
differentiate these classes according to occupational characteristics. The construct validity 
involves whether the newly distinguished social classes predict outcomes of theoretically 
linked variables (Evans, 1992, 1996). We formulated questions regarding the criterion and 
construct validity of our newly distinguished social classes and answered these questions.  
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7.2 Answers to question related to criterion validity 
 
In Chapter 2, we explicated our criteria to reclassify the service class. Then, twelve experts 
allocated the occupations within the service class into the class of technocrats and the class of 
social and cultural specialists. Subsequently, we tested the criterion-related validity of the 
newly distinguished social classes within the service class of the adjusted EGP class schema. 
Our first research question regarding the criterion-related validity of the newly distinguished 
classes was:  
 
1. To what extent do the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists represent the 
underlying criteria that distinguish them?  
 
Using Dutch and British data, we examined the extent to which our criteria underpinned the 
distinction between technocrats and social and cultural specialists. In the 1992 and 2000 
British employment surveys, employees were asked which control systems are important to 
control their work performance. Furthermore, in the British and Dutch data (Family Survey of 
the Dutch Population 2003), employees were asked to what extent the supervisors or the 
managers can control whether they satisfactorily perform their work tasks. 
We claimed that the work tasks of the social and cultural specialists are more difficult 
to control by employers than the work tasks of the technocrats. We argued that the difficulty 
in controlling the social and cultural specialists stems from the specialised knowledge they 
use to perform their job. The employers of these specialists encounter difficulties to control 
them because they do not have the specialists’ knowledge. This is the classical Principal-
Agent problem (Coleman, 1990). Our results showed that the use of ‘fellows or colleagues’ 
differs significantly for the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats. Fellows or 
colleagues are significantly more important to control the work performance of the social and 
cultural specialists than of the technocrats. An important support for our distinction between 
these social classes is that the social and cultural specialists have substantially more discretion 
in performing their work tasks than the technocrats.  
After revealing the differences in the control systems used to control the work tasks of 
the social and cultural specialists and the technocrats, we analysed the extent to which the 
work performance of the members of these two classes can be controlled by their supervisor 
or manager. We analysed this using British and Dutch data. It turned out that the quality and 
quantity of work performance of the British and Dutch social and cultural specialists is much 
less controllable by their supervisors or managers than that of technocrats. Consequently, our 
findings showed convincingly that our first criterion, that the work tasks of the social and 
cultural specialists are more difficult to control by employers than the work tasks of the 
technocrats, is empirically supported.  
Our second criterion about the social-cultural feature of the work tasks has two 
components: 1) whether the work tasks involve social services and 2) whether the work tasks 
are based on specialised knowledge of social and cultural issues. We classified those 
occupations regarding the first component within the service class in which workers’ main 
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responsibility is to provide social services. Chapter 2 tested whether our division of social and 
cultural specialists represents the first component of our second criterion.  
Our findings showed that jobs of the Dutch social and cultural specialists require 
significantly more empathy with clients, patients or students than jobs of the technocrats do. 
In addition, the Dutch social and cultural specialists have significantly more contact with 
clients, patients or students than the technocrats. The British data showed that the social and 
cultural specialists care significantly more for people than the technocrats, and spend 
significantly more time caring for people than the technocrats. We were not able to test 
whether the second component of the second criterion (whether the work tasks are based on 
specialised knowledge on social and cultural issues of the social and cultural specialists) 
underlies our division. Therefore, we rely on the knowledge of our experts to classify the 
fractions within the service class according to this component of the second criterion. In 
general, the British and the Dutch data showed that our distinction of the social and cultural 
specialists and the technocrats within the service class, made by the experts, represents our 
criteria very well.  
 
 
7.3 Answers to questions related to construct validity 
 
Intergenerational mobility patterns 
Once we discovered that our classification of the service class represents the underlying 
criteria, we continued our investigation by formulating questions related to its construct 
validity. In Chapter 3, we focused on intergenerational mobility patterns of the newly 
distinguished social classes. The second research question is:  
 
2. To what extent do the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists constitute distinct 
classes with regard to their intergenerational mobility patterns?  
 
Using the criteria of external and internal homogeneity criteria, developed by Goodman 
(1981) and Breiger (1981), we were able to discern whether the newly distinguished social 
classes have specific mobility patterns. With Dutch surveys held between 1970 and 2004, we 
showed that the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists and the high- and low-
grade technocrats have specific intergenerational mobility patterns according to the external 
homogeneity criterion. That is to say, the patterns of intergenerational mobility between the 
classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists and the other social classes 
are different from the patterns of intergenerational mobility between the classes of the high- 
and low-grade technocrats and the other social classes. We also investigated the 
intergenerational mobility patterns of the newly distinguished social classes by ignoring the 
higher-lower distinction of these classes. Based on the intergenerational mobility patterns, this 
distinction should also be made. However, if one empirically needs to collapse - for example, 
due to a small sample size - some fractions within the service class, according to the external 
homogeneity criterion, it is better to collapse the higher-lower distinction of the newly 
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distinguished social classes than the distinction between technocrats and the social and 
cultural specialists. The reason for this is that the intergenerational mobility patterns of the 
high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists resemble each other and the 
intergenerational mobility patterns of the high- and low-grade technocrats are also more 
similar to each other than the intergenerational mobility patterns of the technocrats and the 
social and cultural specialists.  
We also investigated the extent to which the newly distinguished social classes have 
specific internal mobility patterns. These classes have specific internal mobility patterns if the 
relative mobility between origin and destination class of the high- and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists and the high- and low-grade technocrats is different. In Chapter 3, we 
showed that the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists and the high- and low-
grade technocrats indeed have different intergenerational mobility patterns according to the 
internal homogeneity criterion. In other words, the relative internal mobility patterns of all 
fractions within the service class are specific and heterogeneous. Therefore, according to this 
criterion, a distinction should be made between the technocrats and the social and cultural 
specialists as well as a higher-lower distinction among these fractions. Thus, the high- and 
low-grade social and cultural specialists and the high- and low-grade technocrats clearly 
constitute distinct classes regarding their intergenerational mobility patterns.  
 
Intragenerational mobility patterns 
In Chapter 4, we focused on the intragenerational social (im)mobility of the high- and low-
grade technocrats and the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists. In this chapter, 
we answered the third research question:  
 
3. To what extent do the technocrats and the social and cultural specialists constitute distinct 
classes with regard to their intragenerational mobility patterns?  
 
The fractions within the service class should have manifest boundaries if they indeed form 
separate social classes. We expected the fractions of the high- and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists to be more intragenerationally immobile than the fractions of the high- and 
low-grade technocrats. The reason is that entrance to the ranks of the high- and low-grade 
social and cultural specialists requires educational credentials; entering the ranks of the high- 
and low-grade technocrats is mostly related to skills that are gained in the course of a career. 
Our Dutch data gathered between 1982 and 2003 showed that the class of the high-grade 
social and cultural specialists is the most closed social class. The class of the low-grade social 
and cultural specialists is the third most closed social class, immediately after the class of the 
self-employed. On the other hand, the classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats are the 
two least closed classes. These findings support our expectations. Thus, the high- and low-
grade social and cultural specialists and the high- and low-grade technocrats clearly 
constitute distinct social classes with regard to their intragenerational mobility patterns.  
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Intergenerational mobility patterns over time 
The high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are considered new classes because 
according to new class theories they are engendered by the post-industrial employment 
structure. Therefore, the research question we answered in Chapter 3 is about the class 
formation process of the ‘new’ classes within the service class. New classes need time to 
stabilise into single class units regarding their intergenerational mobility patterns. We 
formulated our fourth research question as:  
 
4. To what extent have the intergenerational mobility boundaries of the social and cultural 
specialists become more closed over time? 
 
The expectation was that the inheritance of fathers’ class position of the high- and low-grade 
social and cultural specialists increases with the passage of time. However, we were not able 
to support this hypothesis. The inheritance of class position of the high- and low-grade social 
and cultural specialists in the Netherlands decreased between 1970 and 2004. This trend 
toward decreasing class reproduction is also salient in relation to other social classes. Thus, 
the intergenerational mobility boundaries of the classes of the high- and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists do not become more closed over time.  
 
Intragenerational mobility patterns over time 
We explored the intragenerational class formation process of the newly distinguished social 
classes. If the ‘new’ social classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists 
are indeed ‘new’, they need time to form their class-specific intragenerational mobility 
patterns. Our fifth research question is:  
 
5. To what extent have the intragenerational mobility boundaries of the social and cultural 
specialists become more closed over time? 
 
We hypothesised that the ‘new’ social classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists become more intragenerationally closed over time. Results showed that this is not 
the case for the high-grade social and cultural specialists. So this result does not support our 
expectation regarding class formation process of the high-grade social and cultural specialists. 
However, the class of the low-grade social and cultural specialists does become more closed 
over time. This supports our expectation. Thus, the mobility boundary of the low-grade social 
and cultural specialists becomes substantively more closed over time while the mobility 
boundary of the high-grade social and cultural specialists does not become more closed over 
time.  
 
Social class, lifestyles and attitudes 
In Chapter 5, we investigated whether the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists 
and the high- and low-grade technocrats are differentiated in a variety of lifestyle forms such 
as social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour. Social-political 
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preferences and behaviour consist of voting behaviour, subjective class identification, 
attitudes towards ethnic minorities and gender roles. Cultural preferences and behaviour refer 
to reading literature, visiting museums, operas and classical concerts and collecting modern 
art. Finally, economic preferences and behaviour are income, working part-time, and 
ownership of classical art and antiques. To reveal whether the newly distinguished social 
classes are differentiated on these outcomes, we asked our sixth question: 
 
6. To what extent do the social and cultural specialists differ from the technocrats in their 
social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour? 
 
Using the 1992, 1998, 2000 and 2003 Family Surveys of the Dutch Population, we showed 
that the newly distinguished social classes within the service class differ on social-political, 
cultural and economic preferences and behaviour. Regarding social-political preferences and 
behaviour, the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are significantly more likely 
to vote for left-wing political parties than the high- and low-grade technocrats are. The high-
grade social and cultural specialists are more likely to rank themselves higher on the 
subjective class ladder than the high-grade technocrats do. There is no significant difference 
between the high- and low-grade technocrats and the low-grade social and cultural specialists 
regarding subjective class identification. The high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists have significantly more tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minorities than the high- 
and low-grade technocrats. The high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists have 
significantly more equal gender-role attitudes than the high- and low-grade technocrats.  
In terms of cultural preferences and behaviour, the high- and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists read significantly more literature than the high- and low-grade technocrats. 
The high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists visit significantly more museums, 
operas and classical concerts than the high- and low-grade technocrats. The high-grade social 
and cultural specialists possess significantly more modern art than the high-grade technocrats. 
Furthermore, there is no significant difference between the high- and low-grade technocrats 
and the low-grade social and cultural specialists regarding modern art possession.  
Regarding economic preferences and behaviour, the high-grade social and cultural 
specialists earn significantly less than the high-grade technocrats while the low-grade social 
and cultural specialists earn significantly less than the low-grade technocrats. The high- and 
low-grade social and cultural specialists work significantly more part-time than the high- and 
low-grade technocrats do. The high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists possess 
significantly less classical art than the high-grade technocrats. Finally, none of the newly 
distinguished social classes differ in ownership of antiques. Overall, the high- and low-grade 
social and cultural specialists differ quite substantively from the high- and low-grade 
technocrats in their social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour. 
 
Social class or education 
To reveal the net effect of the newly distinguished social classes on social-political, cultural 
and economic preferences and behaviour, one needs to control for level of education and field 
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of education since there is an overlap between the skills that the members of the newly 
distinguished social classes have and the skills that they have been taught. One also needs to 
control for other background factors that are causally prior to social class position. Therefore, 
our seventh research question was: 
  
7. To what extent do the social and cultural specialists differ from the technocrats in their 
social-political, cultural and economic preferences and behaviour, when the field of study, the 
level of education and other individual and background factors are taken into consideration?  
  
Using the same dataset we used to answer our sixth research question, we controlled for 
educational resources and other background factors. After controlling for these factors in 
Chapter 5, we showed that the newly distinguished social classes differ in social-political and 
economic preferences and behaviour. The differences between the social and cultural 
specialists and the technocrats regarding cultural preferences and behaviour are fully 
explained by the level and field of education.  
Regarding the social-political preferences and behaviour, the high-grade social and 
cultural specialists are significantly more likely to vote for left-wing political parties than the 
high-grade technocrats. The low-grade social and cultural specialists are significantly more 
likely to vote for left-wing political parties than the high- and low-grade technocrats. The 
low-grade social and cultural specialists have significantly more tolerant attitudes towards 
ethnic minorities than the high-grade technocrats. The high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists have significantly more equal gender-role attitudes than the high-grade 
technocrats. In terms of economic preferences and behaviour, the high- and low-grade social 
and cultural specialists earn significantly less than the high-grade technocrats. The low-grade 
social and cultural specialists are more likely to work part-time than the high- and low-grade 
technocrats. The high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists own significantly less 
classical art than the high-grade technocrats. Generally speaking, the classes of the high- and 
low-grade social and cultural specialists differ from the classes of the high- and low-grade 
technocrats in their social-political and economic preferences and behaviour, when the field 
of study, the level of education and other individual and background factors are taken into 
consideration. The classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists do not 
differ from the classes of the high- and low-grade technocrats in their cultural preferences 
and behaviour, when the field of study, the level of education are taken into consideration. 
 
Political orientation over time 
In Chapter 6, we focused on the development of the political orientation of the ‘new’ social 
classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists. Therefore, we asked our 
eighth research question: 
 
8. To what extent do the ‘new’ social classes of the social and cultural specialists become 
more effective over time in explaining differences in people’s political orientation? 
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The expectation was that the ‘new’ social classes become more crystallised over time 
regarding their political orientation. To test this expectation, we used Dutch data gathered 
between 1970 and 2003 and British surveys from 1964 and 2001. The British and the Dutch 
datasets showed that the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are more likely to 
identify with leftist political parties than the high- and low-grade technocrats even after 
controlling for sector of employment, level of education, sex and age.  
In the Netherlands, after controlling for these factors, the low-grade social and cultural 
specialists became more leftist between 1970 and 2003. This class became the most leftist 
class within the service class in 2003. In Britain, the high-grade social and cultural specialists 
came to identify significantly more with leftist political parties between 1964 and 2001 after 
controlling for individual factors as sex, age, sector of employment and level of education. In 
both countries, other fractions within the service class did not become significantly different 
over time in their political orientation after controlling for these factors.  
 In the Netherlands, the ‘new’ classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural 
specialists are more likely to identify with new-left and with old-left parties than the high-
grade technocrats. After controlling for sex, age, sector of employment and level of education, 
the low-grade social and cultural specialists and the low-grade technocrats became more old-
leftist oriented between 1970 and 2003. Only the low-grade social and cultural specialists 
identified significantly more with new-leftist parties in the Netherlands between 1970 and 
2003 after controlling for the individual factors.  
Simply put, in the Netherlands, the class of the low-grade social and cultural 
specialists has become clearly more effective over time in explaining differences in people’s 
political orientation while the class of the high-grade social and cultural specialists does not 
change. In Britain, the predictive power of the class of the high-grade social and cultural 
specialists has become clearly more effective over time in explaining differences in people’s 
political orientation while the class of the low-grade social and cultural specialists does not 
show a significant trend. 
 
Contradictory results 
All our expectations were supported by our findings, except our expectations regarding inter- 
and intragenerational class formation of the ‘new’ social classes. According to class formation 
theory, the ‘new’ classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists need time 
to establish their own intergenerational mobility patterns and crystallize their ‘demographic 
identity’. Therefore, we expected members of the ‘new’ classes to inherit more their father’s 
class position over time. In contrast, our results showed that intergenerational class 
reproduction of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists decreased. This clearly 
contradicts our expectation. According to Ganzeboom and Luijkx (2004), association between 
father’s class and son’s class is weakening and social class reproduction is diminishing in the 
Netherlands. Therefore, the process of decreasing social class reproduction of the ‘new’ social 
classes can be interpreted in the light of increasing social fluidity and decreasing social 
reproduction (Ganzeboom & Luijkx, 2004). To understand the relationship between social 
fluidity and class formation, these processes have to be investigated in more depth.  
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We also examined the intragenerational formation of the ‘new’ social classes. The 
‘new’ classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are expected to 
become more immobile with time. We showed that the class of the low-grade social and 
cultural specialists in the Netherlands become more immobile over birth cohorts ranging from 
1887 to 1963. The class of the high-grade social and cultural specialists does not show a trend 
towards an increasing immobility over birth cohorts. However, the high-grade social and 
cultural specialists are already the most closed social class. Therefore, one could hardly 
expect them to become even more closed.   
 
 
7.4 Discussion 
 
This study has made a theoretical and empirical contribution to the discussions on social class 
in post-industrial societies. The originality of this study is in its harmonisation and integration 
of theories regarding new classes or new social cleavages within the service class in order to 
adjust the EGP class schema. Since the 1970s, new class theorists have argued that post-
industrial employment relations have engendered new social classes within the service class 
(Bell, 1991; Bruce-Briggs, 1979; Brint, 1984; Lamont, 1987; Kriesi, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 
1993; De Graaf & Steijn, 1997). We used these theories to delineate the social classes within 
the service class. These theories were harmonised and integrated with two additional theses. 
One is Bourdieu’s (1984) distinction between economic and cultural elites, which strongly 
corresponds with the social class cleavages within the service class that new class theorists 
have described. Scholars frequently cite Bourdieu’s theory in class analysis (Robinson & 
Garnier, 1985; Ganzeboom et al., 1987; Blees-Booij, 1994; De Graaf & Kalmijn, 1995). The 
second is Inglehart’s (1977) thesis. Though Inglehart (1997) asserted that social classes in 
post-industrial societies have withered away, his classification of materialists and post-
materialists in advanced economies corresponds well with the rise of new social classes.  
The integration of different theories can provide new insights. Pakulski and Waters 
(1996b) argued that productive property and employment relations as shaping devices of 
social class cleavages in industrial societies have lost their importance. Our argument is that 
employment relations as a device of shaping social classes in post-industrial societies have 
not lost their importance but must be reinterpreted in light of the changing employment 
structure. Social class cleavages need to be restructured in post-industrial societies. The idea 
that social class divisions are only engendered by economic capital and property is too 
narrow. Social and cultural knowledge and skills are becoming more and more important 
devices in employment relations. Bell’s (1971) post-industrial thesis, Bourdieu’s (1984) 
cultural and economic capital thesis and Inglehart’s (1971) materialism and post-materialism 
thesis show that next to the economic basis of social classes, social and cultural capital and 
skills are becoming essential classification devices in the employment structure and in the 
class mechanism. In this sense, harmonising and integrating these theories give us a new class 
perception and the empirical findings are most promising.  
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Pakulski and Waters (1996b) also claimed that advanced societies are no longer class 
societies and that the importance of social class has been replaced by ethnicity, gender and 
religion. Our claim is not that modern societies have remained typical class societies. 
Obviously, other cleavages are just as relevant. However, the adjusted EGP class schema 
gives new insight in intergenerational and career class mobility, in a variety of lifestyles, in 
life chances and attitudes. This schema also brings a new dimension to the explanation of new 
political cleavages in post-industrial societies. We have for example argued and shown in 
Chapter 5 that the ‘new’ classes of the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists 
identify more with new-leftist parties than the ‘old’ classes of the high- and low-grade 
technocrats. An interesting question for further research is whether the adjusted EGP class 
schema will shed new light on the explanation of the support for new-right political parties.  
Theoretically, intragenerational class (im)mobility is important because of its 
implications for people’s life chances and lifestyles. The impact of class (im)mobility upon 
the life course is an overlooked subject. Sociologists have often investigated the influence of 
upward and downward intergenerational mobility on political orientation (Barber, 1970; 
Clifford & Heath, 1993; De Graaf & Ultee, 1990; De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta & Heath, 1995). In 
our understanding, one way of investigating the net effect of people’s own class on people’s 
life chances and lifestyles is by comparing immobile people to mobile people. This may cast 
some light on the relationship between one’s own class position and one’s behaviour and 
attitudes. This is important because Chapter 5 demonstrated that the social classes differ in 
lifestyle forms. A theoretical shortcoming of class research is the lack of speculation into why 
classes differ in lifestyles (Goldthorpe & Marshall, 1992; Breen & Rottman, 1995). The 
exception is the field of research focussing on social class and political behaviour. Maybe we 
gain more insight why social classes differ in outcomes by comparing intragenerationally 
immobile and mobile class members. Another way of explicating the reasoning of why certain 
class members differ from others is, as Breen and Rottman (1995) suggested, to track class 
members with panel data. Do they change their lifestyles when they move from one class to 
another? The impact of intragenerational (im)mobility on people’s life chances and lifestyles 
was beyond the scope of this study, but this could be of interest for future research. 
To support the idea about the death of social class, Pakulski and Waters (1996b) refer 
to the low capacity of social class to predict income and voting behaviour. According to them, 
social class accounts for about 20 percent of the variance in male earnings. One could discuss 
whether this 20 percent is low or high in social science research, but other important 
cleavages like religion (and ethnicity) hardly explain more than 20 percent of the variance in 
voting behaviour (Need, 1997). Furthermore, one could doubt the relevance of the explained 
variance since it also depends on group size (Heath, De Graaf & Need, 1997). Also important 
is the magnitude of class cleavages. Research shows contradictory results (Nieuwbeerta, 
1995; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf, 1999; Brooks & Manza, 1996; Brooks, Nieuwbeerta & 
Manza, 2006). Although Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf (1999) reported a decline in class-based 
voting in twenty western societies in the postwar period, Brooks et al. (2006) found little 
evidence of a universal decline in class cleavages. Brooks et al. (2006) studied six postwar 
democracies (Australia, Austria, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and the United 
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States) and showed that the magnitude of class cleavage had declined in Great Britain while 
remaining stable in the other countries. Brooks and Manza (1997) showed that social class 
cleavage in the United States remain stable after taking into account changes in religion, race 
and gender cleavages. It is clear that these inconsistent results demand more detailed 
investigation. The adjusted EGP class schema could add new insight to this discussion by 
incorporating new class cleavages into class analysis.  
Our adjusted EGP class schema improved our understanding of cleavages in modern 
society. For example, application of the adjusted EGP class schema implies a break with the 
tradition that people from high class positions are more likely to vote for rightist parties. The 
revised schema implies a more complex structure of class-based voting. Most intriguing is the 
fact that while the social and cultural specialists in the Netherlands have a higher class 
position than labourers, the former are more likely to be leftists. In Britain, the social and 
cultural specialists are also more likely to vote for leftist political parties while the technocrats 
prefer rightist parties. 
 To our knowledge, there is no other study in which a social class schema has been 
validated in so many ways. Unique to our classification is the use of experts to allocate the 
occupations into the classes within the service class. Our classification has been checked on 
its criterion and construct validaty. Our result convincingly showed that the newly 
distinguished social classes within the service class established themselves into stable class 
units via patterns of inter- and intragenerational reproduction and via different lifestyles. This 
implies that these fractions constitute social classes in their own right.  
 We made an attempt to show that social class still matters and is not ‘dying’. Instead, 
‘new’ social classes are appearing and the old class schemata should be updated to reflect 
changes in post-industrial societies. Our adjustment of the service class of the EGP class 
schema was theoretically driven. Weeden and Grusky (2005) also made an attempt to show 
the continuing importance of social classes in post-industrial societies. However, they came 
up with a totally new class-map, which contains 126 classes and therefore is rather 
cumbersome. They fundamentally changed social class perception by equating social classes 
with single occupations. Instead, we preferred to adjust the EGP class schema, which has 
already shown its usefulness in plenty of class studies, in a cautious way. In this way, we have 
on the one hand updated this schema according to changes in employment structure while, on 
the other hand, we preserved an effective schema.  
The adjusted EGP class schema and its ‘new’ classes are worth analysing in future 
studies since they offer insights into the importance of social class in contemporary western 
societies. Our conversion tools from CBS 84, ISCO 68 and ISCO 88 to the adjusted EGP 
class schema in Appendix 7 allow scholars to use this schema. The most detailed adjusted 
EGP class schema consists of 13 classes. Table 7.1 gives two versions of this schema.  
There are four classes within the service class and nine other classes. We urge scholars 
to use the most detailed version of the adjusted EGP class schema. However, if they need to 
collapse some of the classes within the service class, for empirical reasons for example, we 
advise them to collapse the high- and low-grade technocrats into one fraction and the high- 
and low-grade social and cultural specialists into another fraction. We advise against 
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collapsing high-grade technocrats with high-grade social and cultural specialists and the low-
grade technocrats with low-grade social and cultural specialists. The reason for this is that our 
results show that the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are more similar to 
each other than the high- and low-grade social and cultural specialists are similar to the high- 
and low-grade technocrats in their inter- and intragenerational mobility and lifestyle forms. 
 
Table 7.1: The two versions of adjusted EGP class schema. 
EGP / 13 
classes 
Class name 
EGP / 11 
classes 
Class name 
Ia High-grade technocrats 
Ib 
High-grade social and cultural 
specialists 
Ia / IIa  High- and low-grade technocrats 
IIa Low-grade technocrats 
IIb 
Low-grade social and cultural 
specialists 
Ib / IIb 
High and low-grade social and 
cultural specialists 
IIIa Routine non-manual workers IIIa Routine non-manual workers 
IIIb Personal service workers IIIb Personal service workers 
IVa Self-employed IVa Self-employed 
IVb Self-employed IVb Self-employed 
IVc Self-employed farmers IVc Self-employed farmers 
V Manual supervisors V Manual supervisors 
VI Skilled manual workers VI Skilled manual workers 
VIIa Semi- and unskilled workers VIIa Semi- and unskilled workers 
VIIb Farm labourers VIIb Farm labourers 
 
Our findings are based on the Dutch and British occupational structures. However, as we 
stated in the introduction (Chapter 1), almost all advanced economies have moved from an 
industrial to a post-industrial employment structure. Therefore, the adjusted EGP class 
schema is valid for testing differences in mobility patterns and lifestyles of the class members 
in other post-industrial societies as well. Future research should reveal the applicability of our 
conclusions to other countries. Therefore, we encourage scholars to implement the adjusted 
EGP class schema in their research. 
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Appendix 3A   
Data Sources for men and women in the labour force in the Netherlands between 1970 and 2004 
Nr AKRO ABBREVIATED STUDY TITLE 
net70 National Election Study 1970-1973 
net71 Parliamentary Election Study, 1971 
net74p Political Action Survey I, 1974 
net76j Justice of Income Survey, 1976 
net77 CBS Life Situation Survey, 1977 
net77e Parliamentary Election Study, 1977 
net79p Political Action Survey II, 1979 
net81e Parliamentary Election Study, 1981 
net82e Parliamentary Election Study, 1982 
net82n National Labour Market Survey, 1982 
net82u National Prestige and Mobility Survey, 1982 
net85o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1985 
net86e Parliamentary Election Study 1986 
net86l CBS Life Situation Survey 1986 
net87i Cultural Change [ISSP] 1987 
net87j Justice of Income Survey 1987 
net87s Primary and Social Relationships, 1987 
net88o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1988 
net90o  Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1990 
net90s Social and Cultural Trends, 1990 
net91j Justice of Income Survey 1991 [ISJP] 
net92f Netherlands Family Survey I, 11992-93 
net92o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1992 
net94e Parliamentary Election Study, 1994 
net94h Household in the Netherlands pilot, 1994 
net94o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1994 
net95h Household in the Netherlands pilot, 1995 
net96 Social Inequality in the Netherlands, 1996 
net96c National Crime Study, 1996 
net96o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1996 
net98 Social and Economic Attitudes, 1998 
net98e Parliamentary Election Study, 1998 
net98f Netherlands Family Survey II, 1998 
net98o Strategic Labour Market Panel Survey, 1998 
net99 Use of Information Technology, 1999 
net00 Netherlands Family Survey III, 2000 
net03 Netherlands Family Survey IV, 2003 
net04 Netherlands Kinship Panel Survey, 2004 
See for  more information: www.scw.vu.nl/~ganzeboom/ismf. 
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Appendix 3B 
Outflow percentages for men in the labour force between 1970 and 2004 
Destination class (Sons’ class) Origin class 
(fathers’ class) Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb IVa IVb V VI VIIa VIIb IVc 
Ia 22.2 5.1 20.6 15.2 10.6 3.4 2.3 1.8 3.3 7.0 7.4 0.5 0.5
Ib 21.1 13.8 18.5 21.5 9.0 2.4 1.1 1.8 1.3 4.6 4.0 0.4 0.6
IIa 16.6 3.7 23.9 14.0 12.9 3.4 1.6 2.0 3.5 8.9 8.3 0.4 0.6
IIb 16.2 6.1 20.7 25.8 11.6 3.1 1.3 1.2 2.0 6.4 4.8 0.3 0.5
IIIa 14.7 3.6 18.9 16.1 17.2 4.0 1.2 1.1 3.4 10.7 8.4 0.2 0.5
IIIb 12.1 0.7 17.2 11.4 14.7 7.5 2.0 0.9 3.5 16.1 12.6 0.4 0.9
IVa 15.9 2.3 16.2 10.4 12.8 4.5 7.4 4.0 2.7 12.0 10.6 0.4 0.8
IVb 9.6 2.1 14.9 10.0 13.0 3.9 6.0 6.8 3.2 14.5 14.0 1.0 1.1
V 14.7 2.0 18.1 11.3 12.2 2.6 1.1 1.7 7.7 15.8 11.7 0.8 0.3
VI 9.8 1.5 14.5 8.5 11.2 4.0 1.5 1.5 5.4 25.1 15.6 0.8 0.6
VIIa 8.4 1.4 11.3 7.3 11.1 3.5 1.4 1.7 5.1 23.2 22.9 1.6 0.9
VIIb 7.0 0.9 9.2 4.5 8.4 2.9 1.3 1.9 4.6 24.5 24.7 6.0 4.1
IVc 8.8 1.8 10.6 7.8 7.7 2.6 2.1 1.9 3.9 13.1 13.5 4.5 21.9
Total 12.7 2.8 16.0 11.4 11.6 3.6 2.2 2.1 4.1 15.7 13.4 1.3 3.0
 
Outflow percentages for women in the labour force between 1970 and 2004 
Destination class (daughters’ class) Origin class 
(fathers’ class) Ia Ib IIa IIb IIIa IIIb IVa IVb V VI VIIa VIIb IVc 
Ia 7.1 4.2 13.0 26.5 25.0 11.0 1.0 2.1 0.4 1.8 7.5 0.1 0.3
Ib 5.7 8.4 10.9 38.7 21.1 5.6 0.8 1.7 0.4 0.8 5.9 0.0 0.0
IIa 4.1 2.8 13.0 21.6 28.7 13.7 1.0 1.7 0.4 2.3 10.1 0.4 0.2
IIb 5.0 6.7 10.0 36.2 22.6 8.5 0.5 1.6 0.3 1.2 6.9 0.3 0.1
IIIa 4.0 2.6 9.1 23.9 31.5 13.0 0.8 1.5 0.4 1.8 11.1 0.1 0.1
IIIb 4.2 1.9 8.3 11.2 30.1 15.3 1.7 3.0 0.2 3.2 20.6 0.4 0.0
IVa 1.9 1.2 10.7 21.2 26.8 17.3 2.0 2.9 0.2 2.4 12.8 0.2 0.5
IVb 2.4 1.7 7.8 15.4 25.6 16.5 1.9 5.3 0.5 3.5 18.8 0.3 0.4
V 4.2 1.2 10.6 17.4 26.7 16.0 0.5 1.0 0.7 3.6 17.4 0.5 0.1
VI 2.7 1.1 7.7 12.7 25.1 17.3 0.9 2.5 0.6 3.9 24.4 0.7 0.5
VIIa 2.1 0.7 7.2 9.8 22.9 19.4 1.0 2.1 0.7 5.0 27.9 0.9 0.4
VIIb 1.8 0.6 6.0 10.6 18.5 14.7 1.1 1.8 0.2 3.9 37.4 2.1 1.3
IVc 2.5 1.4 7.9 18.4 18.9 14.0 1.4 2.9 0.3 2.8 22.2 3.5 3.8
Total 3.5 2.2 9.3 18.9 25.0 14.9 1.1 2.3 0.5 3.0 17.8 0.8 0.6
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Appendix 4A 
Data Sources for men and women in the labour force in the Netherlands 1982-2003 
Nr AKRO ABBREVIATED STUDY TITLE Men (N) Women (N)
net82n National Labour Market Survey, 1982 1335 1342
net82u National Prestige and Mobility Survey, 1982 497 256
net87i Cultural Change [ISSP] 1987 934 1056
net91j Justice of Income Survey 1991 [ISJP] 950 833
net92f Family Survey of the Dutch Population I, 1992-93 902 898
net94h Household in the Netherlands pilot, 1994 440 595
net95h Household in the Netherlands pilot, 1995 1019 1014
net95y Subsample Household in the Netherlands pilot, 1995 680 641
net96 Social Inequality in the Netherlands, 1996 412 378
net96c National Crime Study, 1996 813 1065
net96y Subsample National Crime Study, 1996 355 435
net98 Social and Economic Attitudes, 1998 542 391
net98f Family Survey of the Dutch Population II, 1998 1000 1029
net99 Use of Information Technology, 1999 1431 1080
net00 Family Survey of the Dutch Population III, 2000 779 782
net04 Family Survey of the Dutch Population IV, 2003 1063 1111
 Total 13152 12906
See for more information: www.scw.vu.nl/~ganzeboom/ismf. 
 
Appendix 5A  
SPSS-syntax for recoding the field of study into four different educational resources scale  
 
Educfild: Field of study in 11 categories: 
*1 General 
*2 Teacher education 
*3 Humanities / arts 
*4 Agriculture 
*5 Technical, Physics, Mathematics  
*6 (para)-Medical  
*7 Economic / Commercial  
*8 Law 
*9 Social-cultural  
*10 Personal / Social care 
*11 Police / Military 
 
recode educfild (1=2.94) (2=3.56)(3=3.47)(4=2.13)(5=2.01)(6=1.87)(7=2.03)(8=2.19)(9=2.66)(10=2.40)(11=2.41) into 
culopl. 
recode educfild (1=2.11) (2=1.85)(3=1.70)(4=2.90)(5=2.14)(6=1.82)(7=3.41)(8=3.31)(9=2.24)(10=1.82)(11=2.84) into 
econopl. 
recode educfild (1=2.01) (2=3.5)(3=2.75)(4=2.01)(5=1.95)(6=2.96)(7=2.45)(8=2.61)(9=3.76)(10=2.26)(11=3.17) into 
commopl. 
recode educfild (1=2.04) (2=1.75)(3=1.62)(4=3.06)(5=3.42)(6=2.14)(7=2.06)(8=1.74)(9=1.54)(10=1.52)(11=2.02) into 
techopl. 
 
*Respondents with only a Primary Education get the minimum scale value 1.  
do repeat x=culopl econopl commopl techopl.  
if (educc=1) x=1. 
end repeat. 
 
Variables labels  
culopl ‘cultural educational resources’ 
econopl ‘economic educational resources’ 
commopl ‘communicative educational resources’ 
techopl ‘technical educational resources’. 
exe. 
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Appendix 5B  
Description of all variables in chapter 5 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Surveys  
(FSDP) 
Voting left-wing political party 5856 0 1 0.51 0.49 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Subjective class identification 3279 1 10 6.40 1.47 1998,2000 
Tolerant attitudes towards ethnic minorities 2127 1 5 2.23 0.94 2003 
Equal gender-role attitudes 3349 1 5 3.18 0.92 1992, 1998 
Reading literature  5673 1 3 1.67 0.52 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Visiting museums, operas and classical concerts 3335 1 4 1.56 0.52 1998, 2000,  
Modern art possession  5466 1 2 1.37 0.48 1998, 2000, 2003 
Log10 monthly income  3151 2 4.72 3.09 0.27 1998, 2000, 2003 
Working part-time  4131 0 1 0.37 0.48 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Classic art possession  3880 1 2 1.31 0.46 1998, 2000, 2003 
Antique possession  3887 1 2 1.35 0.48 1998, 2000, 2003 
Higher technocrats 7002 0 1 0.09 0.29 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Higher social and cultural specialists 7002 0 1 0.03 0.16 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Lower technocrats 7002 0 1 0.13 0.33 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Lower social and cultural specialists 7002 0 1 0.12 0.32 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Routine non-manual employees 7002 0 1 0.29 0.45 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Self-employed persons 7002 0 1 0.08 0.28 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Skilled manual workers 7002 0 1 0.11 0.31 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Semi- and unskilled manual workers 7002 0 1 0.15 0.36 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Communicative educational resources 7279 1 3.76 2.22 0.71 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Cultural educational recourses  7279 1 3.56 2.22 0.70 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Economic educational resources  7279 1 3.41 2.11 0.69 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Technical educational resources 7279 1 3.42 2.11 0.78 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Primary education 7337 0 1 0.14 0.35 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Low secondary education 7337 0 1 0.27 0.44 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
High secondary education 7337 0 1 0.31 0.46 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Tertiary education 7337 0 1 0.19 0.39 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
(post)-university education 7337 0 1 0.08 0.27 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Age (0-66) 7344 0 66 25.63 12.49 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Female  7349 0 1 0.50 0.50 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Public sector 7032 0 1 0.34 0.47 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Church Attendance  7220 1 4 1.81 1.05 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Father’s voting behaviour  5943 0 1 0.37 0.48 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Parent’s primary education 6978 0 1 0.33 0.47 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Parent’s low secondary education 6978 0 1 0.37 0.48 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Parent’s high secondary education 6978 0 1 0.16 0.36 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Parent’s tertiary education 6978 0 1 0.09 0.29 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Parent’s (post)-university education 6978 0 1 0.04 0.20 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
Father’s social-economic status 7071 10 90 43.49 16.09 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003
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Appendix 6A  
Data References 
Year of survey N Source of survey 
1970 1,838 Heunks, F. M., M.K. Jennings, W.E. Miller, P.C. Stouthard & J. Thomassen, Dutch Election Study, 1970-1973. 
1971 906 Verba, S., N.H. Nie & J. -O. Kim, Political Participation and Equality in Seven Nations, 1966-1971. 
1972 3,175 Werkgroep Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, Dutch Parliamentary Elections Study, 1972. 
1974 1,201 Barnes, S.H., & M. Kaase et. al. Political Action: An Eight Nation Study, 1973-1976. 
1976 755 Hermkens, P.L.J. & P.J. van Wijngaarden, Criteria for Justification of Income Differences, Netherlands 1976. 
1977 1,856 Werkgroep Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, Dutch Parliamentary Elections Study, 1977. 
1977 4,159 Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek (CBS), Life Situation Survey, Netherlands 1977. 
1979 806 
Allerbeck, K.R., M. Kaase, H. –D. Klingemann, Ph.C. Stouthard, F.J. Heunks, J.J.A. 
Thomassen, J.W. van Deth, S.H. Barnes, B.G. Farah, R. Inglehart, & M.K. Jennings, Political 
Action II, 979-1980. 
1981 2,305 Werkgroep Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, Dutch Parliamentary Elections Study, 1981. 
1982 1,541 Werkgroep Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek, Dutch Parliamentary Elections Study, 1982. 
1985 3,003 Felling, A.J.A., J. Peters & O. Schreuder, Social Relevance of Religion in the Netherlands, 1985. 
1986 1,630 Van der Eijk, C., G.A. Irwin & B. Niemoeller, Dutch Parliamentary Elections Study, 1986. 
1987 795 Hermkens, P.L.J. & P.J. van Wijngaarden, Criteria for Justification of Income Differences, Netherlands 1987. 
1989 956 Arts, K., E. Hollander, K. Renckstorf & P. Verschuren, Media-equipment, Media-exposure and Media-use in the Netherlands, 1989. 
1990 2,384 Felling, A.J.A., J.Peters & O. Schreuder, Social Relevance of Religion in the Netherlands, 1990. 
1992 1,800 Ultee, W. C. & Ganzeboom H.B.G., The Family Survey of Dutch Population 1992-1993 
1998 2,029 De Graaf N.D., De Graaf P.M., Kraaykamp G.& Ultee W.C. The Family Survey of Dutch Population 1998. 
2000 1,561 De Graaf N.D., De Graaf P.M., Kraaykamp G.& Ultee W.C. The Family Survey of Dutch Population 2000. 
2003 2,163 De Graaf N.D., De Graaf P.M., Kraaykamp G.& Ultee W.C. The Family Survey of Dutch Population 2000. 
 
Appendix 6B 
Right-wing versus left-wing political parties in the Netherlands 
 Parties 
Right-wing (0) ARP Anti-Revolutionary Party 
 KVP Catholic Party  
 CHU Christian Historical Party 
 Middle-class Party 
 SGP Political Reformed Party 
 VVD Liberal Party 
 GPV Reformed Political Union 
 BP Farmers Party 
 NMP Middle-class Party 
 RKPN Roman Catholic Party 
 CDA Christian Democratic Appeal 
 RPF Reformed Political Federation 
 Centre Party 
 Extreme Right 
 LPF List Pim Fortuyn 
 Unie55/AOV 
 Other 
Left-wing (1) CPN Communist Party 
 PvdA Labour Party 
 PSP Pacifist Socialist Party 
 D66 Democrats 66 
 DS70 Democratic Socialist ‘70 
 PPR Radical Political Party 
 EVP Evangelical Peoples Party 
 SP Socialist Party 
 Green Left (Groen-links) 
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Appendix 6C  
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Right-wing party identification  2,9446 0 1 0.47 0.50
Old-left party identification 2,5119 0 1 0.38 0.50
New-left party identification 2,0116 0 1 0.23 0.42
High professionals (EGP)* 2,6793 0 1 0.09 0.29
Low professionals (EGP)* 2,6793 0 1 0.23 0.42
Routine non- manual (EGP)* / (EGPG)** 2,6793 0 1 0.25 0.43
Self-employed persons (EGP)* / (EGPG)** 2,6793 0 1 0.08 0.26
Skilled manual workers (EGP)* / (EGPG)** 2,6790 0 1 0.15 0.36
Unskilled manual workers (EGP)* / (EGPG)** 2,6790 0 1 0.20 0.40
High technocrats (EGPG)** 2,6790 0 1 0.08 0.27
High social and cultural specialists (EGPG)** 2,6790 0 1 0.02 0.12
Low technocrats (EGPG)** 2,6790 0 1 0.10 0.30
Low social and cultural specialists (EGPG)** 2,6790 0 1 0.13 0.34
Sector of employment  3,4777 0 1 0.16 0.37
Primary education 3,4621 0 1 0.23 0.42
Low secondary education  3,4621 0 1 0.36 0.48
High secondary education 3,4621 0 1 0.24 0.43
Tertiary education  3,4621 0 1 0.12 0.33
(Post)-university education 3,4621 0 1 0.05 0.21
Time (0-33) 3,4861 0 33 13.62 9.72
Time∗High social-cultural specialists 2,6790 0 1 0.01 0.12
Time∗Low technocrats 2,7453 0 33 1.63 5.89
Time∗Low social-cultural specialists 2,6790 0 1 0.13 0.34
Sex  3,4856 0 1 0.49 0.50
Age 3,4829 18 96 42.37 15.77
* EGP class-schema ** Adjusted EGP class-schema 
 
Appendix 6D  
Data References 
Survey year N Sources of surveys 
1964 1,769 Butler, D. & Stokes, D.E. Political Change in Britain, 1963-1970 
1966 1,874 Butler, D. & Stokes, D.E. Political Change in Britain, 1963-1970 
1970 1,355 Butler, D. & Stokes, D.E. Political Change in Britain, 1969-1970 
1974 2,365 Crewe, I., Saerlvik, B. & Alt, J. British Election Study, October 1974, Cross-Section Survey 
1985 1,530 International Social Science Program (ISSP), International Social Science Program: Role of 
Government, 1985-1986 
1986 1,416 International Social Science Program (ISSP), International Social Science Program: Social 
Networks and Support Systems, 1986  
1987 1,212 International Social Science Program (ISSP), International Social Science Program: Social 
Inequality, 1987 
1988 2,614 International Social Science Program (ISSP), International Social Science Program: Family and 
Changing Sex Roles, 1988  
1989 2,594 International Social Science Program (ISSP), International Social Science Program: Work 
Orientation, 1989 
1990 1,197 International Social Science Program (ISSP), International Social Science Program: Role of 
Government II, 1990 
1992 3,534 Heath, A., Jowell, R., Curtice, J.K., Brand, J.A., & Mitchell, J.C. British General Election Study, 
1992; Cross-Section Survey 
1997 3,615 Heath, A., Jowell, R., Curtice, J.K., & Norris, P. British General Election Study, 1997; Cross-
Section Survey 
2001 3,030 Clarke, H., Sanders, D., Stewart, M. & Whiteley, P.F. British General Election Study, 2001; 
Cross-Section Survey 
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Appendix 6E 
Right-wing versus left-wing political parties in Great Britain  
 Parties 
Right-wing (0) Conservative Party  
 Liberal Party 
 SNP Scottish Party 
 Plaid Cymru – Party of Wales 
 National Front 
 The Alliance  
 Other Party 
Left-wing (1) ILP Independent Labour Party 
 Labour Party 
 Communist Party 
 National Labour 
 Socialist Labour Party  
 Democratic Party 
 Ecology Party  
 
Appendix 6F  
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
Left-right voting behaviour  24397 0 1 0.45 0.50
High professionals (EGP)* 25062 0 1 0.12 0.33
Low professionals (EGP)* 25062 0 1 0.16 0.37
Routine non-manuals (EGP)*/ (EGPG)** 25062 0 1 0.22 0.41
Self-employed (EGP)*/ (EGPG)** 25062 0 1 0.06 0.25
Skilled manual workers (EGP)*/ (EGPG)** 25062 0 1 0.24 0.43
Unskilled manual workers (EGP)*/ (EGPG)** 25062 0 1 0.43 0.49
High technocrats (EGPG)** 25062 0 1 0.10 0.30
High social cultural specialists (EGPG)** 25062 0 1 0.02 0.15
Low technocrats (EGPG)** 25062 0 1 0.08 0.28
Low social cultural specialists (EGPG)** 25062 0 1 0.08 0.27
Sector of employment 28110 0 1 0.23 0.42
Leave education 
19 years or older 24162 0 1 0.24 0.42
Leave education 17 or 18 years 24162 0 1 0.24 0.43
Leave education 16 years  24162 0 1 0.32 0.47
Leave education 15 years or younger 24162 0 1 0.21 0.41
Time (0-37) 28110 0 37 21.91 11.31
Time*High social cultural specialists 25663 0 37 0.63 4.33
Time*Low technocrats 25663 0 37 2.09 7.51
Time*Low social cultural specialists 25663 0 37 1.93 7.11
Sex 28105 0 1 0.54 0.50
Age 28055 18 99 47.21 17.58
* EGP class-schema. ** Adjusted EGP class-schema. 
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Appendix 7  
 
CBS 84 of the service class fractions of the Adjusted EGP class schema  
Ia. High-grade technocrats = (120 132 133 222 223 224 225 232 233 234 239 240 252 253 254 255 
258 259 260 270 281 282 283 284 289 292 293 294 295 296 298 412 413 421 424 426 429 431 432 
439 510 520 532 533 534 670 810 823 822 901 902 903 904 905 1101 1102 1103 1104 5831 2010 
2020 2110 2130 5821 5824) 
 
Ib. High-grade social cultural specialists = (212 213 214 612 613 614 615 616 632 633 634 652 653 
1212 1213 1220 1292 1293 1299 1391 1392 1393 1394 1740 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1997 1998) 
 
IIa. Low-grade technocrats = (142 143 144 145 147 149 310 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 
331 332 333 334 339 341 342 343 344 349 352 353 354 355 359 360 370 422 423 542 543 544 680 
693 752 770 794 797 798 831 832 833 834 835 842 849 852 853 1599 1632 1633 1944 1992 1993 
2120 2140 2191 2192 2193 2194 2195 2196 3001 3101 3102 3103 3104 3105 3108 3109 3510 3520 
3596 3597 4010 4020 4110 4120 4512 4513 4514 4519 4520 4712 4713 4714 4722 4732 4733 5010 
5022 5023 5024 5025 5028 5029 5202 5203 5811 5820 5822 5823) 
 
IIb. Low-grade social and cultural specialists = (640 692 711 715 719 732 733 741 742 743 753 762 
763 764 765 792 793 795 796 1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 1318 1319 1321 1322 1323 
1324 1329 1330 1340 1350 1398 1399 1411 1412 1413 1414 1510 1592 1593 1594 1612 1613 1614 
1615 1622 1623 1624 1625 1629 1634 1635 1636 1712 1713 1714 1720 1730 1750 1790 1802 1803 
1911 1912 1913 1914 1919 1926 1927 1929 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1942 
1943 1952 1953 2197 5931 5932 5933 5934) 
 
 
The ISCO 68 codes of the occupations of four classes within the service class  
Ia. High-grade technocrats = (0100 0110 0120 0130 0131 0132 0133 0139 0200 0210 0220 0230 0240 
0250 0260 0270 0280 0290 0409 0400 0410 0411 0419 0420 0429 0430 0500 0510 0520 0521 0529 
0530 0531 0539 0670 0800 0810 0820 0900 1100 1101 1109 1200 1211 1220 1221 1222 1229 1290 
1394 2000 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2029 2030 2031 2032 
2033 2034 2035 2036 2039 2111 2114 2115 2119 2192 2193 2194 2195 2197 5822 5831). 
 
Ib. High-grade social and cultural specialists = (0600 0610 0611 0619 0630 0650 1210 1219 1299 
1310 1311 1319 1392 1411 1740 1951 1960 1900 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1929). 
 
IIa. Low-grade technocrats = (0140 0300 0310 0320 0329 0330 0339 0340 0350 0360 0370 0380 0390 
0421 0540 0541 0549 0620 0660 0680 0751 0770 0791 0793 0830 0840 0849 1291 1511 1622 1629 
1630 1631 1790 1800 1992 1993 1994 1995 1999 2112 2113 2116 2120 2190 2191 2196 2199 3009 
3100 3101 3102 3103 3104 3109 3500 3510 3520 4000 4001 4002 4009 4200 4210 4220 4221 4222 
4229 4300 4310 4319 4400 4410 4411 4412 4419 4420 4430 4431 4432 4439 5000 5001 5002 5009 
5100 5101 5102 5103 5104 5109 5823). 
 
IIb. Low-grade social and cultural specialists = (0640 0690 0700 0710 0711 0715 0719 0730 0740 
0750 0759 0760 0761 0769 0780 0790 0792 0799 1300 1320 1321 1329 1330 1340 1350 1390 1391 
1399 1400 1410 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1419 1490 1499 1500 1510 1519 1590 1591 1592 1593 
1599 1600 1610 1620 1621 1639 1700 1710 1711 1712 1713 1719 1720 1721 1729 1730 1731 1732 
1739 1749 1750 1791 1799 1801 1809 1910 1930 1931 1939 1940 1941 1949 1950 1959 1990 1991 
5820 5821 5829). 
 
The ISCO 88 codes of the occupations of four classes within the service class 
Ia. High-grade technocrats = (1000 1100 1110 1120 1200 1210 1220 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 
1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1237 1239 1250 1251 2000 2100 2110 2111 2112 
2113 2114 2120 2121 2122 2130 2131 2140 2142 2143 2144 2145 2146 2147 2411 2420 2443 3143 
3144). 
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Ib. High-grade social and cultural specialists = (2141 2213 2220 2221 2222 2223 2224 2229 2310 
2350 2351 2352 2400 2421 2422 2429 2440 2441 2442 2445). 
 
IIa. Low-grade technocrats = (1130 1140 1141 1142 1143 1240 1252 1300 1310 1312 1313 1314 1315 
1316 1317 1318 1319 2132 2139 2148 2410 3000 3100 3110 3111 3112 3113 3114 3115 3116 3117 
3118 3119 3120 3121 3122 3123 3130 3132 3133 3139 3140 3141 3142 3145 3150 3151 3152 3211 
3212 3213 3220 3221 3222 3223 3224 3225 3226 3227 3228 3400 3410 3411 3412 3413 3414 3415 
3416 3417 3419 3420 3421 3422 3423 3429 3431 3432 3434 3440 3441 3442 3443 3444 3449 3450 
3451 3475). 
 
IIb. Low-grade social and cultural specialists = (2230 2300 2320 2321 2322 2323 2330 2331 2332 
2340 2359 2412 2419 2430 2431 2432 2444 2446 2450 2451 2452 2453 2454 2455 2460 2470 3131 
3200 3210 3229 3240 3241 3242 3470 3471 3472 3473 3474 5150 5151 5152) 
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Samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch) 
 
Inleiding 
 
Sociale klasse is een belangrijk onderwerp voor sociologen. Door gebruik te maken van 
sociale klassenschema’s wordt duidelijk in hoeverre samenlevingen opener of meer gesloten 
worden (Goldthorpe, 1980; Ganzeboom, Luijkx & Treiman, 1989; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 
1992; Breen, 2004). Verder blijkt sociale klasse een bruikbaar concept voor de verklaring van 
verschillen in politieke oriëntatie (Lipset, (1980 [1960]; Nieuwbeerta, 1995; Nieuwbeerta & 
De Graaf, 1999) inkomen, opleiding en gezondheid (Wright, 1985; Heath, Jowell & Curtice, 
1985; Weenink, 2005). Aan het eind van de jaren tachtig van de vorige eeuw barstte een 
discussie los in de sociologische wereld over het belang van de sociale klasse in sociologisch 
onderzoek. Sommige sociologen beweerden dat het begrip sociale klasse haar bekwaamheid 
heeft verloren om sociale fenomenen te verklaren (Holton & Turner, 1989; Pahl, 1989:710; 
Pakulski & Waters, 1996). Voor anderen is het nog steeds een onmisbaar concept in de 
sociale wetenschappen, maar moeten de klassenschema’s aangepast worden om de 
veranderingen in de arbeidsmarkt- en klassenstructuur in de overgang van industriële naar 
postindustriële samenlevingen op te vangen (Crompton, 1991; Esping-Andersen, 1993; De 
Graaf & Steijn, 1997). Deze studie is een antwoord op de constatering dat de klassenschema’s 
een aanpassing verdienen.  
Vanaf de jaren zestig van de vorige eeuw, is de dienstenklasse enorm gegroeid in 
Nederland, Engeland en andere postindustriële samenlevingen (Breen, 2004). Vanwege dit 
verschijnsel beweren theoretici dat er nieuwe sociale klassen zijn ontstaan in de 
dienstenklasse die niet terug te zien zijn in de bestaande klassenschema’s. Deze onderzoekers 
onderscheiden een ‘nieuwe’ klasse van ‘kennisarbeiders’ en een ‘oude’ klasse van managers 
en industriële werkgevers in de dienstenklasse (Bruce-Briggs, 1979; Brint, 1984; Lamont, 
1987; Kriesi, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 1993; De Graaf & Steijn, 1997).  
Op grond van de ‘nieuwe klasse’ theorieën hebben wij de dienstenklasse van het EGP-
klassenschema aangepast (zie hoofdstuk 2). Dit is het meest gebruikte schema in sociologisch 
onderzoek. We onderscheiden twee ‘nieuwe’ klassen van sociale en culturele specialisten en 
twee ‘oude’ klassen van technocraten in de dienstenklasse van het EGP-klassenschema. Dit 
onderscheid is gebaseerd op een combinatie van twee criteria. Allereerst zijn de sociale en 
culturele specialisten relatief moeilijk te controleren in hun werktaken en daarnaast hebben 
hun werktaken een sociaal-cultureel kenmerk. Dit tweede criterium bevat twee componenten: 
a) de werktaken zijn gebaseerd op specialistische kennis over sociaal-culturele onderwerpen 
en b) de werktaken hebben betrekking op maatschappelijke dienstverlening. Een beroep hoeft 
niet beide componenten te hebben, één component is reeds voldoende om dat beroep in te 
delen in de sociale en culturele specialisten klasse. De beroepen die voldoen aan deze criteria 
worden ingedeeld als sociale en culturele specialisten. De andere beroepen in de 
dienstenklasse worden beschouwd als technocraten. Twaalf deskundigen op het gebied van de 
Nederlandse arbeids- en beroepsmarkt hebben op basis van onze criteria de beroepen in de 
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dienstenklasse toegewezen tot de sociale en culturele specialisten klassen of tot de 
technocraten klasse.  
Na het aanpassen van het EGP-klassenschema toetsten we de criterium- en de 
constructvaliditeit van de nieuw onderscheiden klassen. Door toetsing van de 
criteriumvaliditeit te toetsen, blijkt of onze criteria deze klassen inderdaad differentieert op 
basis van beroepskenmerken. De toets over de constructvaliditeit toont of de theoretisch 
voorspelde relaties tussen sociale klasse en sociale fenomenen verklaard kunnen worden door 
de nieuw onderscheiden klassen (Evans, 1992, 1996). In deze studie hebben we allereerst 
vragen geformuleerd over de criterium- en de constructvaliditeit van de nieuw onderscheiden 
klassen en vervolgens hebben we die vragen beantwoord. 
 
Antwoord op de vraag over criteriumvaliditeit 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 bevat allereerst een hoofdvraag over de criteriumvaliditeit, namelijk:  
 
1. In hoeverre weerspiegelt de technocraten en de sociale en culturele specialisten de 
onderliggende criteria waarmee zij zijn onderscheiden?  
 
Voor het beantwoorden van deze vraag gebruikten we de Familie Enquête Nederlandse 
Bevolking 2003 en de Britse Beroepsenquête 1992 en 2000. Werknemers werd gevraagd in 
hoeverre hun managers kunnen controleren of zij hun werktaken goed genoeg uitvoeren. Wij 
verwachtten dat de werktaken van de sociale en culturele specialisten relatief moeilijker te 
controleren zijn dan de werktaken van de technocraten. Het probleem bij controle op de 
werktaken van de sociale en culturele specialisten, komt voort uit de specialistische kennis 
waarmee de werktaken worden uitgevoerd. Deze veroorzaakt de traditioneel Principal-Agent 
probleem (Coleman, 1990). Onze bevindingen tonen aan dat de Britse en Nederlandse sociale 
en culturele specialisten significant minder goed te controleren zijn door hun managers dan de 
Britse en Nederlandse technocraten. Deze bevinding ondersteunt het eerste criterium dat de 
sociale en culturele specialisten relatief moeilijker te controleren zijn dan de technocraten.  
 Ons tweede indelingscriterium over het sociaal-culturele kenmerk van de werktaken 
bestaat opnieuw uit twee componenten: 1) hebben de werktaken betrekking op 
gespecialiseerde kennis over sociaal-culturele onderwerpen en 2) vallen de werktaken onder 
maatschappelijke dienstverlening. Wat betreft de tweede component van het tweede criterium 
blijkt uit onze onderzoeksresultaten dat de beroepen van de Nederlandse sociale en culturele 
specialisten significant meer empathie met cliënten, patiënten en studenten vereisen dan de 
beroepen van de Nederlandse technocraten. Verder hebben de Nederlandse sociale en 
culturele specialisten significant meer contact met cliënten, patiënten en studenten dan de 
Nederlandse technoraten. De bevindingen op basis van de Britse data, laten zien dat de sociale 
en culturele specialisten significant meer en langer zorg verlenen dan de technocraten. Tevens 
steunen de uitkomsten de aanwezigheid van de eerste component van het tweede 
onderliggende indelingscriterium voor onze herindeling van de dienstenklasse. 
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 We beschikten helaas niet over de data voor empirische toetsing van de tweede 
component van het tweede indelingscriterium - of de werktaken van de sociale en culturele 
specialisten op gespecialiseerde kennis over sociaal-culturele onderwerpen zijn gebaseerd. 
Toch bieden onze bevindingen alle steun voor het onderscheid tussen de sociale en culturele 
specialisten en de technocraten. Deze indeling weerspiegelt zeer goed de onderliggende 
indelingscriteria.  
 
Antwoorden op de vragen over constructvaliditeit 
 
Intergenerationele mobiliteitspatronen 
Nadat de criteriumvaliditeit van de indeling was getoetst, konden we vragen formuleren over 
de constructvaliditeit van deze indeling. In hoofdstuk 3 onderzochten we of de nieuw 
onderscheiden klassen specifieke intergenerationele mobiliteitspatronen hebben. Onze tweede 
onderzoeksvraag luidt dan ook:  
 
2. In hoeverre vormen de technocraten en de sociale en culturele specialisten aparte klassen 
met betrekking tot hun intergenerationele mobiliteitspatronen?  
Op basis van de externe en interne homogeniteitcriteria die door Goodman (1981) en Breiger 
(1981) zijn ontwikkeld, hebben we uitgezocht of de klassen van de technocraten en de sociale 
en culture specialisten specifieke mobiliteitspatronen presenteren. Deze vraag is beantwoord 
met gegevens die zijn verzameld via Nederlandse enquêtes tussen 1970 en 2004. Onze 
bevindingen tonen dat de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten en de hogere en 
lagere technocraten hun eigen specifieke externe en interne intergenerationele 
mobiliteitspatronen hebben. Tevens keken we of het hoog-laag onderscheid binnen de 
dienstenklasse gehandhaafd moet worden. Uit onze gegevens blijkt dat het hoog-laag 
onderscheid ook gemaakt moet worden binnen de dienstenklasse wat betreft hun 
mobiliteitspatronen. Echter, als op grond van empirische redenen, bijvoorbeeld vanwege een 
kleine samplegrootte, de fracties binnen de dienstenklasse samengevoegd moet worden, dan 
moet men de voorkeur geven aan enerzijds het samenvoegen van de hogere en lagere klasse 
binnen de groep sociale en culturele specialisten en anderzijds het samenvoegen van de 
hogere en lagere klasse technocraten. Dit is omdat de intergenerationele mobiliteitspatronen 
van deze klassen meer op elkaar lijken dan de mobiliteitspatronen van de sociale en culturele 
specialisten en de technocraten. Samengevat moeten we concluderen dat de hogere en lagere 
sociale en culturele specialisten en de hogere en lagere technocraten duidelijk aparte sociale 
klassen vormen met betrekking tot hun intergenerationele mobiliteitpatronen.  
 
Intragenerationele mobiliteitspatronen 
In hoofdstuk 4 ligt het accent op de intragenerationele (im)mobiliteit van de hogere en lagere 
technocraten en de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten. Onze derde hoofdvraag 
luidt: 
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3. In hoeverre vormen de technocraten en de sociale en culturele specialisten aparte klassen 
met betrekking tot hun intragenerationele mobiliteitspatronen? 
 
De fracties binnen de dienstenklasse vertonen zichtbare klassengrenzen als zij inderdaad 
aparte sociale klassen vormen. De verwachting was dat de hogere en lagere sociale en 
culturele specialisten intragenerationeel minder mobiel zijn dan de hogere en lagere 
technocraten. De reden hiervoor is dat toetreding tot de beroepen uit de klasse van de sociale 
en culturele specialisten specifieke vaardigheden vereist die alleen door opleiding verworven 
worden terwijl de vaardigheden die noodzakelijk zijn om tot de technocratische beroepen toe 
te treden ook later in de beroepscarrière eigen gemaakt kunnen worden. Onze bevindingen op 
basis van Nederlandse data die tussen 1982 en 2003 zijn verzameld, laten zien dat de meest 
gesloten sociale klasse bestaat uit de hoge sociale en culturele specialisten. De lage sociale en 
culturele specialisten vormen de derde meest gesloten klasse, na de zelfstandigen als de 
tweede meest gesloten klasse. De hogere en lagere technocraten aan de andere kant zijn de 
minst gesloten sociale klasse. Deze bevindingen steunen onze verwachting. Het antwoord op 
hoofdvraag 3 is dus: de hoge en lage sociale en culturele specialisten evenals de hoge en lage 
technocraten vormen duidelijk aparte sociale klassen met betrekking tot hun 
intragenerationale mobiliteitspatronen. 
 
Trend in intergenerationele mobiliteit  
Volgens de nieuwe klassentheoretici zijn de hoge en lage sociale en culturele specialisten 
ontstaan door de postindustriële arbeidsmarktstructuur en worden zij daarom als nieuwe 
klassen beschouwd. Nieuwe klassen hebben tijd nodig om zich tot aparte en stabiele eenheden 
te vormen met betrekking tot hun intergenerationele en intragenerationele mobiliteit. In 
hoofdstuk 3 zijn we daarom gefocust op het formatieproces van de ‘nieuwe’ klassen 
(Goldthorpe, 1980, 1995). Onze vierde onderzoeksvraag is dan:  
 
4. In hoeverre zijn de intergenerationele mobiliteitsgrenzen van de sociale en culturele 
specialisten door de tijd heen verder gesloten?  
 
De verwachting is dat door de tijd heen de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten 
meer hun vaders klassenpositie overerven. Deze verwachting werd niet door de uitkomsten 
ondersteund. In tegenstelling tot onze veronderstelling nam de overerving van de vaders 
klassenpositie juist af tussen 1970 en 2004 in Nederland. Deze trend van afnemende sociale 
reproductie is ook waar te nemen in verhouding tot het overerven van vaders klassenpositie 
bij de leden van de andere klassen. Al met al zijn de intergenerationele mobiliteitsgrenzen van 
de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten door de tijd heen niet verder gesloten. 
 
Trend in intragenerationele mobiliteit  
Met betrekking tot de intragenerationele mobiliteit verwachten we eveneens dat de ‘nieuwe’ 
sociale klassen tijd nodig hebben om hun klassenspecifieke mobiliteitspatronen te vormen en 
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een ‘demographic identity’ te construeren (Goldthorpe, 1980, 1995). Daarom ligt in hoofdstuk 
4 het accent op de volgende vraag:  
 
5. In hoeverre zijn de intragenerationele mobiliteitsgrenzen van de sociale en culturele 
specialisten door de tijd heen verder gesloten?  
 
Wij verwachtten dat de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten door de tijd heen hun 
intragenerationele mobiliteitsgrenzen verder zullen sluiten. Onze bevindingen zijn gebaseerd 
op de gegevens van mensen die ouder waren dan 39 jaar en die tussen 1887 en 1963 in 
Nederland zijn geboren. Volgens deze data neemt de immobiliteit van de hogere sociale en 
culturele specialisten door de tijd heen niet toe. Dit weerspreekt onze verwachting. De 
intragenerationele immobiliteit van de lagere sociale en culturele specialisten neemt door de 
tijd heen echter wel significant toe. Dit gegeven ondersteunt onze hypothese.  
 
Sociale klasse, leefstijlen en attituden 
In hoofdstuk 5 onderzochten we of de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten en de 
hogere en lagere technocraten verschillen van elkaar in hun leefstijlen. De leefstijlen zijn 
ondergebracht in sociaal-politieke, culturele en economische leefstijlvormen. De sociaal-
politieke leefstijlvormen omvatten stemgedrag, subjectieve klassenidentificatie, attitudes 
tegenover etnische minderheden en geslachtspecifieke rolpatronen. Onder culturele 
leefstijlvormen verstaan we leesgedrag, bezoek aan musea, opera’s en klassieke concerten en 
het verzamelen van moderne kunstvoorwerpen. Inkomen, parttime werken en het verzamelen 
van klassieke kunstvoorwerpen en antiek worden beschouwd als economische 
leefstijlvormen. Om te achterhalen of de nieuw onderscheiden klassen verschillen qua 
leefstijlvormen stellen we de volgende vraag: 
 
6. In hoeverre verschillen de sociale en culturele specialisten van de technocraten in hun 
sociaal-politieke, culturele en economische leefstijlvormen? 
 
Voor de beantwoording van deze vraag gebruikten we de data uit de Familie Enquête 
Nederlandse Bevolking 1992, 1998, 2000 en 2003. De bevindingen laten zien dat de leden 
van de nieuw onderscheiden klassen verschillen in hun sociaal-politieke, culturele en 
economische leefstijlvormen. Wat betreft sociaal-politieke leefstijlvormen zijn de hogere en 
lagere sociale en culturele specialisten significant sterker geneigd om op linkse politieke 
partijen te stemmen dan de hogere en lagere technocraten. De hogere sociale en culturele 
specialisten rangschikken zichzelf significant hoger op de subjectieve klassenladder dan de 
hogere technocraten. De lagere sociale en culturele specialisten verschillen niet van de hogere 
en lagere technocraten met betrekking tot het rangschikken van zichzelf in de subjectieve 
klassenladder. De hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten houden er tegenover 
etnische minderheden significant meer tolerante attitudes op na dan de hogere en lagere 
technocraten. De hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten aanzienlijk meer gelijke 
geslachtspecifieke rolpatronen dan de hogere en lagere technocraten.  
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 Wat betreft culturele leefstijlvormen lezen de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele 
specialisten significant meer literatuur dan de hogere en lagere technocraten. De hogere en 
lagere sociale en culturele specialisten bezoeken aanzienlijk meer musea, opera’s en klassieke 
concerten dan de hogere en lagere technocraten. De hogere sociale en culturele specialisten 
verzamelen significant meer moderne kunstvoorwerpen dan de hogere technocraten. De 
lagere sociale en culturele specialisten verschillen niet van de hogere en lagere technocraten 
wat betreft het verzamelen van moderne kunstvoorwerpen.  
 Met betrekking tot de economische leefstijlvormen verdienen de hogere sociale en 
culturele specialisten significant minder dan de hogere technocraten terwijl de lagere sociale 
en culturele specialisten significant minder verdienen dan de lagere technocraten. Een 
mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is het feit dat de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele 
specialisten aanzienlijk vaker parttime werken dan de hogere en lagere technocraten. De 
hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten verzamelen aanzienlijk minder klassieke 
kunstvoorwerpen dan de hogere technocraten. Tot slot laten onze resultaten zien dat geen van 
de nieuw onderscheiden klassen verschillen in het verzamelen van antiek. Al met al kunnen 
we stellen: de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten substantieel verschillen van 
de hogere en lagere technocraten in hun sociaal-politieke, culturele en economische 
leefstijlvormen.  
 
Sociale klasse of opleiding 
Om het netto effect van de nieuw onderscheiden klassen op sociaal-politieke, culturele en 
economische leefstijlvormen te achterhalen, moet men controleren op het opleidingsniveau en 
de -richting. De vaardigheden die de sociale en culturele specialisten en de technocraten zij op 
de werkvloer zich eigen hebben gedaan, overlappen namelijk met de vaardigheden die zij in 
hun opleiding hebben aangeleerd. Men moet ook controleren op de factoren die causaal 
voorafgaan aan opleiding en sociale klasse. Daarom luidt onze zevende onderzoeksvraag als 
volgt:  
 
7. In hoeverre verschillen de sociale en culturele specialisten van de technocraten in hun 
sociaal-politieke, culturele en economische leefstijlvormen als we rekening houden met de 
opleidingsrichting, het opleidingsniveau en andere achtergrondkenmerken?  
 
Voor beantwoording van deze vraag analyseerden we opnieuw de data die we in hoofdstuk 5 
reeds gebruikten om onderzoeksvraag 6 te beantwoorden. Onze bevindingen laten zien dat de 
hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten verschillen in hun sociaal-politieke en 
economische leefstijlvormen van de hogere en lagere technocraten nadat we hebben 
gecontroleerd op de opleidingsrichting, -niveau en andere achtergrondkenmerken. De hogere 
en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten verschillen niet in hun culturele leefstijlvormen van 
de hogere en lagere technocraten als rekening wordt gehouden met deze kenmerken.  
 Met betrekking tot sociaal-politieke leefstijlvormen zijn de hogere en lagere sociale en 
culturele specialisten significant sterker geneigd om op linkse partijen te stemmen dan de 
hogere en lagere technocraten. De lagere sociale en culturele specialisten hebben een 
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significant meer tolerante houding tegenover etnische minderheden dan de hogere 
technocraten. De hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten hebben significant minder 
geslachtspecifieke rolpatronen dan de hogere technocraten. Met betrekking tot economische 
leefstijlvormen verdienen de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten significant 
minder dan de hogere technocraten. De lagere sociale en culturele specialisten werken 
significant vaker parttime dan de hogere en lagere technocraten. De hogere en lagere sociale 
en culturele specialisten bezitten significant minder vaak klassieke kunstvoorwerpen dan de 
hogere technocraten. Concluderend kunnen we stellen dat in Nederlands de klassen hogere en 
lagere sociale en culturele specialisten verschillen van de klassen hogere en lagere 
technocraten in hun sociaal-politieke en economische leefstijlvormen als we controleren op 
de opleidingsrichting, het opleidingniveau en andere achtergrondkenmerken. De klassen 
hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten verschillen niet van de hogere en lagere 
technocraten in hun culturele leefstijlvormen als er rekening wordt gehouden met de 
opleidingsrichting, het opleidingsniveau en andere achtergrondkenmerken.  
 
Politieke oriëntatie door de tijd heen 
Volgens Goldthorpe (1995) vormt de dienstenklasse ‘een essentieel conservatief sociaal 
element’ in de samenleving omdat de leden van deze klasse de meest geprivilegieerde posities 
innemen en zij daarom geen voorstanders zijn van gelijkheidsidealen. Onderzoek toont echter 
aan dat juist het tegendeel het geval is (Heath & Savage, 1995, Savage, 1991). Door 
onderzoeksvraag 6 en 7 te beantwoorden, hebben wij ook aangetoond dat de sociale en 
culturele specialisten significant vaker op linkse partijen stemmen dan de technocraten. 
Goldthorpe (1995) erkent dat er fracties zijn binnen de dienstenklasse die progressief zijn, 
maar geeft daarvoor als verklaring dat de dienstenklasse nog niet geconsolideerd is. Als de 
dienstenklasse stabiliseert, zullen volgens Goldthorpe (1995) ook deze linkse fracties 
conservatief worden. Hoe zien de ontwikkelingen eruit wat betreft de politieke oriëntatie van 
de leden van de nieuw onderscheiden klassen door de tijd heen? Deze ontwikkelingen vormen 
de kern in hoofdstuk 6. De onderzoeksvraag luidt:  
 
8. In hoeverre zijn de ‘nieuwe’ sociale klassen (de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele 
specialisten) door de tijd heen effectiever geworden om de verschillen in politieke oriëntatie 
te verklaren?  
 
Onze verwachting was dat de politieke oriëntatie van de leden van de ‘nieuwe’ sociale klassen 
over de tijd heen meer vorm, inhoud en richting zou krijgen. Deze verwachting komt voort uit 
het idee dat de leden van een nieuwe klasse tijd nodig hebben om hun klassenbelangen te 
organiseren. Om deze hypothese te toetsen, hebben we Nederlandse geanalyseerd die tussen 
1970 en 2003 zijn verzameld en Britse data die tussen 1964 en 2001 zijn verzameld. Zowel de 
Britse als de Nederlandse data laten zien dat de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele 
specialisten sterker geneigd zijn om op linkse partijen te stemmen dan de hogere en lagere 
technocraten, zelfs wanneer we rekening houden met de sector waarin men werkt, het 
opleidingsniveau, geslacht en leeftijd.  
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 Nadat we hebben gecontroleerd op de sector waarin men werkt, het opleidingsniveau, 
geslacht en leeftijd, blijkt dat de kans dat de lagere sociale en culturele specialisten op een 
linkse partij stemmen significant groter is geworden tussen 1970 en 2003 in Nederland. Deze 
klasse is de meest linkse klasse geworden in 2003. In Engeland is de kans dat de hogere 
sociale en culturele specialisten op een linkse partij stemmen significant groter geworden 
tussen 1964 en 2001, ook na controle op de genoemde achtergrondfactoren. In beide landen 
zijn de leden van de andere klassen door de tijd heen niet veranderd in hun politieke oriëntatie 
na die te hebben gecontroleerd op de achtergrondfactoren. 
 Voor Nederland maakten we ook onderscheid in oud en nieuw linkse partijen. Dit 
onderscheid is helaas niet te maken in Engeland omdat onze enquêtes heel weinig 
respondenten bevatten die zich identificeren met de nieuw linkse partijen. In Nederland zijn 
de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten (de ‘nieuwe’ klassen) significant meer 
geneigd om zich te identificeren met nieuw linkse en oud linkse partijen dan de hogere 
technocraten. Na te hebben gecontroleerd op de bovengenoemde achtergrondkenmerken zijn 
de kansen van de lagere sociale en culturele specialisten en de lagere technocraten om op een 
oud linkse partij te stemmen significant toegenomen tussen 1970 en 2003. De kans van louter 
de lagere sociale en culturele specialisten om op een nieuw linkse partij te stemmen, is 
significant groter geworden tussen 1970 en 2003 nadat we hebben gecontroleerd op de sector 
waarin men werkt, het opleidingsniveau, geslacht en leeftijd.  
 Het antwoord op onderzoeksvraag 8 luidt: In Nederland is de ‘nieuwe’ klasse van de 
lagere sociale en culturele specialisten door de tijd heen duidelijk effectiever groepsmodel 
geworden om de verschillen in politieke oriëntatie te verklaren, in tegenstelling tot de 
‘nieuwe’ klasse van de hogere sociale en culturele specialisten. In Engeland is de 
voorspellende kracht in de ‘nieuwe’ klasse van de hogere sociale en culturele specialisten 
door de tijd heen aanzienlijk gestegen om de verschillen in politieke oriëntatie te verklaren, 
maar dat geldt niet voor deze voorspellende kracht in de loop der tijd bij in de ‘nieuwe’ 
klasse van de lagere sociale en culturele specialisten. 
 
Tegenstrijdige bevindingen 
De bevindingen in onze studie ondersteunden al onze verwachtingen behalve de hypothesen 
over de inter- en intragenerationele klassenformatieproces van de ‘nieuwe’ klassen. Volgens 
de theorie over de formatie van een ‘demographic identity’ hebben de nieuwe klassen tijd 
nodig om hun intra- en intergenerationele mobiliteitspatronen uit te laten kristalliseren. 
Daarom verwachten we dat de leden van de ‘nieuwe’ klassen door de tijd heen vaker hun 
vaders klassenpositie zouden overerven. Echter, onze bevindingen laten het tegendeel zien: de 
intergenerationele klassenreproductie van de hogere en lagere sociale en culturele specialisten 
neemt juist af door de tijd heen. Volgens Ganzeboom en Luijkx (2004) is in Nederland sprake 
van een afname van de associatie in sociale mobiliteit tussen de klasse van vader en zoon. Die 
uitkomst bepaalt dan ook de interpretatie van onze bevindingen. Meer onderzoek is nodig om 
de relatie tussen klassenformatie en social fluidity te achterhalen.  
 Wat betreft de intragenerationele klassenformatieproces was onze verwachting dat de 
‘nieuwe’ klassen van zowel de hogere als de lagere sociale en culturele specialisten door de 
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tijd heen minder mobiel worden. Onze bevindingen tonen aan dat de lagere sociale en 
culturele specialisten door de tijd heen (gemeten aan geboortecohorten tussen 1887 en 1963) 
inderdaad significant meer immobiel zijn geworden in Nederland, waarmee onze hypothese 
wordt ondersteund. De klasse van de hogere sociale en culturele specialisten laat over 
cohorten gemeten echter geen stijgende trend naar meer immobiliteit zien. We moeten echter 
wel opmerken dat de hogere sociale en culturele specialisten de meest gesloten sociale klassen 
zijn. Daarom zou men niet kunnen verwachten dat zij minder mobiel worden door de tijd 
heen. 
 
Deze studie heeft overtuigend laten zien dat er twee ‘nieuwe’ sociale klassen van de hogere en 
lagere sociale en culturele specialisten en twee ‘oude’ klassen van de hogere en lagere 
technocraten te onderscheiden zijn in de sociale middenklasse. Deze sociale klassen 
onderscheiden zich in hun intra- en intergenerationele mobiliteit, sociaal-politieke en 
economische preferenties. Wij adviseren de wetenschapper om het aangepaste EGP 
klassenschema te gebruiken in hun onderzoek. Zij kunnen de schakelschema’s van de 
standaard beroeps codes CBS 84, ISCO 68 en ISCO 88 naar het aangepaste EGP 
klassenschema downloaden van de website www.ayseguveli.nl.  
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